

### KEY DATA

#### APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2025

Not on track to meet deadline  
Seven-year extension requested, but Tajikistan was only granted a one-year extension to 31 December 2026 due to late submission of its Article 5 deadline extension request.

#### AP MINE CONTAMINATION:

**6KM<sup>2</sup>**  
Medium  
(Mine Action Review estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2024 (km <sup>2</sup> )	Release in 2023 (km <sup>2</sup> )
Clearance	0.42	0.41
Technical Survey	0.64	0.40
Non-Technical Survey	0.64	0.45
<b>Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks</b>	<b>2024</b>	<b>2023</b>
AP Mines destroyed	2,795 (incl. 18 during spot tasks)	1,127 (incl. 18 during spot tasks)

#### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Ministry of Defence Humanitarian Demining Company (MoD HDC)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD)
- Union of Sappers Tajikistan (UST)

### KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Tajikistan will not meet its current Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 clearance deadline and in October 2025, at a very late stage, it requested a further seven-year extension to 2032. Tajikistan informally presented its request at the Intersessional Meetings in June 2025 and formally submitted the request only in mid-October 2025. There was progress in border relations with Uzbekistan and discussions on border delineation, a necessary step towards securing access to all areas still requiring survey, with protocols on the issue signed by both States first in May and then in August 2024. In March 2025, a trilateral agreement, dubbed the Khujand Declaration, was also signed between Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, demarcating the tri-state border.

Tajikistan had planned to complete all necessary survey in order to establish a baseline of contamination by the end of 2025, having previously committed to doing so by end of 2023. However, Tajikistan now plans to complete survey/re-survey of 44 CHAs in the Central Region and the Tajik-Afghan border region by the end of 2027. Previously unrecorded areas of contamination continued to be found. Overall land release in Tajikistan increased slightly in 2024 compared to 2023, but clearance remained almost the same.

### RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- The Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre (TNMAC) should continue to prioritise accelerated survey to reach a clear national baseline estimate of mined area.
- Tajikistan should explore all possible ways to increase national demining capacity to the levels needed to fulfil its Article 5 commitments as soon as possible, and within its proposed seven-year extension period.
- Tajikistan should continue working with key stakeholders to address shortfalls in funding.

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2024)	Score (2023)	Performance Commentary
<b>UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION</b> (20% of overall score)	6	5	Tajikistan has comprehensive information on all remaining known mined areas and has completed survey of all mined areas from its 2018 extension request. However, it still lacks a comprehensive baseline of contamination and new AP mined areas continue to be added to the database. It plans to complete survey/re-survey of the 44 CHAs in the Central Region and in the Tajik-Afghan border region by the end of 2027. In 2024, TNMAC conducted an assessment and monitoring on the Tajik-Uzbek border, which resulted in it determining that mined areas are located on the Uzbek side of the border, and removing the 54 SHAs totalling 3.25km <sup>2</sup> from its contamination baseline. A further final assessment of some extremely high and hard-to-reach mountainous areas on the Tajik-Uzbek will be conducted only after the final delimitation and demarcation of the border.
<b>NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT</b> (10% of overall score)	7	7	Tajikistan has strong national ownership of mine action, led by TNMAC. It has political will and provides an enabling environment for Article 5 implementation but is heavily reliant on funding from a limited number of international donors. Tajikistan faced significant shortfalls in the funding required to meet its 2019 extension request targets. It initiated an Individualised Approach to the APMBC Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties (21 MSP) in November 2023, but, as at mid-2025, this had not yielded new donor support.
<b>GENDER AND DIVERSITY</b> (10% of overall score)	6	6	Tajikistan's mine action programme has a gender strategy but few women are employed in mine action and there are none in the Ministry of Defence Humanitarian Demining Company (MoD HDC), the largest operator. A gender and diversity working group reconvened in 2024, having not met since 2022, and a multi-stakeholder training was held. International operators are making efforts to increase female staff.
<b>ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION</b> (10% of overall score)	7	7	Tajikistan has a national mine action standard (NMAS) on environmental management in mine action and environmental assessments are said to be conducted. Operators have measures in place to minimise environmental harm during survey and clearance. A multi-stakeholder working group on climate change and the environment was established and held its first meeting in 2024. Changes to weather patterns negatively impact the nine-month window for demining operations.
<b>INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING</b> (10% of overall score)	7	6	TNMAC uses Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core. TNMAC and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) collaborated in 2024 to strengthen data communication by aligning reporting formats and improving internal data validation. Tajikistan finally submitted its third Article 5 deadline extension request in mid-October 2025, but the request itself was comprehensive.
<b>PLANNING AND TASKING</b> (10% of overall score)	6	6	Tajikistan had to revise its work plan for 2023–2025 having failed to meet its earlier land release targets. It now plans to complete survey/re-survey in the Central Region and in the Tajik-Afghan border region by the end of 2027. Tajikistan has provided updated annual targets, including a comprehensive work plan, in its 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension request to end of 2032. The extension request work also includes three different options, each based on different assumptions.
<b>LAND RELEASE SYSTEM</b> (10% of overall score)	6	6	Tajikistan has NMAS that are compliant with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). The standards are available in Russian and English. Tajikistan last updated the NMAS in 2023, revising the standards on marking, medical support, land release, battle area clearance, safety, and quality management.
<b>LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE</b> (20% of overall score)	7	7	Clearance in 2024, at nearly 0.42km <sup>2</sup> , remained almost the same as in 2023. Overall demining capacity decreased slightly in 2024. It is somewhat unclear if the extended requested deadline of end of 2032 is based on current capacity (151 deminers as at June 2025), or if it contingent of increased capacity of 261, for which funding has yet to be secured. The request assumes no previously unknown mined areas will be discovered. If new contamination is added to the database, which seems likely, Tajikistan foresees it can still meet the deadline if it adopts operational efficiencies in land release activities.
<b>Average Score</b>	<b>6.5</b>	<b>6.2</b>	<b>Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE</b>

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Commission for the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law (CIIHL)
- Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre (TNMAC)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Ministry of Defence Humanitarian Demining Company (MoD HDC)
- Border Guard Forces of Tajikistan\*
- Committee of Emergency Situations and Civil Defence (CoES)\*
- National Guard\*
- Union of Sappers Tajikistan (UST)

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Fondation Suisse de Déminage (FSD)

### OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

\*The National Guard provide staff to form the MoD HDC. Border Guard personnel are also seconded into NPA multi-task teams (MTTs).

## UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

Tajikistan still lacks a clear fully comprehensive baseline estimate of mined areas, though it has now surveyed all hazardous areas planned in its 2018 extension request and planned to survey/resurvey by the end of 2027, the 44 previously unknown confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) (without minefield records) discovered in the Tajik-Afghan border region and in the Central Region.<sup>1</sup> In addition, some extremely high and hard-to-reach mountainous areas on the Tajik-Uzbek, which are not yet delimited or which were inaccessible, will only be assessed and surveyed after the final delimitation and demarcation of the border.<sup>2</sup> In its Article 7 report (covering 2024) and in its reporting to Mine Action Review, Tajikistan reported 6.75km<sup>2</sup> of anti-personnel

(AP) mined area at the end of 2024, consisting of 109 CHAs measuring 6.13km<sup>2</sup> and two suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering an estimated 0.62km<sup>2</sup> (see Table 1).<sup>3</sup> This is down from the 7.54km<sup>2</sup> across 125 CHAs and 9 SHAs a year earlier.<sup>4</sup> Tajikistan's 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request included detailed information on the remaining CHAs in each province, but did not include the 0.61km<sup>2</sup> of SHA from its Article 7 report.<sup>5</sup> The reason for this is not known.

Of the total 6,132,708m<sup>2</sup> of CHA detailed in Table 1, 100 CHAs measuring 5,082,228m<sup>2</sup> are in the Tajik-Afghan border region and 9 CHAs measuring 1,050,480m<sup>2</sup> are in the Central Region.<sup>6</sup>

**Table 1: AP mined area by district (at end 2024), excluding the Tajik-Uzbek border<sup>7</sup>**

Region	District	CHAs		SHAs		Total area (m <sup>2</sup> )	
		No.	Area (m <sup>2</sup> )	No.	Area (m <sup>2</sup> )		
Region of Republican Subordination (DRS)	Sangvor	2	150,000	0	0	150,000	
<b>Subtotals</b>		<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>150,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>150,000</b>	
Badakhshan (also known as GBAO or VMKB)	Darvoz	9	986,280	2	621,000	1,607,280	
	Vanj	6	908,119	0	0	908,119	
	Shughnon	3	56,000	0	0	56,000	
	Ishkoshim	1	250,000	0	0	250,000	
<b>Subtotals</b>		<b>4</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>2,200,399</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>621,000</b>	<b>2,821,399</b>

1 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 26, 78, and 108.

2 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10, 21, 25, 26, 31, 79, 97, 112, and 150.

3 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.

4 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form D.

5 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 15–20 and pp. 78–80.

