

# TAJIKISTAN



## CLEARING THE MINES 2021

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2025  
NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

### KEY DATA

ANTI-PERSONNEL (AP)  
MINE CONTAMINATION: MEDIUM

NATIONAL AUTHORITY ESTIMATE

**11.8** km<sup>2</sup>

AP MINE  
CLEARANCE IN 2020


**0.67** km<sup>2</sup>

AP MINES  
DESTROYED IN 2020

**5,336**

(INCLUDING 3 DESTROYED IN  
SPOT TASKS)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUT



CURRENT LIKELIHOOD OF MEETING 2025 CLEARANCE TARGET (as per the Oslo Action Plan commitment): **LOW**

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

The Ministry of Defence's Humanitarian Demining Company expanded capacity in 2020, adding two demining teams to the five multi-task teams already operating as well as two more survey teams. Tajikistan released almost 1.7km<sup>2</sup> through survey and clearance in 2020, almost the same level as the previous year. The Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre (TNMAC) also recruited an information management specialist to develop and manage the national Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core database.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Tajikistan should explore all possible avenues of increasing national capacity to the levels needed to fulfil its Article 5 extension request commitments, including training and deploying Border Guard forces on the Afghan border as deminers.
- TNMAC should set up a Survey Working Group to expedite planning and prioritisation of accelerated survey to reach a clear national baseline estimate of contamination, as outlined in information supporting Tajikistan's last Article 5 deadline extension request.
- Tajikistan should clarify its resource mobilisation strategy and report on the progress of consultations with key national and international stakeholders.
- TNMAC should develop plans for establishing sustainable demining capacity to tackle residual risk identified after completion.

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2020)	Score (2019)	Performance Commentary
<b>UNDERSTANDING OF CONTAMINATION</b> (20% of overall score)	5	5	Tajikistan lacks a clear baseline estimate of contamination, with 20 areas previously recorded as mined that had yet to be surveyed, some of them including several minefields, and another three SHAs; in addition to some re-survey planned to define the extent of other mined areas more accurately. Lack of access has also prevented an accurate determination of contamination on the disputed Tajik-Uzbek border.
<b>NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT</b> (10% of overall score)	7	7	Tajikistan has strong national ownership of mine action, which is led by TNMAC and implemented primarily by Ministry of Defence clearance teams. It has political will and provides an enabling environment for Article 5 implementation but is heavily reliant on increased funding from international donors. This may present challenges to achievement of its extension request targets.
<b>GENDER AND DIVERSITY</b> (10% of overall score)	7	7	Tajikistan's mine action programme has a gender strategy drawn up with support from the Geneva Mine Action Programme (GMAP), but few women are employed in mine action. TNMAC says the government is committed to increasing involvement of women in mine action but there is little evidence that the number of female staff is rising. Mine action data are disaggregated by sex and age, and women and children are said to be consulted during community liaison.
<b>INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING</b> (10% of overall score)	6	6	TNMAC upgraded its information management by installing IMSMA Core in 2019 and has continued efforts to streamline and improve the accuracy of data by modifying reporting forms. TNMAC recruited an information management specialist to maintain and develop the database, filling a gap left by the closure of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) support programme in 2019.
<b>PLANNING AND TASKING</b> (10% of overall score)	6	7	Tajikistan's Article 5 deadline extension request sets out a framework for mine action, including annual targets, but these far exceed past results and require a doubling of capacity. This is dependent on availability of donor funding, which appears unlikely, particularly since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. TNMAC has yet to draw up plans for clearance of residual contamination found after completion.
<b>LAND RELEASE SYSTEM</b> (20% of overall score)	6	6	Tajikistan has national mine action standards that were revised in 2017 and are compliant with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). They are available in Russian and English. TNMAC reports it has also issued guidelines on land release, including a manual on testing and evaluating mechanical assets.
<b>LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE</b> (20% of overall score)	7	7	Land released in 2020 sustained the progress in 2019 but Tajikistan will need to accelerate clearance or it will not meet its 2025 completion deadline. In 2020, the Ministry of Defence's Humanitarian Demining Company expanded capacity, adding two demining teams to the five multi-task teams already operating as well as two more survey teams.
<b>Average Score</b>	<b>6.2</b>	<b>6.3</b>	<b>Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE</b>

