

KEY DATA

CLUSTER MUNITION CONTAMINATION: UNKNOWN


SUBMUNITION
CLEARANCE IN 2021

572,142_M²

SUBMUNITIONS
DESTROYED IN 2021

4

LAND RELEASE OUTPUT



KEY DEVELOPMENTS

From the start of its attack on Ukraine in February 2022, Russia's armed forces used cluster munitions against Ukrainian military targets as well as against civilians and civilian objects in violation of international law. The exact number of cluster munition attacks is unknown, but hundreds have been documented or reported, adding significantly to the existing contamination.¹ The State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU) have been clearing some of the contamination caused by explosive ordnance (EO), including of CMR, immediately after its use.² One media report has also alleged the use of cluster munitions by Ukrainian forces against a village occupied by the Russian troops.³

The scale of the new CMR contamination in Ukraine is estimated to be large, with some early estimates suggesting the threat from unexploded submunitions might require a decade or more of concerted action.⁴

In November 2021, the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers issued a long-awaited resolution on the establishment of the national mine action authority (NMAA), which was hoped to progress into a stronger and more coordinated mine action sector in Ukraine. This is the first step in what will be a protracted process.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Ukraine should immediately halt all use of cluster munitions and accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.
- As soon as conditions allow, Ukraine should undertake a baseline survey to understand the extent and nature of its cluster munition remnants (CMR) contamination in areas to which it has effective access.
- Ukraine should clear CMR on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.
- Ukraine should revise its national mine action standards (NMAS), taking into careful consideration the recommendations of the Technical Working Group.
- Ukraine should expedite the implementation of its new national mine action legislation and finalise the creation of the necessary structures and procedures to allow systematic clearance of CMR.
- Ukraine should elaborate a strategic plan for mine action, including for CMR survey and clearance.
- Ukraine should establish a centralised mine action database and report on contamination, survey, and clearance activities in a manner consistent with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT

- National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)
- Humanitarian Demining Centre (under the State Emergency Services of Ukraine)
- Social-Humanitarian Response Centre (under the Ministry for Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories)
- Mine Action Centre (under MoD)
- State Special Transport Service (SSTS)
- Military Engineering School

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU)
- Armed Forces of Ukraine
- National Guard
- Security Service
- SSTS
- State Border Service
- Demining Solutions
- The Demining Team of Ukraine
- Ukrainian Deminers Association (UDA)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Danish Refugee Council's (DRC's) Humanitarian Disarmament and Peacebuilding sector (formally known as Danish Demining Group (DDG). Hereafter referred to as DRC)
- Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)
- The HALO Trust
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

OTHER ACTORS

- Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- Mine Action Sub-cluster chaired by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

The extent of contamination from CMR in Ukraine is not known, but is expected to be large due to the widespread use of cluster munitions in the course of the Russian assault on Ukraine. Since the beginning of the conflict on 24 February 2022, humanitarian organisations and media outlets have documented and reported on a myriad of cluster munition attacks carried out by the Russian forces. Human Rights Watch documented the use of cluster munitions in at least eight of Ukraine's twenty-four districts: Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Sumy. Six types of cluster munitions were used: 220mm 9M27K-series Uragan, 300mm 9M55K-series Smerch, 300mm 9M54-series guided missile, 9M79-series Tochka ballistic missile, Iskander-M 9M723 ballistic missile, and RBK-series air-dropped cluster bombs. All these cluster munitions, apart from the RBK-series, were fired from the ground by missiles and rockets. Some of these munitions were manufactured as recently as 2021, and some have self-destructing features.