6 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 78 and 108.

7 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D; email from Muhabbat Ibrahimzoda, Director, TNMAC, 2 July, 2025; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 78–80.

Table 1 Continued

Region	District	CHAs		SHAs		Total area (m <sup>2</sup> )
		No.	Area (m <sup>2</sup> )	No.	Area (m <sup>2</sup> )	
Khatlon	Farkhor	1	5,000	0	0	5,000
	Hamadoni	3	135,000	0	0	135,000
	Panj	12	792,338	0	0	792,338
	Jayhun	10	164,005	0	0	164,005
	Sh. Shohin	61	2,680,782	0	0	2,680,782
	Qabodiyon	1	5,184	0	0	5,184
<b>Subtotals</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>3,782,309</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3,782,309</b>
<b>Totals</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>109</b>	<b>6,132,708</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>621,000</b>	<b>6,753,708</b>

AP mined areas are located in three of Tajikistan's administrative regions, also referred to as provinces. The highly mountainous regions of Khatlon and Badakhshan (also known as Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO), or VMKB) contain significant contamination;<sup>8</sup> 56% and 42% of the total, respectively, while the smallest remaining proportion (2%) is in the Region of Republican Subordination (also known as the Districts of Republican Subordination or DRS). Contamination data are disaggregated by weapon type in the national database.<sup>9</sup> Tajikistan notes in its 2025 extension request, however, that both in the more densely contaminated Tajik-Afghan border region (Khatlon and parts of Badakhshan), as well as in the central region (DRS, and other parts of Badakhshan), there remains a high possibility of re-classification of minefields to battle areas and vice versa, as some areas contain both mines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW).<sup>10</sup>

As already mentioned, building a fully comprehensive baseline of contamination depends on the completion of delineation of the border with Uzbekistan. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan settled most of their 1,283km-long border dispute following the collapse of the Soviet Union but certain areas have not yet been delineated. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan agreed in 2018 to set up a joint commission to investigate mined areas along the border.<sup>11</sup> As at July 2025, Tajikistan

had yet to report on any follow-up action regarding this proposed joint commission. However, online media sources indicate that delineation talks between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan were ongoing throughout 2023<sup>12</sup> and two meetings of the working groups of the Joint Tajik-Uzbek Demarcation Commission took place during 2024 – one from 29 April to 4 May, in Dushanbe, and a second in Termez, Uzbekistan, from 22 to 28 August. On both occasions, protocols were signed by both States. A further meeting was planned in Tajikistan.<sup>13</sup> However, no date was given and it is not known whether it had yet gone ahead as at September 2025. As at the time of writing, the delimitation and demarcation process of the Tajik-Uzbek Border was ongoing.<sup>14</sup>

Previously, information about mined areas on the Tajik-Uzbek border had been limited and based on the non-technical survey (NTS) conducted in 2011–15 by The Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD) and a needs assessment survey by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 2013–15. However, the FSD survey only covered one part of the border in Sughd province, and although survey teams recorded 82 incidents they did not have access to the border and relied mainly on incident forms. As a result, records lack detail on the exact location where mine incidents occurred.<sup>15</sup> Recent progress has been made, however, and in 2024, TNMAC conducted a joint assessment and monitoring with other

8 Statement of Tajikistan on Article 5 Implementation, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023.

9 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 16 June 2023.

10 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 78–79.

11 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 16.

12 "Demining Mountains: Tajikistan's Struggle Against Landmine Contamination", *NCT CBNW*, 7 February 2024, at: <https://bit.ly/4d5WdKY>.

13 "Tajikistan and Uzbekistan discussed border demarcation – a protocol signed", *Central Asian Light*, 6 May 2024, at: <https://bit.ly/3LKBbpc>; "Uzbek-Tajik demarcation commission held a meeting in Dushanbe", *KUN.UZ*, 4 May 2024, at: <https://bit.ly/3LMkSbx>; and "Tajik-Uzbek demarcation commission holds next meeting", *Turkic World*, 28 August 2024, at: <https://bit.ly/480Mo13>.

14 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 150.

15 Interview with Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda and Murtazo Gurezov, TNMAC, Dushanbe, 25 May 2018; Statement of Tajikistan, 16MSP, Vienna, 20 December 2017; and 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 33.

relevant Tajik Government entities, local authorities and communities, and implementing partners to determine the level of threat of mined areas on the Tajik-Uzbek border.<sup>16</sup>

Tajikistan reported that: "During that visit, local communities and local authorities informed that there was no information regarding existence of the hazard areas on the Tajik side of the border."<sup>17</sup> As a result of the assessment and monitoring, Tajikistan affirmed that the mined areas are located on the Uzbek side of the border.<sup>18</sup> Tajikistan further clarified that the 54 suspected mined areas previously reported as totalling 3,25km<sup>2</sup>, and previously included in Tajikistan's November 2023 work plan,<sup>19</sup> was an approximate estimation based on "distance survey" methodology, as there was no access to conduct NTS/technical survey (TS) at that time. TNMAC has subsequently repealed this figure, believing it to be a result of incorrect estimates.<sup>20</sup> As such, and as Tajikistan believes mined areas are located on the Uzbek side of the border, this region is not included in Tajikistan's baseline of mined area (Table 1). However, it is important to note that a further final assessment of some of the extremely high and hard-to-reach mountainous areas on the Tajik-Uzbek, which have not yet been delimited or which were inaccessible, will be conducted only after the final delimitation and demarcation of the border.<sup>21</sup> Tajikistan has pledged to continue to monitor the progress of high-level discussions on border demarcation and to keep the States Parties updated through its Article 7 reports and at Meetings of the States Parties.<sup>22</sup>

Tajikistan is also delimiting and demarcating its border with Kyrgyzstan, a process that has been ongoing since 2022.<sup>23</sup> FSD cautions that there may be unrecorded contamination along the border with Kyrgyzstan.<sup>24</sup> In August 2024, FSD reported deploying teams along the Tajik-Kyrgyz border that had identified one battle area clearance (BAC) task. FSD expects unexploded ordnance (UXO) rather than AP mines to be the main contamination type<sup>25</sup> and is engaged in ongoing survey and re-survey efforts with TNMAC to identify hazardous areas.<sup>26</sup> Progress was made on the border issue on 13 March 2025, when the presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed an agreement to demarcate their shared border.<sup>27</sup>

Additional progress towards fully delimiting and demarcating Tajikistan's borders both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan was also made when, on 31 March 2025, the presidents of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan gathered to discuss cooperation, an unprecedented event following decades of strained relations.<sup>28</sup> A trilateral agreement, dubbed the Khujand Declaration, was signed, demarcating the tri-state border and making a formal declaration of friendship.<sup>29</sup> It is not yet clear if this move towards cooperation will increase the opportunity to release any mined border areas remaining.

The majority of remaining mined areas is in the Tajik-Afghan border region. This includes mined areas on two islands in the Panj river on the Tajik-Afghan border. The islands were created by a change in the flow of the river, and have historically been inaccessible. TNMAC noted in 2022 that the river may again change its path and re-connect the islands with the Tajik riverbank in the future.<sup>30</sup> Though they remained "non-executable" during 2022,<sup>31</sup> one of these areas, measuring 30,000m<sup>2</sup> and located in Ayvoj, in the Shahrituz district of Khatlon, was cancelled during resurvey in 2023. TNMAC planned to resurvey the other in the course of 2024,<sup>32</sup> but, as at July 2025, it remained inaccessible.<sup>33</sup>

In 2024, six new CHAs, with a total of 959,200m<sup>2</sup> were added to Tajikistan's information management database.<sup>34</sup> Tajikistan has been consistently adding new areas to the database in recent years, and cites the discovery of new minefields for which no records existed (as well as some inaccurate minefield records) as one of the primary reasons that necessitates a third Article 5 deadline extension request.<sup>35</sup> The total amount of newly recorded AP mined area in 2024 was down from the 607,807m<sup>2</sup> of CHAs added in 2023.<sup>36</sup>

Tajikistan needs technical support and expertise in order to complete the baseline survey,<sup>37</sup> with TNMAC suggesting a regional training and learning exchange event on survey would be helpful. In July 2025, TNMAC pushed back its timeline for completing survey in the Central Region and in the Afghan-Tajik border region once again, and now plans to complete survey of the 44 CHAs only by the end of 2027, noting that previously unrecorded areas of contamination

16 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10, 21, 25, 31, 37, and 79.

17 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 150.

18 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 10, 21, 25, 31, 37, and 79.

19 General Land Release Operational Plan for October 2023 to December 2025, 2023, p. 14.

20 General Land Release Operational Plan for October 2023 to December 2025, 2023, pp. 14 and 31.

21 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10, 21, 25, 26, 31, 79, 97, 112, and 150.

22 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 37, 97, 108, 112, and 150.

23 "Tajikistan and Uzbekistan discussed border demarcation – a protocol signed", *Central Asian Light*, 6 May 2024.