## DEMINING CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Commission for the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law (CIHHL)
- Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre (TNMAC)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Ministry of Defence (MoD), Humanitarian Demining Company (HDC)
- Union of Sappers Tajikistan (UST)
- Border Guards
- Committee of Emergency Situations and Civil Defence (CoES)
- National Guard

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)

### OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

## UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Tajikistan had an estimated 11.8km<sup>2</sup> of anti-personnel mine contamination at the end of 2020, consisting of 145 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) covering 7km<sup>2</sup> and 84 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) affecting 4.8km<sup>2</sup> (see Table 1). Tajikistan reported releasing more than 1km<sup>2</sup> of mined area in 2020 but also added additional contamination to the database. As a result, the total is almost unchanged from a year earlier, when Tajikistan recorded contamination of just under 12km<sup>2</sup>, though regional contamination estimates have shifted.<sup>1</sup>

More than 70% of the confirmed mined area is in the Khatlon region, which includes Shamsiddin Shohin, the most heavily mined district in the country. Survey and clearance operations in the region reduced the estimate of its contamination there by 0.9km<sup>2</sup> in 2020. Survey in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region's Darvoz district, which borders Afghanistan, added two SHAs covering a total of 0.6km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>2</sup>

Tajikistan still lacks a clear baseline estimate of its mined areas. By early 2021, Tajikistan still had 20 areas previously recorded as mined that had yet to be surveyed, some of them including several minefields, and another three SHAs. Two are in the Central Region while the remainder are in districts on the Afghan border, roughly estimated to affect 1.5km<sup>2</sup>. In addition, two-thirds of Tajikistan's SHAs totalling 3.25km<sup>2</sup> are on the border with Uzbekistan, parts of which have still to be demarcated and have yet to be surveyed for contamination.<sup>3</sup>

**Table 1: Anti-personnel mined area by province (at end 2020)<sup>4</sup>**

Province	District	CHA		SHA		Total area (m <sup>2</sup> )
		No.	Area (m <sup>2</sup> )	No.	Area (m <sup>2</sup> )	
Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region	Darvoz	14	957,410	5	928,852	1,886,262
	Vanj	6	908,119	0	0	908,119
	Shugnan	3	56,000	0	0	56,000
	Ishkoshi	0	0	1	5,000	5,000
<b>Subtotals</b>		<b>23</b>	<b>1,921,529</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>933,852</b>	<b>2,855,381</b>
Khatlon	Farkhor	6	96,800	1	8,000	104,800
	Hamadoni	3	80,772	6	177,000	257,772
	Panj	21	1,400,072	3	23,000	1,423,072
	Jayhun	8	135,636	11	307,000	442,636
	Shamsiddin Shohin	80	3,221,110	0	0	3,221,110
	Kabodiyon	1	5,184	0	0	5,184
	Shahrirus	1	30,000	0	0	30,000
	Khovaling	1	80,000	1	30,000	110,000
<b>Subtotals</b>		<b>121</b>	<b>5,049,574</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>545,000</b>	<b>5,594,574</b>
Sughd Region (Uzbek border)	Asht	0	0	11	610,000	610,000
	Ayni	0	0	5	535,000	535,000
	Isfara	0	0	20	1,105,000	1 105,000
	Konibodom	0	0	3	165,000	165,000
	Panjakent	0	0	13	715,000	715,000
	Shahrison	0	0	2	120,000	120,000
<b>Subtotals</b>		<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>3,250,000</b>	<b>3,250,000</b>
Central Region	Sangvor	1	50,000	2	50,000	100,000
<b>Subtotals</b>		<b>1</b>	<b>50,000</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>50,000</b>	<b>100,000</b>
<b>Totals</b>		<b>145</b>	<b>7,021,103</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>4,778,852</b>	<b>11,799,955</b>