Human Rights Watch believes that, to date, there have already been several hundred cluster munition strikes in the course of the 2022 conflict in Ukraine.⁵

The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) stated on 30 March 2022 that it had received credible allegations of Russian armed forces using cluster munitions in populated areas at least 24 times, and was investigating allegations of similar use by the Ukrainian armed forces.⁶ An investigation by *The New York Times* claimed that the Ukrainian army used cluster munitions while trying to retake Husarivka village, which was occupied at the time by the Russian forces, on 6–7 March 2022. Ukrainian army officials did not deny using cluster munitions, but in response to the article declared that the armed forces strictly adhere to the norms of the international humanitarian law (IHL) in their use of weapons.⁷

- 1 Human Rights Watch, "Intense and Lasting Harm: Cluster Munition Attacks in Ukraine", Report, 11 May 2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3wJ6Or4>; Amnesty International, "Everything is on fire": One month since the Russian invasion of Ukraine", 24 March 2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3lyZrgK>; Article 36, "Article 36 condemns Russia's use of cluster munitions in Ukraine", 16 March 2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3PymSES>.
- 2 "See how Kharkiv's bomb squad neutralizes cluster bombs in Ukraine", National Public Radio (NPR), 24 April 2022, at: <https://n.pr/3NqnQ47>; Ukraine's State Emergency Service Facebook page, 8 May 2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3G04DDJ>.
- 3 Human Rights Watch Report, "Intense and Lasting Harm: Cluster Munition Attacks in Ukraine", 11 May 2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3wJ6Or4>; and "To Push Back Russians, Ukrainians Hit a Village With Cluster Munitions", *The New York Times*, 18 April 2022, at: <https://nyti.ms/3sSAUr5>.
- 4 Online presentation by Hannah Rose Holloway, Humanitarian Disarmament and Peacebuilding Coordinator, Danish Refugee Council (DRC), CCM Intersessional Meeting, Geneva, 16 May 2022.
- 5 Human Rights Watch, "Intense and Lasting Harm: Cluster Munition Attacks in Ukraine", Report, 11 May 2022; and online presentation to the CCM Intersessional Meetings by Mary Wareham, Advocacy Director, Human Rights Watch, 16 May 2022.
- 6 Statement of Michelle Bachelet, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 30 March 2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3M6N1bB>.
- 7 "To Push Back Russians, Ukrainians Hit a Village With Cluster Munitions", *New York Times*, 18 April 2022; and Human Rights Watch, "Intense and Lasting Harm: Cluster Munition Attacks in Ukraine", Report, 11 May 2022, p. 23.

Before 2022, Ukraine said that many unexploded submunitions contaminated the Donetsk and Luhansk regions,⁸ with the most intensive use of cluster munitions said to have occurred in and around the city of Debalcevo in Donetsk oblast.⁹ Since 2017 and again in 2020, Ukraine estimated, implausibly, that total contamination by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW, including CMR) could extend over 7,000km².¹⁰ The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence (MoD) has accepted that this is a “rough” estimate.¹¹ It was further suggested that up to one fifth of the explosive contamination in Ukraine is from mines, while the rest is from different ERW, including CMR.¹²

Prior to February 2022, the heaviest mine and ERW contamination was believed to be inside the non-delineated 15km buffer areas on either side of the frontline separating Ukrainian government-controlled areas (GCA) from territories controlled by the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk Republics.¹³ Survey and clearance by The HALO Trust on the GCA side of the buffer zone in 2021 confirmed the presence of a combination of anti-personnel mines, CMR, and other ERW.¹⁴

Multiple reports from 2014 and 2015 indicated that both government forces and pro-Russian rebels used cluster munitions in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of eastern Ukraine. This included Smerch (Tornado) and Uragan (Hurricane) cluster munition rockets, which deliver 9N210 and 9N235 anti-personnel fragmentation submunitions; 300mm 9M55K cluster munition rockets with 9N235 submunitions; and 220mm 9M27K-series cluster munition rockets.¹⁵ In 2021, HALO Trust discovered 1.57km² of previously unrecorded CMR contamination in six confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) that it believes dates back to the 2014–15 conflict.¹⁶