24 Email from Nickhwah Din Mohammed, Country Director, FSD, 11 April 2024.

25 Email from Nickhwah Din Mohammed, FSD, 16 August 2024.

26 Email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 26 September 2025.

27 "Tajikistan and Uzbekistan discussed border demarcation – a protocol signed", *Central Asian Light*, 6 May 2024; and "Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan sign deal to end long-running border dispute", *Reuters*, 13 March 2025, at: <https://bit.ly/4lWftij>.

28 "Central Asian Presidents Meet, Seeking to Defuse Decades of Tensions in the Ferghana Valley", Foreign Policy Research Institute, 16 April 2025, at: <https://bit.ly/4m0CK2R>.

29 "Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan sign deal on junction point of state borders", *AA*, 31 March 2025, at: <https://bit.ly/4leX5JA>; and "Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan's Leaders Signed a Historical Agreement in Khujand", *SpecialEurasia*, 31 March 2025, at: <https://bit.ly/4fw0v07>.

30 Interview with Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda and Murtazo Gurezov, TNMAC, Dushanbe, 25 May 2018.

31 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 11 April 2023.

32 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 17 April and 3 October 2024.

33 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.

34 Ibid.

35 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 96–97.

36 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 3 October 2024.

37 Tajikistan's Mine Action Programme: Overview of Remaining Challenges and Needs', Individualised Approach Meeting, 21MSP, Geneva, 21 November 2023, p. 3.

continued to be found.<sup>38</sup> Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) believes that significant progress with survey and survey methodology was made in 2024, but stresses the need to maintain a strong focus on both survey and re-survey.<sup>39</sup> FSD noted the particular need for re-survey in mountainous locations, where some minefield tasks have remained suspended for a long time.<sup>40</sup>

Mine contamination in Tajikistan dates from conflicts in the 1990s. Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan was mined by Russian forces in 1992–98; the border with Uzbekistan was mined by Uzbek forces in 1999–2001; and the Central Region was contaminated during the 1992–97 civil war. As the Union of Sappers Tajikistan (UST), recalls, and as detailed in Afghanistan's 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request,<sup>41</sup> some AP mines were used without being recorded, particularly during the civil war. As such, NTS teams are trying to find former military personnel and other informants who were involved in the civil war and who can help survey teams build a picture of likely contamination.<sup>42</sup> In Khatlon region, which borders Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, mines

were laid in and around military positions on hilltops overlooking the Panj river valley, mostly delivered remotely by helicopter or laid by troops who were moved in and out by helicopter. There are no established roads or tracks to access the minefields for survey or clearance.<sup>43</sup> Tajikistan's terrain can also present further challenges to determining an accurate baseline of contamination in a given area, as mudslides, landslides, avalanches, and rockfalls can cause mines to move or become more deeply buried.<sup>44</sup> This can sometimes result in the suspension of tasks.<sup>45</sup>

Neither TNMAC nor operators report mines of an improvised nature in Tajikistan. However, booby-traps in minefields were recorded by FSD along the Tajik-Afghan border between 2008 and 2014. These included a PMN-2 AP mine placed on top of an ML-7 mine that serves as an anti-handling device and 200g of TNT; an OZM-72 AP mine placed on top of an ML-7; and a stone placed on top of an ML-7.<sup>46</sup> The only reported demining accident in Tajikistan in 2023 involved a PMN-2 AP mine emplaced with an ML-7.<sup>47</sup>

## OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Tajikistan also has cluster munition remnants (CMR) remaining on its territory (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants* report on Tajikistan for further information).

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The Commission for the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law (CIIHL), which is chaired by the First Deputy Prime Minister and comprises senior representatives from relevant line ministries, acts as Tajikistan's national mine action authority. The CIIHL is also responsible for mainstreaming mine action in the government's socio-economic development policies.<sup>48</sup>

TNMAC is the executive arm of CIIHL and the body coordinating mine action, responsible for accreditation, risk management, issuing task orders, information management, quality assurance (QA), and quality control (QC).<sup>49</sup> It was set up by government decree in 2014, replacing the Tajikistan Mine Action Centre and assuming responsibility for the

transition to a fully nationally-owned programme.<sup>50</sup> Tajikistan's Parliament adopted a Law on Humanitarian Mine Action in 2016.<sup>51</sup> The Ministry of Defence (MoD) plays a significant role in the mine actor sector through its Humanitarian Demining Company (HDC), the biggest demining operator.<sup>52</sup>

The Government of Tajikistan and TNMAC are enabling and highly supportive of mine action. This includes the ready granting of visas, conclusion of memoranda of understanding with operators and facilitating imports, granting access to border-detached areas that require special permissions, and involving operators in decisions as needed.<sup>53</sup>

38 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 26.

39 Email from Azim Ibrohimov, Senior Operations Officer/Acting Country Director, NPA, 20 March 2025.

40 Email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, Country Director for Tajikistan/ Programme Manager for Central Asia, FSD, 13 May 2025.

41 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 25.

42 Email from Saynurridin Kalandarov, Director, UST, 14 April 2023.

43 Interview with Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda and Murtazo Gurezov, TNMAC, Dushanbe, 25 May 2018; and Statement of Tajikistan, 16MSP, Vienna, 20 December 2017.

44 Presentation by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 22 June 2022; email from Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 14 April 2023; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 9, 25, and 35.

45 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 35.

46 Email from Nickhwah Din Mohammed, FSD, 11 April 2024.

47 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 17 April 2024; and Statement of Tajikistan on Victim Assistance, 21MSP, Geneva, 20–24 November 2023.

48 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 20.

49 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 20–21; and General Land Release Operational Plan for October 2023 to December 2025, p. 9.

50 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 1.

51 *Ibid.*, pp. 20–21.

52 *Ibid.*, p. 23.

53 Emails from Faiz Mohammad Paktian, Country Director, NPA, 6 May 2024; Saodat Asadova, National Programme Officer, OSCE, 24 March 2025; and Nickhwah Din Mohammed, FSD, 24 March 2023.

TNMAC regularly receives support on topics such as information management from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).<sup>54</sup> The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) also continued to provide support to the national programme in 2024, including training of MoD explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel through the OSCE-funded Regional Explosive Hazards Training Centre (REHTC).<sup>55</sup> Military medical specialists from Tajikistan also received medical training in support of EOD in Kazakhstan, co-organised by the OSCE.<sup>56</sup> NPA does not have a formal capacity development agreement with TNMAC but assists informally with activities upon request.<sup>57</sup> Tajikistan has highlighted a need for capacity development in the areas of survey, information management, quality management (QM), priority setting, risk assessment, and post-clearance assessment.<sup>58</sup>

Monthly technical co-ordination meetings between TNMAC, operators, and implementing partners continued in 2024.<sup>59</sup> These meetings typically have representation from operators, management staff of the engineering units of the MoD, Border Troops, the State Committee for National Security, the Committee of Emergency Situations and Civil Defence (CoES), and the National Guard.<sup>60</sup> A key topic discussed during 2024 was the pressing need to undertake thorough surveys, to better understand the exact extent of remaining contaminated areas, and contribute to improved planning and prioritisation. An annual meeting of stakeholders under the auspices of the CIHL also took place as usual, to review the achievements and challenges of 2024 and, critically, to discuss Tajikistan's new 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request.<sup>61</sup> It has been suggested that more discussion on funding at these meetings would be beneficial given the relatively small number of donors to the programme.<sup>62</sup>

## FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

National funding for humanitarian demining has remained modest but consistent. A total of US\$480,000 was allocated from the government for 2024, the same amount as in earlier years.<sup>63</sup> This is designated for "technical and non-technical assistance" and to facilitate the implementation of Tajikistan's obligations under the APMBC. An additional US\$66,020 was allocated "to support humanitarian mine action in the country,"<sup>64</sup> though no details were given about which mine action activities this was for. HDC is funded by the United States (US),<sup>65</sup> which provided almost US\$1.7 million in 2024, and the OSCE, which provided \$201,175 in 2024.<sup>66</sup> Following the US review of funding to mine action globally in early 2025, continued US funding of TNMAC and of OSCE's implementation of the REHTC was approved.<sup>67</sup> TNMAC anticipated that the donors to Tajikistan's national mine action programme in 2025 would be the same ones that provided support in 2024.<sup>68</sup>

It has been suggested that, given that Tajikistan's mine action programme has only a few donors, more effective efforts are needed in donor engagement.<sup>69</sup> TNMAC notes that Tajikistan's National Strategy on Humanitarian Mine Action for 2021–30 foresees resource mobilisation.<sup>70</sup> Tajikistan had budgeted US\$36 million for mine action for 2019–2024, but secured just

under US\$20 million.<sup>71</sup> Tajikistan initiated an Individualised Approach at the Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties (21MSP) in November 2023,<sup>72</sup> but, as at July 2025, this had not yielded any new donor support.<sup>73</sup>

In its 2025 extension request Tajikistan states that "preliminary calculations" suggest that implementation of its 2026–32 plan will require US\$42 million. This amount is based on an assumption of US\$6.60 on average per square meter of manual clearance, also taking into account an expected decrease of the "clearance ratio" given that much remaining contamination is in high altitude and/or hard-to-reach mountainous terrain.<sup>74</sup> Although the request is inconsistent on the demining capacity needed to meet the 2032 deadline, it seems to assume a huge increase in demining capacity from the current capacity of 151 deminers to 261. It is not stated how much of the required US\$42 million had already been secured.