Mine contamination in Tajikistan dates from conflicts in the 1990s. Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan was mined by Russian forces in 1992–98; the border with Uzbekistan was mined by Uzbek forces in 1999–2001; and the Central Region of Tajikistan was contaminated as a result of the 1992–97 civil war.<sup>5</sup>

A national survey in 2003–05 by the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) estimated that mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination extended over 50km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>6</sup> Tajikistan later concluded the results were unreliable due to lack of

experience among the initial survey teams, as well as the absence of minefield records and other important information and poor equipment. As a result, the size of SHAs were miscalculated and their descriptions not clearly recorded.<sup>7</sup> Tajikistan said its minefield maps/records were mostly of good quality but did not accurately capture the location of some mined areas, for example in locations where mines were scattered from helicopters, and as a result needed to be verified and validated through new survey and data analysis.<sup>8</sup>

In Khatlon region, mines were laid in and around military positions on hilltops overlooking the Panj river valley, mostly delivered remotely by helicopter or laid by troops who were moved in and out by helicopter as there are no established roads or tracks to access the minefields for survey or clearance.<sup>9</sup> Information about mined areas on the Tajik-Uzbek border is limited and based on the later non-technical survey conducted in 2011–15 by FSD and a needs assessment survey by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 2013–15. However, the FSD survey only covered one part of the border, Sughd province, and although survey teams recorded 82 accidents they did not have access to the border and relied mainly on incident forms. As a result, records lack detail on the exact location where mine incidents occurred.<sup>10</sup>

Tajikistan and Uzbekistan settled most of their 1,283km-long border dispute following the collapse of the Soviet Union but certain areas have not yet been delineated and the exact location of mined areas is still not known. Most mined areas are thought to be in disputed sections of the Tajik-Uzbek

border which have not been accessible and assessed.<sup>11</sup> Although most of the mines are believed to be on Uzbek territory,<sup>12</sup> there is a possibility that some mines may have been displaced downhill into Tajikistan due to landslides or flooding.<sup>13</sup> The 3.25km<sup>2</sup> of SHA on the border with Uzbekistan is a rough estimate and the actual extent of any anti-personnel mined area on Tajik territory along this border will only be more accurately established once both countries permit survey and have delimited the border. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan agreed in 2018 to set up a joint commission to investigate mined areas along the border but by mid-2021 there was no report that it had been set up.<sup>14</sup>

There are also mined areas on two islands in the Panj river on the Tajik-Afghan border, one of which is 538,500m<sup>2</sup> in size and the other 30,000m<sup>2</sup>, which are said to be “non-executable” at the present time. The islands were created by a change in the flow of the river, and it is possible that the river may again change its path and re-connect the islands with the Tajik river bank in the future.<sup>15</sup>

Tajikistan acknowledges the urgency and importance of establishing a clear baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination as soon as possible, and in August 2019 TNMAC announced that a survey working group would be established with expert representatives from all key stakeholders and implementing partners to help plan and prioritise survey tasks.<sup>16</sup> As of June 2021, however, the working group had not been established.<sup>17</sup>

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The Commission for the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law (CIIHL), chaired by the first deputy of the Prime Minister, and containing key representatives from relevant line ministries and TNMAC, oversees the humanitarian sector and acts as Tajikistan’s national mine action authority, responsible for mainstreaming mine action in the government’s socio-economic development policies.<sup>18</sup>

TNMAC is the executive arm of CIIHL and the body coordinating mine action, responsible for issuing task orders, information management and quality assurance/quality control.<sup>19</sup> It was set up by government decree in January 2014, replacing the Tajikistan Mine Action Centre and taking over the process of managing transition to a fully nationally-owned programme.<sup>20</sup> In 2016, Tajikistan’s Parliament adopted a Law on Humanitarian Mine Action, which covers all aspects of mine action, and in 2017 it approved a national mine action strategy for 2017–20.<sup>21</sup>

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) plays a major role in Tajikistan’s mine action sector, in particular by providing

personnel that comprise Tajikistan’s main demining capacity.<sup>22</sup> The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Programme Office in Dushanbe (OSCE POiD) has supported the MoD to update its multiyear plan, entitled “Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Tajikistan Co-operation Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2023.”<sup>23</sup>