NEW USE OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS

As noted above, the 2022 conflict in Ukraine saw repeated use of cluster munitions since its first day. The new use has been extensively covered and documented by media and international organisations, including Amnesty International, Bellingcat, and Human Rights Watch. At least 11 attacks were recorded between 24 February and 9 April, many of which have seemingly targeted civilian objects protected under IHL, including hospitals,¹⁷ sparking widespread international condemnation and allegations of possible war crimes.¹⁸

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES

Ukraine is contaminated by considerable quantities of other ERW as well as by anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines used during the different conflicts (see Mine Action Review’s *Clearing the Mines* report on Ukraine for further information on the mine problem). It is also affected by unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) remaining from the First World War and Second World War¹⁹ and remnants of Soviet military training and abandoned stockpiles.

8 National Security and Defence Council and State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU), “Humanitarian demining in Ukraine: current issues and challenges”, Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties (14MSP), Side event, Geneva, 2 December 2015.

9 Interview with Lt.-Col. Yevhenii Zubarevskiy, Mine Action Department, Ministry of Defence (MoD), in Geneva, 20 May 2016.

10 “Measures to ensure compliance”, presentation by Col. Viktor Kuzmin, Deputy Chief, Engineer Troops, Armed Forces of Ukraine, provided to the APMBC Implementation Support Unit at the APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 9 June 2017, at: <http://bit.ly/2EoMS2u>; 2020 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 1.

11 Interview with Maksym Komisarov, Chief of Mine Action Department, MoD, in Geneva, 8 June 2018.

12 Ibid.

13 Emails from Yuri Shahramanyan, Programme Manager, HALO Trust Ukraine, 24 May 2017; and Henry Leach, Head of Programme, DDG Ukraine, 29 May 2017.

14 Emails from Imogen Churchill, Senior Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 23 March 2022; and Almedina Musić, Head of Humanitarian Disarmament and Peacebuilding, DRC, 7 February 2022.

15 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Ukraine: Widespread use of cluster munitions”, 20 October 2014, at: <http://bit.ly/2WgCZ0n>; “Ukraine used cluster bombs, evidence”, *The New York Times*, 20 October 2014; HRW, “Ukraine: Attacks require better investigation”, 19 December 2014; “A test of the new Ukraine’s commitment to reform”, 15 January 2015; “Ukraine: More Civilians killed in Cluster Munition Attacks”, 19 March 2015; and Protection Cluster Ukraine, “Eastern Ukraine: Brief on the need for humanitarian mine action activities”, undated, but accessed on Protection Cluster website, 5 May 2016, at: <http://bit.ly/2YKhME2>; Armament Research Services, “9M55K cargo rockets and 9N235 submunitions in Ukraine”, Blog entry, 3 July 2014, at: <http://bit.ly/2YE33AB>.

16 Email from Imogen Churchill, HALO Trust, 23 March 2022.

17 Human Rights Watch, “Ukraine: Russian Cluster Munition Hits Hospital”, 25 February 2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3wqWeGe>; Amnesty International, “Cluster munitions kill child and two other civilians taking shelter at a preschool in Ukraine”, 27 February 2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3wmdVFI>; OHCHR, “Update on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 26 March 2022”, at: <https://bit.ly/3yPZyMP>; Human Rights Watch, “Ukraine: Cluster Munitions Launched Into Kharkiv Neighborhoods”, 4 March 2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3N4IPu5>; Human Rights Watch Report, “Intense and Lasting Harm: Cluster Munition Attacks in Ukraine, Report, 11 May 2022; “To Push Back Russians, Ukrainians Hit a Village With Cluster Munitions”, *The New York Times*, 18 April 2022; Human Rights Watch, “Ukraine: Cluster Munitions Repeatedly Used on Mykolaiv”, 17 March 2022, at: <https://bit.ly/37zfb01>; “In shattered Chernihiv, Russian siege leaves a city asking, ‘Why?’”, *The Washington Post*, 5 April 2022, at: <https://wapo.st/37XfUIq>; and Médecins sans Frontières (MSF), “Area around hospitals, houses, bombed in Mykolaiv”, 5 April 2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3NviCPE>.