A summary of information from international humanitarian operators on their funding for survey and clearance in 2024 and forecast for 2025 is provided in Table 2. Both FSD and NPA were significantly impacted by the suspension of funding by the US State Department Bureau of Political-Military

54 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 15 April 2024.

55 Email from Saodat Asadova, OSCE, 24 March 2025; and OSCE, "The first-ever Tajik-led explosive ordnance disposal course kicks off at OSCE-supported Regional Explosive Hazards Training Centre", 16 September 2024, at: <https://bit.ly/4hnV9Uj>.

56 OSCE, "OSCE-led regional medical training course for specialists from Central Asia concludes in Kazakhstan", 28 August 2024, at: <https://bit.ly/4g5BtDS>.

57 Emails from Melissa Andersson, Country Director, NPA, 21 May 2022 and 29 March 2023.

58 Tajikistan's Mine Action Programme: Overview of Remaining Challenges and Needs', Individualised Approach Meeting, 21MSP, 21 November 2023.

59 Emails from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

60 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 17 April 2024.

61 Email from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

62 Email from Faiz Mohammad Paktian, NPA, 6 May 2024.

63 Statement of Tajikistan on Political Commitment, APMBC Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 25–29 November 2024, p. 4.

64 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.

65 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 23.

66 Article 7 report (covering 2024), Form F.

67 Interview with Saodat Asadova, OSCE, Geneva, 9 April 2025.

68 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.

69 Email from Faiz Mohammad Paktian, NPA, 6 May 2024.

70 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 17 April 2024.

71 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 47.

72 "Tajikistan's Mine Action Programme: Overview of Remaining Challenges and Needs", Individualised Approach Meeting, 21MSP, 21 November 2023.

73 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.

74 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension request, p. 11.

Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) in January 2025. NPA's funding was withdrawn in February 2025, forcing it to reduce capacity and begin operations later in the year than planned.<sup>75</sup> PM/WRA funded one demining team for FSD Tajikistan and the project terminated in February 2025. The operational impact

was somewhat mitigated by other funding. However, FSD would welcome the restarting of US funds in order to expedite clearance along the Tajik-Afghan border, where UK Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO) funding was allowing FSD operations to resume from October 2025.<sup>76</sup>

**Table 2: Funding for survey and clearance by international operators in Tajikistan (2024–25)<sup>77</sup>**

Donor	2024	2025
Norway (Norad <sup>78</sup> /Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA))	NPA	NPA
PATRIIP Foundation	FSD	FSD
Private donors (unspecified)	FSD	FSD
UK (FCDO)	FSD	FSD
US PM/WRA	NPA, FSD	Withdrawn from NPA in January 2025. FSD funding terminated in February 2025.

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Gender and diversity considerations were integrated into Tajikistan's national mine action strategy for 2021 to 2030, with annual plans also addressing these issues.<sup>79</sup> TNMAC says that gender is mainstreamed in all aspects of its mine action programme,<sup>80</sup> which is underpinned by Tajikistan's legislation on gender equality, its National Development Strategy to 2030, and other key national programme and strategy documents.<sup>81</sup>

**Table 3: Gender composition of operators in 2024<sup>82</sup>**

Organisation	Total staff	Total women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Total women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Total women operational staff
TNMAC*	26	7 (27%)	10	3 (30%)	14	0 (0%)
NPA	64	14 (22%)	6	2 (33%)	50	10 (20%)
FSD	59	18 (31%)	16	8 (50%)	49	15 (31%)
UST*	54	0 (0%)	5	0 (0%)	54	0 (0%)
MoD HDC**	117	0 (0%)	15	0 (0%)	84	0 (0%)
<b>Totals</b>	<b>320</b>	<b>39 (12%)</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>13 (25%)</b>	<b>251</b>	<b>25 (10%)</b>

\*As per data for gender composition at end 2023. Information on 2024 was requested but not provided. \*\*No women employed in MoD HDC in 2024. Staff numbers are as at end of 2023.

75 Emails from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March and 26 June 2025.

76 Email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 26 September 2025.

77 Emails from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May and 26 September 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

78 Norad is the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, under Norway's MFA. See [www.norad.no](http://www.norad.no).

79 Emails from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 21 May 2022; and Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 June 2022.

80 Committee on the Implementation of Article 5, Preliminary Observations on Tajikistan, Intersessional meetings, Geneva, 20–22 June 2022.

81 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 15 April 2024.

82 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 15 April and 23 July 2024; Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 7 May 2024; Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

The Tajikistan Mine Action Programme (TMAP) Gender and Diversity Working Group (GDWG) reconvened with renewed focus in Q2 2024,<sup>83</sup> having previously not met since 2022.<sup>84</sup> Participants included TNMAC, the MoD, operators, and OSCE. Key items discussed in 2024 included gender and diversity analysis and assessments and monitoring and evaluation of efforts by the GDWG members.<sup>85</sup> In its 2025 extension request Tajikistan emphasises that the GDWG will "guide and support the integration of gender considerations into all aspects of the TMAP's policies and practices by the mine action partners, provide technical expertise, strategic advice, and coordination on gender related issues". The extension request also reiterates that development of a gender and diversity policy for humanitarian mine action is included in planned activities by 2030, as part of Tajikistan's national mine action strategy.<sup>86</sup> In support of the re-established GDWG, the OSCE held a training workshop, covering effective mainstreaming of gender and diversity into mine action, including relevant aspects of Tajikistan's national strategic documents and international commitments.<sup>87</sup> The basic demining course in Tajikistan includes content on gender and human rights.<sup>88</sup>

TNMAC asserts that men and women with relevant work experience and qualifications in demining have equal access to employment in the sector in Tajikistan.<sup>89</sup> It acknowledges, however, that in view of the predominance of men in the

military, where service is compulsory for men and voluntary for women, it is challenging to achieve gender balance.<sup>90</sup> No women were employed in MoD's HDC in 2024 or recent years.<sup>91</sup>

NPA, FSD, and national operator UST all report having a gender and diversity policy.<sup>92</sup> FSD and NPA deploy gender-mixed teams.<sup>93</sup> Although UST supports equal access to employment in theory, it had not yet employed any women as at May 2024.<sup>94</sup> NPA saw a notable drop in the proportion of managerial or supervisory positions occupied by women, from 50% in 2023 to 33% in 2024 (see Table 3). This was due to a 50% drop in all management and supervisory staff, leaving only six staff, including two women, in these positions.<sup>95</sup> It did, however, continue collaborating with local women's associations to actively recruit and train female deminers in 2024, with all candidates for the basic demining course successfully gaining employment with NPA.<sup>96</sup>

In 2024, FSD launched a socio-economic baseline assessment (SEBA) to map gender disparities and identify the specific needs of women and men in surveyed areas along the Kyrgyz border. This is intended to inform future interventions, such as expanding employment and vocational training, and improving gender-sensitive mine action.<sup>97</sup> FSD also employed a Gender Officer to oversee SEBA, risk education, and community engagement.<sup>98</sup>

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Table 4: Environmental policies and action<sup>99</sup>

Operator name	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
FSD	Yes	Yes	Yes
NPA	Yes	Yes (from June 2025)	Yes
UST*	Yes	Not known	Not known
MoD HDC*	Not known	Not known	Not known

\*Updated information requested in March 2025 but not provided at the time of writing.

83 Email from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

84 Email Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, 31 March 2023.

85 Email from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

86 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension request, p. 38.

87 Emails from Saodat Asadova, OSCE, 24 March and 18 June 2025.

88 Email from Saodat Asadova, OSCE, 18 June 2025.

89 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 15 April 2024.

90 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information received 3 August 2019.

91 Emails from Saodat Asadova, OSCE, 3 June 2022; Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 16 June 2023, 23 July 2024, and 2 July 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

92 Emails from Nickwah Din Mohammed, FSD, 15 April 2024; Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 14 April 2023 and 7 May 2024; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

93 Email from Faiz Mohammad Paktian, NPA, 6 May 2024; and "Activity Report 2024", FSD, pp. 18–19, at: <https://bit.ly/4384LOE>.

94 Emails from Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 14 April 2023 and 7 May 2024. A more recent update was requested from UST but not provided.

95 Emails from Faiz Mohammad Paktian, NPA, 6 May 2024; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March and 26 June 2025.

96 Email from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

97 Email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; and "Activity Report 2024", FSD, at: <https://bit.ly/4384LOE>, pp. 18–19.

98 Email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025.

99 Emails from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March and 2 April 2025; online interview with Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 3 April 2025; emails from Nickwah Din Mohammed, FSD, 15 April 2024; and Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 26 September 2025; and "Activity Report 2024", FSD, p. 19.