A technical working group chaired by TNMAC and meeting monthly coordinates mine action stakeholders.<sup>24</sup> Tajikistan informed the States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) in 2019 that it planned to establish a management working group involving key stakeholders to develop a working plan for implementation of its Article 5 extension request as well as a survey technical working group to promote survey planning and prioritisation.<sup>25</sup> As at mid 2021, neither group had yet met. TNMAC reported it had delivered a “General Land Release Operation Plan 2021–2025” to the Article 5 Committee.<sup>26</sup>

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

TNMAC adopted a gender programme in October 2018 that was prepared by the Geneva Mine Action Programme (GMAP, now a programme of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, GICHD) and is committed to improving the situation of women in the mine action sector.<sup>27</sup> A United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) evaluation in 2019 concluded TNMAC had made progress

mainstreaming gender and diversity in mine action but the strategy had not yet been systematically implemented, a state of affairs that appears to continue. UNDP said areas for further action included ensuring that training of trainers for MRE was gender balanced, introducing female quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) officers, and developing a code of conduct and complaints mechanisms.<sup>28</sup>

Tajikistan did not address gender and diversity issues in its 2019 Article 5 deadline extension request but in response to APMBC Article 5 committee's requests for more information it acknowledged that it would be a challenge to achieve gender balance in operations because most people serving in the military, which provides most mine action personnel, are predominantly male. At the same time, it noted Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)'s successful employment of female deminers and said the government would address gender issues in Tajikistan's mine action programme.<sup>29</sup> TNMAC said if it is possible to identify key positions that can be filled by female candidates like paramedics and/or QA/QC officers this would be discussed and prioritised.<sup>30</sup>

TNMAC reports it always encourages women to apply for mine action positions and, all other factors being equal, gives preference to the female candidate. The number of women in mine action, though, remains small. TNMAC reported

employing seven women staff in 2020 and did not plan to open additional positions in 2021. None of its female staff worked in operations.<sup>31</sup> TNMAC coordinated with NPA to convene meetings of a gender working group in early 2020 but the meetings lapsed with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.<sup>32</sup>

NPA has a gender and diversity policy integrated into its Tajikistan programme and in 2020 had a total of 18 female employees making up one-fifth of its total staff and 43% of management and support staff. It expected the number of women employees to remain unchanged in 2021. Fifteen of its female staff work in the field, making up 17% of NPA's operations staff, slightly less than the 22% in 2019, but they included 11 female deminers. NPA reported awareness of their work was making it easier to attract female candidates for jobs even though NPA has still to achieve gender balance in its two survey teams.<sup>33</sup>

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## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

TNMAC upgraded its national mine action database to IMSMA Core in 2019, making it easier to input, edit, and retrieve data. TNMAC also introduced new data collection forms intended to simplify data entry and improve data quality.<sup>34</sup> In 2020, it hired an information management specialist to maintain and develop the system, filling a gap left by the closure of UNDP's support programme in 2019 and the resultant loss of trained staff.<sup>35</sup> TNMAC and its implementing partners worked to fine tune the system in 2020 and made a number of adjustments to reporting forms. In 2021, they planned to focus more on analysis of the data in the system.<sup>36</sup>

TNMAC also planned to launch a performance monitoring tool in the course of 2021, which it hoped would help to make planning more efficient and effective while also helping to facilitate resource mobilisation.<sup>37</sup>

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## PLANNING AND TASKING

Tajikistan laid out a framework for mine action in the Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in March 2019, which said land release efforts would focus mainly on the Central region and the border with Afghanistan, especially the Shamsiddin Shohin district as the area most contaminated with anti-personnel mines.<sup>38</sup> It aimed to complete work on the Central region and complete survey of the Tajik-Afghan border by 2023. No timeline is set for survey or clearance on the Tajik-Uzbek border. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan agreed in 2018 to set up a joint commission to arrange survey and clearance of border areas. Tajikistan said it would keep States Parties to the APMBC informed of developments but has yet to report follow-up action.<sup>39</sup>