18 Human Rights Watch, “End Cluster Munition Attacks in Ukraine”, 11 May 2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3lx3cTX>; and “Early Signs of War Crimes and Human Rights Abuses Committed by the Russian Military during the Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine”, 16 March 2022, at: <https://bit.ly/385TFA7>; Mines Action Canada, “Cluster Munition Use in Ukraine Condemned”, at: <https://bit.ly/3Npw0d2>; and Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) “ICBL-CMC Condemns Russia Cluster Bomb Use and Civilian Harm in Ukraine Conflict”, 25 February, at: <https://bit.ly/38FGV4>.

19 See, e.g., “During a Year in Kerch and Sevastopol neutralized 33 thousands of munitions”, *Forum*, 4 December 2009.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The national bodies involved in the mine action centre in Ukraine include, the MoD, the Ministry of Interior (MoI), under which sits the SESU; the Ministry for Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories; the State Special Transport Services (SSTS) of the MoD; the National Police; and the State Border Service.

Ukraine's national mine action legislation (Law No. 2642), was originally adopted by parliament on 6 December 2018 and signed into law by the President on 22 January 2019.²⁰ However, the government did not proceed to implement the Law on the grounds that it was inconsistent with a number of other legal acts. None of the institutions was created and the national mine action response in Ukraine has remained uncoordinated as a consequence. In addition to the lack of implementation, the Law also had gaps and weaknesses in its regulation of the safety and efficiency of mine action operators.²¹

In June 2020, the "Law on the Amendments to the Law on Mine Action in Ukraine" passed its first reading. Following this, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Project Coordinator in Ukraine (PCU), The HALO Trust, and the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) came together to prepare an explanatory note suggesting further amendments.²² The amendments to the Law on Mine Action in Ukraine was finally signed off by the president in December 2020 and the recommendations of the working group were broadly taken into account. Yet, the new Law fell short of addressing two major concerns of the mine action community, namely: operators' licence to carry out disposal, destruction, and transportation of explosive items for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) procedures, and operators' permits for the importation and use of so-called dual-use items. Additional legislative amendments are required to resolve these two concerns,²³ which as of writing, remained unresolved.²⁴

The approved Law established a framework for humanitarian demining, dividing responsibilities among State institutions, and foresaw the creation of an NMAA. However, it had a peculiarity in that it envisaged the creation of two National Mine Action Centres (NMACs): one under the MoD and a second under SESU (which sits under the MoI). The latter centre was named the "Special Humanitarian Demining Centre". The two NMACs share the remits of information

management (IM), quality assurance (QA), monitoring, planning, and certification of the operators and their responsibility is divided territorially.²⁵ The Humanitarian Demining Centre is in charge of all humanitarian demining across Ukraine with the exception of MoD infrastructure, railways (out to five metres on both sides of the tracks), which is the remit of SSTS, and some other specific areas assigned to other agencies.²⁶ The decision to create two NMACs as opposed to one comes as a compromise after competition between the MoD and MoI on who takes the lead on mine action.²⁷ But it does not augur well for either efficient or effective mine action.

The authorities reported during an online sub-cluster meeting that, by the end of 2021, the Humanitarian Demining Centre has been created in Merefa (in eastern Ukraine) and the MoD NMAC was in an advanced stage of development in Chernihiv (in northern Ukraine) with 100% of senior management fully recruited and 70% of overall personnel recruitment completed.²⁸ The HALO Trust reported, though, that neither of the centres was fully operational as at March 2022.²⁹ The Ministry for Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories was also setting up a Social-Humanitarian Response Centre, which will coordinate victim assistance and explosive ordnance risk education.³⁰