Tajikistan has a national mine action standard (NMAS) on environmental management in mine action, though, as at September 2025, this had not yet been updated to be in line with the revised 2024 edition of International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 07.13.<sup>100</sup> The NMAS covers issues such as safeguarding of the environment during the establishment and removal of worksites and accommodation, waste disposal, air quality, and water supply.<sup>101</sup> Based on this Standard, TNMAC monitors demining by all operators to assess the environmental implications and environmental protection requirements.<sup>102</sup> Tajikistan does not have an environmental management policy for mine action but a 2011 law on environmental protection and other regulatory documents define the legal basis for all State policy on the environment.<sup>103</sup> It states that, in line with these documents, all mine action actors seek to minimize the negative impact of mine action, for example, avoiding cutting down trees as much as possible, and removing all large fragments of mines and UXO following operations.<sup>104</sup>

In 2024, a mine action working group on the Climate Change and the Environment was established, which includes participation from NPA, FSD, OSCE, MoD HDU, UST, and the Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan.<sup>105</sup> A representative from the Committee for Environmental Protection of the Government of Tajikistan will participate, to ensure “the planned activities are well negotiated and agreed”. The working group is intended to provide technical expertise, strategic advice, and coordination on climate change and environment-related issues. The first of planned bi-annual meetings was held in June 2024 to identify possible steps on how the mine action community can contribute to the environment protection.<sup>106</sup>

FSD, NPA, and UST all have an environmental standard operating procedure (SOP),<sup>107</sup> and undertook various specific measures to prevent or minimise environmental harm in 2024. FSD has an environmental policy at its headquarters and consolidated its environmental management system by

the end of 2024. FSD is also undergoing the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) 14001 accreditation process, though this was progressing a little slower than expected, mainly due to challenges resulting from reduced US funding.<sup>108</sup> FSD also conducts environmental assessments to support planning and delivery of survey and clearance.<sup>109</sup> It undertakes refresher training each year on the environmental SOP and FSD’s commitments to sound environmental practices, with all management and operational staff.<sup>110</sup> NPA Tajikistan has an annual environmental action plan linked to its environmental policy,<sup>111</sup> and, from June 2025, was implementing NPA’s global Green Field Tool, in order to conduct environmental screening of the areas where it works and analyse its environmental impact.<sup>112</sup> NPA replaced two vehicles with electric cars and improved travel planning to reduce emissions. It also introduced use of solar panels in the field, including in some remote locations.<sup>113</sup> Going forward, NPA planned to extend recycling from its offices to its field bases, though it highlights that government recycling facilities in the districts outside Dushanbe are variable and limit the extent to which recycling is possible.<sup>114</sup> UST reports that, after leaving field camps or completing operations, UST buries waste, excluding metal and plastic materials.<sup>115</sup>

In 2024, operators and TNMAC also continued collective tree-planting efforts, planting over 1,000 trees in total. Alongside its demining activities, FSD is continuing a separate project to remediate polluted soil in areas contaminated by Soviet-era toxic pesticides (persistent organic pollutants, or POPs),<sup>116</sup> focusing in 2024 on phytoremediation (the use of plants to remove pollutants), including large-scale tree planting.<sup>117</sup>

Environmental concerns and climate resilience are becoming increasingly pertinent for mine action in Tajikistan as changes to weather patterns, including extreme heat, early snow, and heavy rainfall, continue to negatively impact the nine-month window for demining operations.<sup>118</sup>

---

100 Emails from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March and 18 September 2025.

101 Emails from Saodat Asadova, OSCE, 3 and 9 June 2022; and Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 June 2022; and NMAS Chapter 20: “Environment, Health and Safety”.

102 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 15 April 2024.

103 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 31 March 2023 and 15 April 2024; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 38-39, which lists these regulatory documents as: “Law of the RT [Republic of Tajikistan] on environment protection; State environmental program of the Republic of Tajikistan for 2023–2028; Climate change adaptation Strategy of the Republic of Tajikistan up to 2030; State program for the study and protection of glaciers of the Republic of Tajikistan for 2010–2030; Comprehensive state program for the development of environmental education of the population of the Republic of Tajikistan for 2021–2025; Land Code; Water Code; etc.”

104 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 39.

105 Email from Saodat Asadova, OSCE, 24 March 2025; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 39.

106 Article 5 Extension Request of Tajikistan, 16 October 2025, p. 39.

107 Emails from Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 7 May 2024; Nickhwah Din Mohammed, FSD, 29 May 2024; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

108 Emails from Nickhwah Din Mohammed, FSD, 29 May 2024; and Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 26 September 2025.

109 Email from Nickhwah Din Mohammed, FSD, 24 March 2023.

110 Email from Nickhwah Din Mohammed, FSD, 24 March 2023.

111 Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 21 May 2022.

112 Emails from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March and 2 April 2025; and online interview, 3 April 2025.

113 Emails from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March and 2 April 2025; and online interview, 3 April 2025.

114 Emails from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March and 2 April 2025; and online interview, 3 April 2025.

115 Email from Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 7 May 2024.

116 “Tajikistan”, FSD website, accessed 25 March 2024 at: <https://bit.ly/30zn7hh>.

117 “Activity Report 2024”, FSD, p. 19.

118 Interview with Faiz Mohammad Paktian, Tajikistan, NPA, Geneva, 21 November 2023.

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

TNMAC uses the latest version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA Core) for its national mine action database.<sup>119</sup> Data are disaggregated by weapon type and method of land release in the national database.<sup>120</sup> Data collection forms are reported to enable efficient collection of the requisite data<sup>121</sup> and both the database and information management by TNMAC more generally are said to be functioning well, with progress and other reports from the field received daily and cross-checking of the data by TNMAC.<sup>122</sup> Tajikistan's General Land Release Operations Plan sets out clear guidelines for operators on the required content and timelines for all types of operational reports to be sent to TNMAC on a daily, weekly, monthly and as-needed basis.<sup>123</sup> TNMAC regularly receives support on information management through online consultations with the GICHD. NPA took steps in 2024 to strengthen its data communication with TNMAC, including regular coordination

meetings to align reporting formats and timelines; the introduction of improved internal data validation procedures prior to submission; and more consistent sharing of operational updates and clearance statistics.<sup>124</sup>

In recent years, Tajikistan has submitted detailed Article 7 reports of generally good quality. In November 2023, Tajikistan acted upon the decision at the Fourth Review Conference of the APMBBC by submitting an updated plan for 2023–2025.<sup>125</sup>

Tajikistan informally presented its 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request at the Intersessional Meetings in June 2025,<sup>126</sup> but did not formally submit it until mid-October. This is despite the 31 March 2025 deadline for submission of extension requests in order to give the Committee on Article 5 implementation and States Parties sufficient time to analyse and consider the request.

## PLANNING AND TASKING

TNMAC's activities are guided by the National Strategy of the Republic of Tajikistan on Humanitarian Mine Action for 2021–2030.<sup>127</sup> An annual work plan was in place for 2024<sup>128</sup> and one had been prepared for 2025.<sup>129</sup>

Tajikistan had previously set a target to release almost 8.85km<sup>2</sup> during its current extension period of 2019–25. In fact, it managed to release almost 8.24km<sup>2</sup> in 113 hazardous areas between 2019 and 2024, 89% of its target for this period. In the course of this, Tajikistan destroyed 17,598 mines and 7,693 ERW. However, between 2019 and 2024, Tajikistan also identified new areas of AP mine contamination amounting to a little over 5.14km<sup>2</sup> in 44 CHAs. TNMAC cites these discoveries as one of the key reasons for not fulfilling its obligations during its current extension period.<sup>130</sup>

In its 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Tajikistan has provided a comprehensive work plan for 2025–2032, including its plan for survey/re-survey of 44 CHAs currently totalling 2.56km<sup>2</sup> in the Tajik-Afghan border region and

Central Region,<sup>131</sup> a clear rationale for projected annual land release targets; anticipated challenges and measures to mitigate against these; personnel required; QM measures; and detailed lists of minefields to be surveyed, re-surveyed, or cleared.<sup>132</sup>

Tajikistan outlines three work plan options within its 2025 extension request, although the rationale for the projections and assumptions is not always evident. The Option 1 work plan foresees the release of the 109 CHAs totalling 6.13km<sup>2</sup> by end of 2032, based on current capacity.<sup>133</sup> Furthermore, elsewhere in the extension request, it says “To meet its projected 2032 deadline Tajikistan will need to increase its current capacity from 151 deminers to 261,”<sup>134</sup> which appears at odds with Option 1. The Option 2 work plan assumes discovery of an additional 2.78km<sup>2</sup> of previously unrecorded mined areas (based on practical field experience). This would bring the total amount of mined areas needing to be addressed during the extension period to 9km<sup>2</sup>. This

119 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 28 May 2020; and Committee on the Implementation of Article 5, Preliminary Observations on Tajikistan, Intersessional meetings, 20–22 June 2022.