The request identifies areas of agricultural and tourist importance as the main priorities. It called for annual release of approximately 1.3km<sup>2</sup>. Annual targets set out in the request were revised in the "General Land Release Operation Plan 2021-2025" issued in January 2021 which provides for release of 1.71km<sup>2</sup> in 2021, 1.69km<sup>2</sup> in 2022, 1.64km<sup>2</sup> in 2023, 1.73km<sup>2</sup> in 2024, and 1.78km<sup>2</sup> in 2025.<sup>40</sup> The annual land release targets total 8.55km<sup>2</sup> which, even if met, will not address all of the existing contamination recorded by TNMAC by the end of 2025.

TNMAC tasks operators according to a set of priorities agreed with government that include humanitarian impact, the proximity of hazards to settlements, national development priorities and the seasonal constraints on access to mined areas in mountainous terrain.<sup>41</sup>

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## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Tajikistan's revised National Mine Action Standards (TNMAS) were approved by decree on 1 April 2017 and are available in Russian and English.<sup>42</sup> The standards were developed as general guidelines allowing implementing partners scope to develop their own standing operating procedures (SOPs).<sup>43</sup> TNMAC says it regularly updates and amend standards to address particular challenges.

TNMAC introduced a new approach to survey in 2017 known as "non-technical survey with technical intervention". In addition to standard non-technical survey, survey teams use technical assets to confirm the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) and identify their location avoiding poorly defined and inflated polygons.<sup>44</sup> This approach is particularly useful dealing with minefield records that are incomplete or inconsistent due to incorrect coordinates and grid numbering or lack of

landmarks/reference points, or when there are often few local people to ask about evidence of mines or accidents as people have moved away. In addition, mines are sometimes displaced due to landslides, rock falls, or flooding.<sup>45</sup>

TNMAC reports it has supplemented NMAS by issuing additional guidelines in 2020 including a manual on "Testing and Evaluation of Mechanical assets in the Accreditation Process". TNMAC said it had also set up a site for testing mechanical assets in Khatlon region's Pyani district, which was operational in May 2020.<sup>46</sup>

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Tajikistan's 2019 Article 5 deadline extension request set an ambitious target of doubling the number of deminers from 90 to 180 and in 2020 it took initial steps in that direction while also raising survey and mechanical capacity.

The MoD HDC, which provides Tajikistan's main mine action capacity, started 2020 with five multi-task teams and fifty deminers. They included three teams financed by the OSCE and two by the United States.<sup>47</sup> By the end of 2020 it had six manual demining teams with a total of 107 personnel, including four teams with 65 HDC personnel, one team from the Committee for Emergency Situations (23 staff) and one team from the Border Guard (19 staff).<sup>48</sup> TNMAC had discussed standing up five more teams and previously reported the government had agreed to pay their salaries but it has since stated it will only be able to establish the other demining teams when it receives further donor support.<sup>49</sup>

NPA provided the other main demining capacity, operating five manual clearance teams with forty-one deminers and two teams conducting non-technical survey. NPA employs mainly civilian staff but also has 13 Border Guard Force personnel seconded through TNMAC conducting land release

operations. It expected to keep the same number of staff in 2021. NPA reactivated a Mini MineWolf in 2020, which is being used to support clearance by both MoD and NPA and it planned to bring into service an MV-4 flail for use in areas inaccessible to the larger MineWolf.<sup>50</sup> TNMAC said mechanical assets were used to prepare a total of 135,520m<sup>2</sup> for manual clearance in 2020.<sup>51</sup>

UST, a national not-for-profit organisation, provides additional capacity with potential for development. UST started 2020 with two teams accredited only for non-technical and technical survey and victim assistance and added two more NTS/TS teams with a total of 14 personnel. In 2021, UST continued to operate with four teams but added seven more staff. TNMAC planned to accredit UST for clearance in the course of 2021.<sup>52</sup> Tajikistan has not spelled out plans for UST but has acknowledged advantages in using civilian deminers, since they require less time overall in training and building up experience compared with military conscripts who rotate annually, necessitating training for each new intake.<sup>53</sup>