In November 2021, the Cabinet of Ministers issued Resolution No. 1207 "On Establishment of National Mine Action Authority", providing the framework for the future NMAA. It was defined as an interagency state body acting on an advisory and collegial basis under the chairmanship of the Minister of Defence. The chairmanship of the NMAA will be transferred to the MoI once Ukraine restores territorial integrity over its internationally recognised borders by decision of the Cabinet of Ministers.³¹ The NMAA coordinates the ministries, local self-government, central and local state bodies, and other organisations (including mine action operators). The NMAA forms and ensures national mine action state policy; monitors and reports on state's progress in fulfilling its obligations in mine action field taken under international treaties; and coordinates the development and execution of mine action strategy, national mine action programme, and action plan.³² While the NMAA sits at a ministerial level, it is serviced by a secretariat that also "has some managerial functions."³³

20 OSCE, "Ukrainian parliament adopts legal framework for mine action, with OSCE advice provided", 10 December 2018, at: <http://bit.ly/2QdTa9q>; interview with Miljenko Vahtarić, OSCE PCU, 7 February 2019; and email, 13 June 2019.

21 DRC-DDG Legal Alert Special, "Mine Action Law Amendment", Issue 56, September 2020.

22 Email from Almedina Musić, DRC, 20 April 2021.

23 Email from Ronan Shenhav, HALO Trust, 20 April 2021.

24 Emails from Imogen Churchill, HALO Trust, 23 March 2022; and Almedina Musić, DRC, 7 February 2022.

25 DRC-DDG Legal Alert Special, "Mine Action Law Amendment", Issue 56, September 2020; and interview with Miljenko Vahtarić, OSCE PCU, 13 February 2020.

26 SESU, 'Public Report of the Head of the SESU on the SESU operational results in 2020' (in Ukrainian), at: <https://bit.ly/3wb8Lev>, p. 13; and email from Nick Vovk, Project Manager, DRC, 3 June 2021.

27 Interview with Miljenko Vahtarić, OSCE PCU, 10 May 2021.

28 Email from Almedina Musić, DRC, 7 February 2022.

29 Email from Imogen Churchill, HALO Trust, 23 March 2022.

30 Emails from Imogen Churchill, HALO Trust, 23 March 2022; and Almedina Musić, DRC, 7 February 2022.

31 DRC Special Legal Alert – "NMAA Framework 2022", Issue 73, January 2022; and email from Miljenko Vahtarić, OSCE PCU, 1 July 2022.

32 DRC Special Legal Alert – "NMAA Framework 2022", Issue 73, January 2022.

33 Email from GICHD, 17 June 2022.

Operators participate in monthly mine action sub-cluster meetings, which are attended by representatives of the MoD, SESU, the Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories, and which are chaired by UNDP. There are also regular roundtable meetings organised by OSCE PCU on specific mine action topics and other sectoral relevant discussions.³⁴ The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) convened an NMAS working group and an IMSMA working group,³⁵ to add to the information management (IM) working group established in 2020 and which has remained active during the 2022 conflict.³⁶

There is an overall positive environment and facilitation of the operators' work by the Ukrainian government (e.g., granting of visas, collaboration on security matters).³⁷ But operators continue to face difficulties importing armoured equipment and dual-use items.³⁸

Since the 2022 conflict, all operators, including those yet to be certified, have supported Ukraine in demining, explosive ordnance risk education (EORE), and building of national capacities.³⁹ The DRC, for one, supported the Ukrainian authorities so that they can continue providing services related to mine action. Technical, non-technical, and clearance activities have taken place around Kyiv and Kyiv district with the support of 30 deminers. DRC has also been providing risk education and training in EOD.⁴⁰ In 2021, DRC supported or equipped 13 SESU demining teams, 2 non-technical survey teams, and 1 EOD team; trained 60 IM personnel from 25 regional centres; trained 35 deminers on mechanical mine clearance, battle area clearance (BAC), and

technical survey; revised and adapted standard operational procedures (SOPs) to be IMAS compliant; equipped the SESU training centre in Merefa and the regional coordination cell in Rubizne; procured metal detectors and protective personal equipment (PPE); and provided 10 new vehicles, including an armoured vehicle for the EOD team.⁴¹