120 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 16 June 2023.

121 Emails from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 21 May 2022 and 29 March 2023.

122 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 15 April 2024; and Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 7 May 2024.

123 Tajikistan Mine Action Programme General Land Release Operational Plan for October 2023 to December 2025, pp. 4–5.

124 Emails from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March and 26 June 2025.

125 Implementation Support Unit, “Tajikistan”, accessed 1 August 2024 at: <https://bit.ly/4c4tJjf>.

126 “Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre under the Government of Tajikistan, Tajikistan's Extension Request for 2026–2032”, Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, Intersessional Meetings, 17–22 June 2025.

127 Statement of Tajikistan on Political Commitment, Fifth Review Conference, 25–29 November 2024, p. 2.

128 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 17 April 2024.

129 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.

130 “Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre under the Government of Tajikistan, Tajikistan's Extension Request for 2026–2032”, Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, Intersessional Meetings, 17–22 June 2025.

131 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 121.

132 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 126 and 117–136.

133 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 28 and 129–131.

134 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 11, 108, and 112–113).

second option assumes completion by end of 2032, with existing capacity, which will be achieved through increasing the operational efficiency of land release and survey operations.<sup>135</sup> Again, however, this is at odds with elsewhere in Tajikistan's extension request where it says a demining capacity of 261 deminers is needed in order to achieve completion by 2032.<sup>136</sup> The Option 3 work plan foresees the release of the 109 CHAs totalling 6.13km<sup>2</sup> by end of 2030 (rather than 2032), based on the assumption funding levels are doubled and no previously unknown mined areas is added to the baseline.<sup>137</sup> All three options only include CHAs, and exclude the 0.62km<sup>2</sup> of SHA contained in Tajikistan's Article 7 report covering 2024.

During the upcoming extension request period, Tajikistan plans to undertake the following key activities:

- Complete re-survey of all hazardous areas in the central region and in Tajik-Afghan border areas, by the end of 2027;
- Conduct detailed survey and assessment of minefields and battle areas, as some of them are contaminated with both landmines and UXOs;
- Establish multi-task teams to increase operational efficiency;
- Complete land release of the "remaining hazardous areas"<sup>138</sup> identified as measuring a little over 6.13km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>139</sup>

In order to implement these activities and meet its proposed 2032 deadline, Tajikistan states that it needs to increase its current capacity from 151 deminers to 261 deminers,<sup>140</sup> although elsewhere in the report it suggests that completion by 2032 is possible with existing capacity if no additional mined area is found, or if operational efficiencies are made if new area is discovered.<sup>141</sup>

Tajikistan said it will also need to deploy mechanical assets in order to meet its proposed 2032 deadline.<sup>142</sup> It estimates that 10–20% of total remaining contaminated areas are in lowlands with an altitude less than 800m above sea level, which could be processed using mechanical demining machines, particularly in flat areas with a high concentration of metal fragments and high levels of vegetation. It provides a detailed list of hazardous areas that are likely to be

suitable to mechanical clearance, which are located almost entirely in the Khatlon region.<sup>143</sup> TNMAC said that at present it is impossible to use the mechanical demining machines available in Tajikistan, as they require funding for the purchase of spare parts and technical maintenance.<sup>144</sup> TNMAC planned to involve donors for the support of the mechanical demining during the Third Extension Request period of 2026–2032.<sup>145</sup>

Tajikistan also plans for the operators to establish sufficient multi-task teams (MTTs), to increase operational efficiency. MTTs are intended to work in hard-to-reach remote mountainous areas, camping in the field to reduce transportation time, and capable of conducting NTS/TS, clearance, EOD, EORE, and completion and handover of the released hazardous area to TNMAC. Subject to the availability of funding, TNMAC planned to establish 10 MTTs.<sup>146</sup> Such teams are planned to be deployed within Tajikistan's prioritisation and district-by-district land release approach.<sup>147</sup>

Tajikistan's annual land release targets for 2025–32 are summarised in Table 5, with 52% forecast to be released through clearance, 27% reduced through TS, and 21% cancelled through NTS. These targets provide for the release of just over 6.13km<sup>2</sup> remaining in 109 CHAs, but do not provide for the 0.62km<sup>2</sup> that remains in two SHAs in the DRS region and reported in Tajikistan's Article 7 report (see Table 1).<sup>148</sup> As noted earlier, TNMAC concluded in 2024 that AP mine contamination along the border with Uzbekistan is on the Uzbek side, but that a final assessment would be conducted upon completion of the delimitation and demarcation of the border.<sup>149</sup>

Tajikistan provides a detailed explanation of its planned land release methods for the proposed extension period, and expects to undertake a combination of NTS, TS, and clearance.<sup>150</sup> It will make use of NTS/TS with technical intervention, also referred to as Targeted Technical Survey, i.e. physical intervention with appropriate equipment while conducting survey, which has already been used extensively in Tajikistan to improve the efficiency of operations by more precisely identifying the extend of hazardous areas.<sup>151</sup>

136 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 11, 108, and 112–113).

137 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 28 and 134–136.

138 Though Tajikistan states "remaining hazardous areas", the figure given of 6.13km<sup>2</sup> accounts for only land contained in CHAs, and excludes the 0.62km<sup>2</sup> contained in SHAs.

139 "Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre under the Government of Tajikistan, Tajikistan's Extension Request for 2026–2032", Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, Intersessional Meetings, 17–22 June 2025; and 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10–11

140 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 11, 108, and 112–113).

141 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 28 and 129–131 (see Option 1 and Option 3 work plans).

142 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 11.

143 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 89 and 114.

144 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 11 and 27.

145 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 27.

146 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 11, 90–92, and 120–121.

147 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 11, 52, 69, 91, 112, 121, and 149.

148 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form D.

149 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July, 2025; and 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10, 21, 25, 26, 31, 79, 97, 112, and 150.

150 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 53–58.

151 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 55–68.

Table 5: Annual land release targets for 2025–32<sup>152</sup>

Year	CHAs to be released	Manual clearance (m <sup>2</sup> )	Reduction (m <sup>2</sup> )	Cancellation (m <sup>2</sup> )	Total area (m <sup>2</sup> )
2025	20	368,171	208,155	73,729	650,055
2026	7	137,800	105,000	576,500	819,300
2027	13	382,855	255,000	126,038	763,893
2028	17	391,498	201,500	98,907	691,905
2029	19	516,000	242,900	106,500	865,400
2030	17	433,500	238,500	151,755	823,755
2031	6	480,000	206,500	77,900	764,400
2032	10	452,000	205,000	97,000	754,000
2032	10	452,000	205,000	97,000	754,000
<b>Totals</b>	<b>109</b>	<b>3,161,824</b>	<b>1,662,555</b>	<b>1,308,329</b>	<b>6,132,708</b>

Aside from a lack of required demining capacity to fully implement planned land release, ongoing security challenges along the border with Afghanistan, where access is regulated by the Border Guard Forces of Tajikistan, have intermittently impeded access to some of Tajikistan's most heavily mined districts in recent years and made full implementation of plans here impossible.<sup>153</sup> This said, some improvement in conditions occurred in both 2023 and 2024. In 2024, NPA teams operating in border areas of the Panj district lost only three working days due to security concerns,<sup>154</sup> and no such concerns hindered operations in 2023.<sup>155</sup> FSD states that security concerns did not prove a barrier to its operations along the border with Afghanistan during 2024.<sup>156</sup> TNMAC cautions, however, that insecurity may still affect implementation here in the future.<sup>157</sup>

Land release tasks are prioritised by TNMAC through application of Tajikistan's SOP 1.2 (Planning and Tasking of Mine Action Operations), taking into consideration the following criteria, reiterated in Tajikistan's 2025 Article 5 extension request:<sup>158</sup>

- Government and local authority requests
- The area's status in relation to the district-by-district approach
- Distance of the task site from populated areas
- The need to complete any previously suspended areas
- Altitude of the task site
- The local security situation (permission from the Border Forces)<sup>159</sup>

According to Tajikistan's Article 5 extension request, TNMAC, in conjunction with the Government of Tajikistan and Border Forces, will prioritise land release activities using a district-by-district approach, based on the following criteria:

- Mined areas with high socio-economic and infrastructure impacts (i.e. agriculture lands, pastures, rice plantations, reconstruction and strengthening of river banks etc.).
- Survey tasks: clarify the type and categories of the contamination for those hazard areas contaminated both with landmines and UXOs, adjust the borders and real size of the hazard areas.
- Clearance tasks: districts that have less remaining contamination area will be cleared first.
- Requests for clearance of the hazardous areas from the local population and local authorities, governmental structures, and production and business structures.
- Establishing MTTs, which will increase operational efficiency and reduce time and resources for the clearance of minefields.<sup>160</sup>

Operators report that task dossiers are issued in a timely matter by TNMAC.<sup>161</sup> NPA highlights that seasonal access constraints present a major ongoing challenge to planning and tasking, particularly in remote areas, which are often impacted by harsh weather. NPA has, however, made significant progress to improve logistical coordination and deploy teams as effectively as possible when conditions are optimal.<sup>162</sup>

152 "Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre under the Government of Tajikistan, Tajikistan's Extension Request for 2026–2032", Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, Interseasonal Meetings, 17–22 June 2025; Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F; and 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 80.