## DEMINER SAFETY

Two MoD HDC deminers were injured in 2020 by an anti-personnel mine detonation in the course of clearance operations. TNMAC identified the mine that exploded as a Russian-made POM-2 but provided no other details.<sup>54</sup>

# LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2020

TNMAC reported land release through survey and clearance totalling 1,722,688m<sup>2</sup> in 2020, representing a small increase (3%) over the previous year.<sup>55</sup> Revised figures for area reduced through technical survey raised the total to 1,748,179m<sup>2</sup>. Land release was heavily concentrated in two districts on the Tajik-Afghan border, Shamsiddin Shohin and Panj, which together accounted for just under 80% of the total.<sup>56</sup>

## SURVEY IN 2020

Tajikistan's Article 5 deadline extension request noted that the progress of survey was slowing because survey teams have already tackled areas that are most accessible to the local population and were increasingly left with hazardous areas in remote and rugged terrain.<sup>57</sup> Results in 2020, however, were almost the same as the previous year. TNMAC reported a total of 1,080,892m<sup>2</sup> through survey in 2020, a little less than the 1,138,210m<sup>2</sup> released in 2019.<sup>58</sup>

The 0.4km<sup>2</sup> cancelled by non-technical survey (see Table 2) was roughly half the area cancelled in 2019 and 60% of it was accounted for by the Ministry of Defence's Humanitarian Demining Companies.

**Table 2: Cancellation through non-technical survey in 2020<sup>59</sup>**

District	Operator	Area cancelled (m <sup>2</sup> )
Panj	NPA	90,000
Sh. Shohin	UST	45,000
Darvoz	UST	16,100
Sh. Shohin	MoD	271,158
<b>Total</b>		<b>422,258</b>

The amount of land reduced through technical survey in 2020 (see Table 3) was more than double the 2019 figure, with NPA accounting for 330,724m<sup>2</sup> or 50% of the total.<sup>60</sup>

Of these remaining tasks, survey teams have been prioritising the easiest to access, as the easier a task is to access, the more likely it is that local people will try and use the land. The effect of this is that, year-on-year, tasks get harder to access, which slows down progress towards completing non-technical survey in Tajikistan.<sup>61</sup>

**Table 3: Reduction through technical survey in 2020<sup>62</sup>**

District	Operator	Area reduced (m <sup>2</sup> )
Panj	UST	9,630
Sh. Shohin	UST	48,579
Darvoz	UST	103,304
Darvoz	NPA	134,534
Sh. Shohin	NPA	36,858
Panj	NPA	121,976
Khovaling	NPA	37,356
Sh. Shohin	MoD	87,569
Panj	MoD	78,828
<b>Total</b>		<b>658,634</b>

## CLEARANCE IN 2020

Tajikistan cleared 0.67km<sup>2</sup> in 2020, 70% released by MoD HDC teams working in Panj and Shamsiddin Shohin (see Table 4). TNMAC reported operations resulted in destruction of 5,333 anti-personnel mines. A further three anti-personnel mines and 14 anti-vehicle mines were destroyed in EOD spot tasks.<sup>63</sup> UST was not accredited for clearance in 2020 and the 22,715m<sup>2</sup> of clearance attributed to UST are thought to represent technical survey.

**Table 4: Mine clearance in 2020 by operator<sup>64</sup>**

Operator	District	Area cleared (m <sup>2</sup> )	AP mines destroyed	UXO destroyed
NPA	Darvos	71,560	18	196
	Panj	69,691	306	0
	Sh. Shohin	30,511	248	7
	Khovaling	9,247	1	0
MoD HDC	Panj	205,377	1,110	13
	Sh. Shohin	258,186	3,650	53
UST	Darvoz	15,924	0	0
	Panj	2,370	0	0
	Sh. Shohin	4,421	0	0
<b>Totals</b>		<b>667,287</b>	<b>5,333</b>	<b>269</b>

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE





Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the latest extension granted by States Parties in 2019), Tajikistan is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2025.