In 2021, the GICHD led or co-led various capacity building efforts for the Ukrainian authorities: a non-technical survey training course delivered in two parts, an operational efficiency roundtable discussion led by the GICHD-OSCE in September, and a training on IMAS and land release in October 2021.⁴² The HALO Trust provided further training and workshops to national mine action stakeholders.⁴³

Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) has provided SESU with EOD clearance equipment, PPE, medical supplies, and communication equipment. NPA has also been engaging directly with SESU with a view to future cooperation in the fields of EORE, and mine detection dogs (MDD).⁴⁴

The OSCE PCU organised two regional roundtables on strategic planning and land release. In addition, together with GICHD and the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), OSCE organised trainings on non-technical survey, and several workshops on topics including NMAS, IMAS, EORE, and geographic information system (GIS). In addition, OSCE sponsored the participation of the Ukrainian delegation in the 25th meeting of mine action national directors (NDM) in June 2022, and donated four vehicles and 20 electronic tablets for non-technical survey and quality control teams of the MAC.⁴⁵

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

The current Ukrainian NMAS include a chapter (11.2.9) on "Environmental regulations", and a section (12.6) on "Environment, occupational health and safety".⁴⁶

DRC has an environmental management system in place, which is stipulated in its SOP (1.13) on health, safety and environmental management. The SOPs were approved by Ukraine's military unit acting in accordance with the regulations of the certification body.⁴⁷ FSD has detailed SOPs on environmental management (SOP 17.0) and work safe practices (SOP 02). These SOPs are in accordance with IMAS and comply with Ukrainian legal requirements.⁴⁸

The HALO Trust works in line with the IMAS and is accredited to the ISO 14001:2015 environmental standards, aiming to adhere to or exceed their requirements. HALO SOPs aim to leave the environment in a state equivalent to or better than prior to the completion of demining operations. The HALO Trust aligns its environmental management policy with NMAS as well as national laws on environmental protection and any other relevant regulations or guidelines in the country of operation. HALO's SOPs contain recommendations on the environmental protection measures that should be taken to ensure that environments affected by survey and clearance operations are not degraded by the work, and, once demining is completed, are fit for their intended use.⁴⁹

34 Emails from Toby Robinson, HALO Trust, 27 April 2020; Almedina Musić, DDG, 23 April 2020; and GICHD, 13 May 2020.

35 Email from Imogen Churchill, HALO Trust, 23 March 2022.

36 Email from GICHD, 18 May 2022.

37 Emails from Almedina Musić, DRC, 7 February 2022; and Imogen Churchill, HALO Trust, 23 March 2022.

38 Emails from GICHD, 13 May 2020; Almedina Musić, DRC, 20 April 2021; and Tony Connell, Country Director, Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), 24 March 2021.

39 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, OSCE PCU, 1 July 2022.

40 Online presentation by Hannah Rose Holloway, DRC, to the CCM Intersessional Meeting, Geneva, 16 May 2022.

41 Email from Almedina Musić, DRC, 7 February 2022.

42 Email from GICHD, 18 May 2022.

43 Email from Imogen Churchill, HALO Trust, 23 March 2022.

44 Email from Alberto Serra, Programme Manager, NPA, 5 July 2022.

45 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, OSCE PCU, 1 July 2022.

46 Emails from Almedina Musić, DRC, 7 February 2022; and Imogen Churchill, HALO Trust, 23 March 2022.

47 Emails from Almedina Musić, DRC, 7 February and 13 June 2022.

48 Email from Tony Connell, FSD, 10 June 2022.

49 Email from Imogen Churchill, HALO Trust, 23 March 2022.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

As at May 2021, no information had been provided on whether there is a gender policy and associated implementation plan for mine action in Ukraine. No reference was made to gender or diversity in Ukraine's Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in 2020 or in Ukraine's APMBC Article 7 report covering 2020.⁵⁰