153 Presentation by Tajikistan on Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Geneva, 23 May 2019; and email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 June 2022.

154 Email from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

155 Email from Faiz Mohammad Paktian, NPA, 8 May 2024.

156 Email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025.

157 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 17 April 2024.

158 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 69 and 149.

159 Tajikistan Mine Action Programme General Land Release Operational Plan for October 2023 to December 2025, pp. 6–7; email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 31 March 2023; and 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 69.

160 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 149.

161 Emails from Faiz Mohammad Paktian, NPA, 6 May 2024; Nickwah Din Mohammed, FSD, 15 April 2024; and Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 7 May 2024.

162 Email from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

# LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

## STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Tajikistan's NMAS are reviewed annually, and SOPs are reviewed in accordance with the designated accreditation period, both in consultation with clearance operators.<sup>163</sup> No updates were made to Tajikistan's NMAS in 2024, but updates were made to the protocol documentation for marking and safety procedures. This was done through a technical working group and in consultation with operators.<sup>164</sup> Operators report that Tajikistan's NMAS are appropriately adapted to the local threat and enable effective, efficient, and safe survey and clearance work.<sup>165</sup>

In 2024, NPA focused on improving the effectiveness and efficiency of operations by prioritising targeted technical surveys (TTS) over systematic technical surveys (STS). While STS involves surveying larger, 10x10 metre grid areas, TTS allows for a more focused approach.<sup>166</sup>

A total of 30,719m<sup>2</sup> was cleared in 2024, which proved to contain no AP mines: 15,619m<sup>2</sup> by NPA that contained small arms ammunition but no AP mines;<sup>167</sup> and 15,100m<sup>2</sup> by FSD<sup>168</sup> (see Table 13).

## OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

All FSD and NPA teams deployed in Tajikistan are MTTs, capable of survey and clearance (see Table 6).<sup>169</sup> NPA continues to cooperate with Tajikistan's Border Guard Forces, with ten officers seconded into NPA's teams in 2024. This collaboration serves to build capacity, with secondees typically trained in both demining and BAC.<sup>170</sup> NPA reduced its capacity from five to four MTTs in 2024 due to an overall drop in funding, and reduced it further to three teams at the start of 2025, due to the withdrawal of US funding, which was formally terminated in February.<sup>171</sup> NPA also experienced a two-month delay in the start of 2025 demining operations, starting in June instead of April, due to this reduced funding and capacity.<sup>172</sup>

FSD expanded from one to four teams in 2024<sup>173</sup> but had to stand down one team in early 2025 when PM/WRA funding for this team was terminated.<sup>174</sup> The MoD HDC was able to add 26 deminers in 2024,<sup>175</sup> having also added one team in 2023.<sup>176</sup> Since 2020 MoD HDC's demining teams have drawn personnel from several bodies, including the MoD, CoEs, National Guard, and Border Troops.<sup>177</sup>

**Table 6: Operational survey and clearance capacities deployed in Tajikistan 2024<sup>178</sup>**

Operator	No. of teams	Total deminers	Mechanical assets/machines	Comments
FSD	3 MTTs	23		0 EOD quick response team in place within MTTs.
UST <sup>179</sup>	4 NTS/TS teams	18		0
NPA	4 MTTs	36		0
MoD HDC	8 manual clearance teams	89		0 A Mini MineWolf is available but was not used for survey or clearance.
<b>Totals</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>166</b>		<b>0</b>

163 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 June 2022; and Committee on the Implementation of Article 5, Preliminary Observations on Tajikistan, Intersessional meetings, 20–22 June 2022.

164 Email from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

165 Emails from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 29 March 2023; and Dr Nickwah Din Mohammed, FSD, 24 March 2023.

166 Email from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

167 Emails from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March and 2 April 2025; and online interview on 3 April 2025.

168 Email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025.

169 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 15 April 2024; Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

170 Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 23 May 2023; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

171 Emails from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March and 26 June 2025.

172 Online interview with Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 3 April 2025.

173 "Activity Report 2024", FSD, p. 18.

174 Email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 26 September 2025.

175 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.

176 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 17 April 2024.

177 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 43.

178 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025; Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025; and 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 40.

179 Based on data contained in Tajikistan's 2025 Article 5 extension request, pp. 40 and 43.

Tajikistan's 2019 Article 5 deadline extension request set an ambitious target of doubling the number of deminers from 90 to 180<sup>180</sup> but it has made only halting progress towards this, with numbers increasing early in the extension period, but then fluctuating. Personnel across the combined survey and clearance teams of all operators had increased to 150 by 2021, then to 169 in 2022<sup>181</sup> but dropped again to 149 in 2023.<sup>182</sup> Current capacity, as reported in Tajikistan's 2025 Article 5 extension request, stood at 151 deminers.<sup>183</sup> All relevant State armed forces (such as MoD, National Guard, Committee of the Emergency Situations and Civil Defence, Border Guard (Border Troops), and other implementing partners FSD, NPA, and UST are ready to increase the number of deminers if funding becomes available.<sup>184</sup>

UST teams report directly to TNMAC, which funds UST's survey and clearance operations.<sup>185</sup> UST was still in the process of obtaining a licence for the use of explosive materials and devices from the relevant authorities as at May 2025,<sup>186</sup> an issue that has been ongoing for several years.<sup>187</sup>

HDC MoD has a Mini MineWolf, which is also available for use also by NPA. However, this was not deployed for clearance in 2024 or in recent years.<sup>188</sup> NPA has pointed out that this machine cannot be used to its full capacity due to a lack of funding.<sup>189</sup> Deployment of mechanical assets is one of the 2026–32 activities Tajikistan is seeking funding for.<sup>190</sup>

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

Table 7: Summary of land release outputs in 2024 (national authority data)

Release of AP mined area	Release in 2024 (m <sup>2</sup> )
<b>Clearance</b>	415,853
<b>Technical Survey</b>	643,212
<b>Non-Technical Survey</b>	640,961
<b>Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks</b>	<b>2024</b>
<b>AP mines destroyed</b>	2,795 (including 18 destroyed in spot tasks)

TNMAC and operators reported land release totalling just over 1.7km<sup>2</sup> in 2024, of which 0.64km<sup>2</sup> was cancelled through NTS, a little over 0.64km<sup>2</sup> was reduced through technical survey (TS), and over 0.41km<sup>2</sup> was cleared. A total of 2,777 AP mines and 120 items of UXO were destroyed during clearance

and technical survey.<sup>191</sup> A further 18 AP mines and three anti-vehicle (AV) mines were destroyed during spot tasks in 2024.<sup>192</sup> Tajikistan added 959,200m<sup>2</sup> of CHAs to the national database in 2024.<sup>193</sup>

### SURVEY IN 2024

A total of 1.28km<sup>2</sup> was released through survey in 2023, of which 640,961m<sup>2</sup> was cancelled through NTS and 643,212m<sup>2</sup> was reduced through TS (see Tables 8 and 9).<sup>194</sup> Overall, the amount released through survey is an increase on the 854,267m<sup>2</sup>

180 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.

181 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 and 24 June 2022.

182 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 17 April 2024; Nickwhah Din Mohammed, FSD, 11 April 2024; Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 7 May and 6 August 2024; and Faiz Mohammad Paktian, NPA, 6 May 2024.

183 2025 Article 5 extension request, pp. 11, 108–109, 111–112, and 119.

184 2025 Article 5 extension request, pp. 113.

185 Emails from Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 16 May 2023 and 7 May 2024.

186 Email from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

187 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 31 March 2023; and Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 14 April 2023 and 7 May 2024.

188 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 31 March 2023; Melissa Andersson, NPA, 23 May 2023; Faiz Mohammad Paktian, NPA, 29 May 2024; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

189 Interview with Faiz Mohammad Paktian, NPA, Geneva, 21 November 2023.

190 "Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre under the Government of Tajikistan, Tajikistan's Extension Request for 2026–2032", Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, Intersessional Meetings, 17–22 June 2025; and 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 27.

191 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, 2 July 2025; Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.