An immediate challenge to achieving Tajikistan's extension request targets is lack of capacity. The request called for the mine action programme to double the number of deminers from 90 in 2019 to 180. By the end of 2020, MoD HDC and NPA together mustered 117 deminers. TNMAC has expanded the role of Border Guard Forces, which used to support demining teams by providing security to operators working on the Tajik-Afghan border and since 2019 it has involved them in survey and clearance. It also mobilised one demining team from the CoES. But Tajikistan is looking to international donors to cover the non-salary costs and it was unclear what additional capacity could be mobilised for clearance and in what period of time.<sup>65</sup>

Tajikistan said it needed \$3 million a year to maintain the capacity it had at the start of the extension period but estimated it needed US\$33 million for costs of manual clearance alone to meet its extended Article 5 deadline.<sup>66</sup> TNMAC has received support from Norway and the OSCE<sup>67</sup> but funding has been heavily dependant on the US Department of State and TNMAC has acknowledged it will need to attract other donors.<sup>68</sup> Tajikistan conducted a workshop with other major international donors in June 2019

in an effort to diversify its sources of support but by the end of the year had not received any additional funding.<sup>69</sup>

Tajikistan also does not yet know the full extent of the contamination it needs to address. The extension request clearance targets do not cover 31 minefields that are due to be surveyed by 2023, some of them located in remote, mountainous areas where conditions only permit 40 operational days a year. It also does not cover mined areas on the Uzbek border. The existing estimate of SHAs covering 3.25km<sup>2</sup> is based on only partial access. Further survey and clearance are subject to agreement with Uzbekistan.<sup>70</sup> Insecurity on the border with Afghanistan has previously prevented access to some of Tajikistan's most heavily mined districts and adds a further element of uncertainty to the outlook for implementation.<sup>71</sup>

**Table 5: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance**

Year	Area cleared (km <sup>2</sup> )
2020	0.67
2019	0.54
2018	0.59
2017	0.62
2016	0.50
<b>Total</b>	<b>2.92</b>

## PLANNING FOR RESIDUAL RISK AFTER COMPLETION

Tajikistan has yet to develop plans for tackling residual contamination. Tajikistan said in 2019 that it recognised the importance of the issue and had held preliminary discussions with the GICHD. It planned to hold a workshop with the GICHD to develop detailed plans and said it would incorporate them into its mine action strategy for 2021–25 but has not reported further developments.<sup>72</sup> The OSCE, in coordination with TNMAC and the GICHD, drafted terms of reference for the position of Residual Risk Manager in 2020 but TNMAC reportedly did not find a suitable candidate for the post and was continuing the search in 2021.<sup>73</sup>

- 1 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, TNMAC, 22 April and 17 August 2021; Article 7 Report (covering 2020), Form D.
- 2 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 22 April and 12 August 2021.
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 Ibid; and Article 7 Report (covering 2020), Form D.
- 5 Tajikistan Mine Action Centre (TMAC), "Scope of the Problem", accessed 29 July 2019 at: <http://bit.ly/2ZhlFpN>.
- 6 R. Roberts, "Evaluation of United Nations Development Programme Support to the Tajikistan Mine Action Programme", January 2012, p. 11, at: <http://bit.ly/20qRe0B>.
- 7 2009 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 1.
- 8 Ibid., p. 34.
- 9 Interview with Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda and Murtazo Gurezov, TNMAC, Dushanbe, 25 May 2018; and Statement of Tajikistan, APMBC 16th Meeting of States Parties, Vienna, 20 December 2017.
- 10 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 33; interview with Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda and Murtazo Gurezov, TNMAC, Dushanbe, 25 May 2018; and Statement of Tajikistan, APMBC 16th Meeting of States Parties, Vienna, 20 December 2017.
- 11 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 27 April 2018.
- 12 Statement of Tajikistan, APMBC 16th Meeting of States Parties, Vienna, 20 December 2017.
- 13 "National Strategy of the Republic of Tajikistan on Humanitarian Mine Action for 2017–2020", 25 February 2017.
- 14 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 16.
- 15 Interview with Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda and Murtazo Gurezov, TNMAC, Dushanbe, 25 May 2018.
- 16 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information received 3 August 2019.
- 17 Email from Melissa Andersson, Country Director, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), 1 June 2020.
- 18 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 20; and 2009 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 1.
- 19 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 20–21.
- 20 2009 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 1; and TMAC, "About TMAC", 2012, accessed 10 March 2014 at: <http://bit.ly/2LvPub1>.
- 21 Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 18 October 2016; and 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 20–21.
- 22 MoD, "Strategic Plan on Humanitarian Demining 2013–2016", Dushanbe, 17 July 2013; and Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Luka Buhin, Mine Action Office, OSCE Office in Tajikistan, 8 April 2014.
- 23 Email from Luka Buhin, OSCE Tajikistan, 9 October 2017.
- 24 Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 8 August 2021.
- 25 Additional information provided for Tajikistan's Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 3 August 2019, pp. 3,7.
- 26 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 12 August 2021.
- 27 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 14 June 2019.
- 28 R. Roberts, "Final Evaluation of Support to the Tajikistan Mine Action Programme", UNDP, 30 December 2019, pp. 17–18.