DRC has a global gender and diversity policy, and a country-specific implementation plan. Following an assessment conducted by the GICHD of DRC's Ukraine's mission in 2021, the programme was evaluated as very strong in all age, gender, and diversity mainstreaming aspects. Some of the strengths assessed were: integrated and inclusive community liaison and needs assessments, deployment of mixed gender humanitarian demining teams, gender-sensitive human resources practices, a positive and encouraging work culture, and an excellent awareness of the safeguarding system. All DRC's mine action data is age, gender, and disability disaggregated. In 2021, of the total 114 staff members, 20 women were employed in operations positions and eight in managerial/supervisory positions, making a total of 25% of the workforce of DRC's Humanitarian Disarmament and Peacebuilding Sector in Ukraine.⁵¹

FSD uses mixed gender non-technical survey and manual clearance teams and employs women in management roles within its country office. In 2021, the Deputy Country Director, Senior Finance Officer, Operations Coordinator,

two risk education team leaders, one non-technical survey team leader, and one Support to Education team leader were women. FSD states that it is a strong advocate of promoting talent and recognising skills regardless of gender. At the end of 2021, 29% of FSD's national staff were female, of whom 24% were in operational roles.⁵²

The HALO Trust uses mixed gender non-technical survey and community liaison teams.⁵³ HALO seeks to increase the number of women employed in operational roles and improve gender balance in these roles. It has an equality and diversity policy and is working globally on a gender and diversity implementation plan. In September 2021, HALO introduced a new benefit for female employees and single fathers to reimburse childcare costs for children aged three to six. HALO continues to tailor job adverts towards women, and ensures that voices of women are heard in case they have differing accounts of contamination and its effects during non-technical surveys. As of December 2021, 25% of HALO's national staff and 22% of its operational staff were women. In addition, 18% of international and cross-posted staff were women.⁵⁴

The OSCE PCU translated into Ukrainian two GICHD brochures: the 'Recruitment and Training Guidelines' and 'Gender and Priority Setting'. It subsequently distributed the translated brochures to partners and government officials.⁵⁵

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Ukraine uses the International Management Systems for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core database. The database is housed in two separate servers, one owned by SESU and the other by the MoD.⁵⁶ Both entities collect and analyse contamination and land release data from national operators and NGOs using the harmonised forms and reporting systems.⁵⁷ The main server at SESU was subject to cyberattacks shortly before the Russian military offensive on 24 February, which meant that the GICHD and the IM Working Group subsequently needed to re-establish large parts of the data.⁵⁸ As at May 2022, the IMSMA database was not yet fully functional.⁵⁹

The GICHD continued supporting SESU and MOD to establish their respective IMSMA databases, which is a key pillar of its work in Ukraine.⁶⁰ In collaboration with the OSCE, GICHD also provided training on IMAS and land release in October, which was attended by representatives of SESU, the Humanitarian Demining Centre, the Mine Action Centre, the STT, and the Ministry for Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories. Since the end of 2020, the GICHD has dedicated an IM advisor for Ukraine, and maintained a pool of consultants who can provide additional ad-hoc support on IM.⁶¹

According to DRC, all data collection forms both in hardcopy and online format cover the key qualitative and quantitative indicators of mine action activities and meet minimum data requirements in accordance to IMAS 05.10.⁶²

50 2020 Article 5 deadline extension request, Annex A.

51 Emails from Almedina Musić, DRC, 7 February and 13 June 2022.

52 Email from Tony Connell, FSD, 10 June 2022.

53 Emails from Yuri Shahramanyan, HALO Trust Ukraine, 24 May 2017 and 16 May 2019.

54 Email from Imogen Churchill, HALO Trust, 23 March 2022.

55 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, OSCE PCU, 1 July 2022.