192 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, 2 July 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

193 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

194 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F; and emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025; Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

released through survey in 2023,<sup>195</sup> partly due to a notable increase in land released through reduction by NPA, compared to 2023, through greater use of targeted technical surveys, which it says proved highly efficient.<sup>196</sup>

Tajikistan added 959,200m<sup>2</sup> of CHAs to the national database in 2024 (see Table 10),<sup>197</sup> an increase on the 607,807m<sup>2</sup> of CHAs added in 2023.<sup>198</sup>

**Table 8: Release of mined area through NTS in 2024<sup>199</sup>**

Region	District	Operator	SHAs cancelled	Area cancelled (m <sup>2</sup> )
GBAO	Darvoz	TBC	1	*350,000
	Darvoz	NPA	1	33,000
Khatlon	Farkhor	TBC	5	63,300
	Hamadoni	FSD	1	860
	Jaykhun	TBC	1	120,000
	Sh. Shohin	TBC	4	73,000
	Panj	NPA	1	**801
<b>Totals</b>			<b>14</b>	<b>640,961</b>

\*Tajikistan's Article 7 report (covering 2024) gives a figure of 383,000m<sup>2</sup>. However, Mine Action Review has used the figure of 350,000m<sup>2</sup> provided separately to Mine Action Review by TNMAC on 2 July 2025, as this corresponds with the total area cancelled during 2024, as stated both by TNMAC and in the Article 7 report. \*\*This area of 801m<sup>2</sup> was cancelled during a clearance task and represents an adjustment to the size of the clearance polygon.

**Table 9: Release of mined area through TS in 2024<sup>200</sup>**

Region	District	Operator	Areas reduced	Area reduced (m <sup>2</sup> )
Khatlon	Panj	MoD HDC	3	136,861
	Panj	NPA	4	79,586
	Hamadoni	FSD	2	106,802
	Sh. Shohin	MoD HDC	2	31,900
	Sh. Shohin	NPA	2	65,090
GBAO	Darvoz	MoD HDC	1	25,275
	Darvoz	NPA	1	197,698
<b>Totals</b>			<b>15</b>	<b>643,212</b>

**Table 10: AP mined area newly recorded in 2024<sup>201</sup>**

Region	District	Operator	CHAs recorded	Area (m <sup>2</sup> )
GBAO	Darvoz	NPA	1	298,875
	Darvoz	Not reported	2	616,805
Khatlon	Farkhor	Not reported	1	5,000
	Jaihun	Not reported	1	4,000
	Sh. Shohin	NPA	1	34,520
<b>Totals</b>			<b>6</b>	<b>959,200</b>

195 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 17 April and 3 October 2024; Faiz Mohammad Paktian, NPA, 8 May and 18 August 2024; Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 7 May and 6 August 2024; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form F.

196 Email from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

197 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

198 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 17 April 2024; Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 7 May and 6 August 2024; and Faiz Mohammad Paktian, NPA, 18 August 2024.

199 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F; and emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025; Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

200 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025; Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

201 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

Tajikistan cleared 415,853m<sup>2</sup> in 2024,<sup>202</sup> a marginal increase on the 413,791m<sup>2</sup> cleared in 2023.<sup>203</sup> TNMAC and operators reported that clearance resulted in the destruction of 2,777 AP mines and 120 items of UXO. Of this clearance, 238,174m<sup>2</sup> was undertaken by MoD HDC; 92,919m<sup>2</sup> by NPA; and 84,760m<sup>2</sup> by FSD (see Table 11).<sup>204</sup> A further 18 AP mines and three AV mines were destroyed in spot tasks by NPA (see Table 12).<sup>205</sup>

Though overall clearance in Tajikistan remained steady compared to a year earlier, FSD was able to increase clearance in 2024 substantially compared to the 16,570m<sup>2</sup>

it cleared in 2023,<sup>206</sup> due to the nature of the sites allocated and a longer operational window in the demining season.<sup>207</sup>

NPA reported that it cleared two tasks in Khatlon, in the Panj District (Gulobod MF-13 and Gulobod MF-14) with a total area of 15,619m<sup>2</sup> that were found to contain some small arms ammunition, but no AP mines.<sup>208</sup> FSD cleared one area of 15,100m<sup>2</sup> in Hamadoni, also in the Khatlon region, that proved to contain no mines, but did contain 20 items of UXO<sup>209</sup> (see Table 13). Along with minefield clearance in 2024, Tajikistan cleared three battle areas covering 577,321m<sup>2</sup>.<sup>210</sup>

Table 11: AP mine clearance in 2024<sup>211</sup>

Region	District	Operator	CHAs cleared	Area cleared (m <sup>2</sup> )	AP mines destroyed	UXO destroyed
GBAO	Darvoz	MoD HDC	1	6,040	15	83
	Darvoz	NPA	1	37,305	106	0
Khatlon	Hamadoni	FSD	1	15,100	0	20
	Hamadoni	FSD	1	69,660	513	3
	Panj	MoD HDC	1	53,188	838	0
	Panj	MoD HDC	1	3,720	135	0
	Panj	MoD HDC	1	20,872	932	0
	Sh. Shohin	MoD HDC	1	4,140	2	3
	Sh. Shohin	MoD HDC	1	22,760	36	4
	Sh. Shohin	MoD HDC	1	17,120	21	2
	Panj	MoD HDC	1	18,120	0	0
	Panj	MoD HDC	1	5,450	0	0
	Panj	MoD HDC	1	86,764	33	0
	Panj	NPA	1	3,689	0	2
	Panj	NPA	1	1,929	0	1
	Panj	NPA	1	6,099	3	0
	Sh. Shohin	NPA	1	10,140	0	0
Sh. Shohin	NPA	1	18,678	142	2	
Panj	NPA	1	15,079	1	0	
<b>Totals</b>			<b>19</b>	<b>415,853</b>	<b>2,777</b>	<b>120</b>

Table 12: AP and AV mines destroyed in EOD spot tasks in 2024<sup>212</sup>

Operator	Region	District	AP mines destroyed	AV mines destroyed
NPA	Khatlon	Sh. Shohin	4	0
NPA	GBAO	Darvoz	14	3
<b>Totals</b>			<b>18</b>	<b>3</b>

202 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, 2 July 2025; Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.

203 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 3 October 2024.

204 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, 2 July 2025; Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.

205 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, 2 July 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

206 Emails from Nickhwah Din Mohammed, FSD, 11 April and 16 August 2024.

207 Email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025.

208 Emails from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March and 2 April 2025; and online interview with Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, on 3 April 2025.

209 Email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025.

210 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.

211 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, 2 July 2025; Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.

212 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, 2 July 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

**Table 13: Area cleared in 2024 in which no AP mines were found (operator data)<sup>213</sup>**

Operator	Region	District	Area cleared (m <sup>2</sup> )	Comments
NPA	Khatlon	Panj	15,619	Contained small arms ammunition.
FSD	Khatlon	Hamadoni	15,100	Contained 20 items of UXO.
<b>Total</b>			<b>30,719</b>	

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE



Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the latest extension granted by States Parties in 2019), Tajikistan is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2025. It will not meet this deadline.

Tajikistan stated at the Fifth Review Conference in November 2024 that it was preparing its third request to extend its Article 5 deadline to 31 December 2032.<sup>214</sup> Tajikistan then informally presented its request at the Intersessional Meetings in June 2025,<sup>215</sup> but did not formally submit it until mid-October (well after the 31 March deadline for submission of extension requests), despite the extension request cover page being dated 31 March 2025.<sup>216</sup>

Tajikistan is to be commended for having a well-coordinated and planned programme with strong national ownership, and for its comprehensive 2025 Article 5 extension request (albeit submitted very late and with some inconsistencies regarding the demining capacity needed to achieve the 2032 deadline requested). However, as it moves towards a new proposed extension period, the challenges that have severely impeded Tajikistan's capacity to fulfil its commitments under its Article 5 deadline of the end of 2025 still remain and are reiterated in its 2025 extension request,<sup>217</sup> in summary: the pressing need to upscale and complete survey/re-survey; discovery

of previously unrecorded minefields, in CHAs where there were no minefield records or other information; lack of additional funding, despite the need and capabilities to increase demining capacity/MTTs; challenging access to remote terrain; short demining season due to weather conditions; natural phenomena, such as rock falls and landslides which can cause the migration of mines; and intermittent insecurity along the Tajik-Afghan border. The extent to which Tajikistan can overcome these challenges to meet its new goal of completion by the end of 2032, will need to be reassessed after Tajikistan has implemented at least the initial couple of years of its 2026–32 plan.

**Table 14: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance**

Year	Area cleared (km <sup>2</sup> )
2024	0.42
2023	0.41
2022	0.58
2021	0.21
2020	0.67
<b>Total</b>	<b>2.29</b>

## PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Tajikistan produced a technical manual on the management of residual contamination in 2023, though as at June 2025, TNMAC had not provided any further update on the formalisation of these guidelines. TNMAC is developing the operational capacity of UST and plans that UST will deal with residual risk of mines upon completion of area clearance.<sup>218</sup>

<sup>213</sup> Emails from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

<sup>214</sup> Statement of Tajikistan on Renewing Political Commitment, Fifth Review Conference, 25–29 November 2024.

<sup>215</sup> "Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre under the Government of Tajikistan, Tajikistan's Extension Request for 2026–2032", Maj.-Gen. Muhabbat Ibrohimzod, TNMAC, Intersessional Meetings, 17–22 June 2025.

<sup>216</sup> 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, cover page.

<sup>217</sup> 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 96–97, 119.

<sup>218</sup> Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 15 April 2024.