- 29 Additional information provided for Tajikistan's Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 3 August 2019, p. 6.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 22 April 2021.
- 32 Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 21 April 2021.
- 33 Emails from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 11 April 2019, 29 April 2020, and 21 April 2021.
- 34 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 28 May 2020.
- 35 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 22 April 2021; R. Roberts, "Final Evaluation of Support to the Tajikistan Mine Action Programme", UNDP, 30 December 2019, p. 15.
- 36 Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 21 April 2021.
- 37 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 22 April 2021.
- 38 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 34, 42.
- 39 Ibid., p. 44.
- 40 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 12 August 2021.
- 41 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 27 April 2018 and 22 April 2021; and Melissa Andersson, NPA, 5 April 2018.
- 42 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2019, p. 21.
- 43 Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 29 April 2020.
- 44 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016, 22 May 2017, and 27 April 2018; GICHD, Presentation on "NTS Field Studies: General Findings", 15 February 2018, Geneva; and Article 7 Report (covering 2017), Forms A and D.
- 45 "Non-technical survey/technical intervention", Presentation by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, at the 21st International Meeting of National Mine Action Programme Directors and United Nations Advisers, Geneva, 13–16 February 2018; and interview with Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, Dushanbe, 25 May 2018.
- 46 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 22 April 2021.
- 47 The OSCE reported providing €250,000 to support three teams in 2020 and 2021. Email from Johan Dahl, Head of Arms Control and Mine Action, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, 9 April 2021.
- 48 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 12 August 2021.
- 49 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 22 April 2021; 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 45.
- 50 Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 21 April 2021.
- 51 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 22 April 2021.
- 52 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 22 April and 12 August 2021.
- 53 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 36.
- 54 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 22 April 2021.
- 55 Article 7 Report (covering 2020), Form D.
- 56 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 22 April 2021.
- 57 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 47.
- 58 Article 7 Report (covering 2020), Form D.
- 59 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 22 April 2021.
- 60 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 12 August 2021; and Melissa Andersson, NPA, 21 April 2021.
- 61 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 47.
- 62 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 12 August 2021.
- 63 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 22 April 2021; Article 7 Report (covering 2020), Form D, recorded destruction of 5,103 anti-personnel mines.
- 64 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 22 April 2021.
- 65 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 22; emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 22 April and 12 August 2021.
- 66 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 52; Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form D.
- 67 In addition to funding provided to TNMAC to support three MoD HDC teams, OSCE expected to provide €300,000 a year in bilateral funds for training until 2023. Email from Johan Dahl, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, 9 April 2021.
- 68 Additional information provided for Tajikistan's Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 3 August 2019, p. 7.
- 69 R. Roberts, "Final Evaluation of Support to the Tajikistan Mine Action Programme", UNDP, 30 December 2019, p. 19.
- 70 Presentation by Tajikistan on Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Geneva, 23 May 2019.
- 71 Ibid.
- 72 Additional information provided for Tajikistan's Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 3 August 2019, p. 8.
- 73 Email from Johan Dahl, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, 9 April 2021.