56 Email from GICHD, 17 June 2022.

57 Emails from Lt.-Col. Yevhenii Zubarevskiy, MoD, 21 October 2016 and 27 June 2017; and GICHD, 17 June 2022.

58 Email from GICHD, 17 June 2022.

59 Email from Imogen Churchill, HALO Trust, 23 March 2022.

60 Emails from GICHD, 18 May 2022; and Imogen Churchill, HALO Trust, 23 March.

61 Email from GICHD, 18 May 2022.

62 Email from Almedina Musić, DRC, 7 February 2022.

DRC delivered an IM workshop for 60 key IM SESU personnel from 25 regional departments and five central SESU offices. The trainees also received courses on MS Excel, MS Access with data management, data analysis, geographic information system (GIS), and aeronautical reconnaissance coverage geographic information system (ArcGIS).⁶³ During further workshops, all IM SESU staff installed the application ArcGIS Survey123 on their mobile devices and PCs; received access to IMSMA Core mobile data collection forms; and tested IMSMA Core. DRC also supported SESU to develop IM SOPs for the first time. The IM SOPs are based on DRC IM SOPs which are IMAS compliant.⁶⁴

FSD conducted the initial trials of Survey123 in conjunction with GICHD during 2021, before the system was subject to further development.⁶⁵

The GICHD continued to chair the IM Working Group and meet on a regular basis in 2021. The group was attended by IM personnel from DRC, FSD, HALO Trust, the GICHD, NPA, MoD, the Ministry for Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories, and SESU.⁶⁶ The group discussed substantive data that should be recorded in the national database, and minimum reporting requirements for data collection forms. The following reports were agreed and started being used: the risk education data collection form, cancellation report, completion report, and non-technical survey forms.⁶⁷

While the quality of official reporting was expected to improve markedly in light of all the capacity development support that Ukraine has received on information management, the new large-scale contamination and the need to focus on emergency clearance means that Ukraine will now require more time to translate this capacity building support into quality information management and reporting.

PLANNING AND TASKING

Ukraine does not have a national mine action strategy, but as of June 2022, the NMAA secretariat has set as a priority the creation of a "national programme", and asked the GICHD and the OSCE to support its drafting.⁶⁸

There are currently no standardised criteria at national level for task prioritisation.⁶⁹ The MoD does not issue task dossiers but approves an annual plan with the list of all known locations planned by an operator for either clearance or survey.⁷⁰ Local government have been helping the MoD to prioritise tasks based on humanitarian criteria.⁷¹ Operators prioritise clearance according to humanitarian impact and in discussion with the local community.⁷²

DRC continues to prioritise areas for survey and clearance according to its integrated mine action and development programming, and as defined by communities or local officials during non-technical survey.⁷³ DRC began in 2021 an in-depth consultation process with conflict-affected communities in order to prioritise and plan its mine activities, and to advocate for tasking with the NMAA. DRC's area-based development approach begins with a stakeholder mapping exercise, following which, field visits are conducted to consult with all major local-level stakeholders, with gender, age, disability, and displacement representation considerations, using integrated needs assessment forms to collect data on the socio-economic interactions with EO contamination. Further community consultation feeds back into decision-making on the targeting of clearance, survey, and risk education.⁷⁴

HALO uses its "internal prioritisation matrix", which takes into account different humanitarian factors such as number of people who use the area of the task, proximity to settlements, proximity of schools and hospitals, number of accidents recorded, as well as threat type, balancing these considerations with security and access considerations.⁷⁵

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid.

65 Email from Tony Connell, FSD, 10 June 2022.

66 Emails from Imogen Churchill, HALO Trust, 23 March 2022; and Almedina Musić, DRC, 7 February 2022.

67 Ibid.

68 Email from GICHD, 17 June 2022.

69 Emails from Henry Leach, DDG Ukraine, 2 May 2019; Yuri Shahramanyan, HALO Trust Ukraine, 16 May 2019; and Almedina Musić, DRC, 7 February 2022.

70 Email from Almedina Musić, DRC, 7 February 2022.

71 Interviews with Lt.-Col. Yevhenii Zubarevskiy, Ministry of Defence, in Geneva, 20 May 2016; and Maksym Komisarov, MoD, in Geneva, 8 June 2018.

72 Emails from Almedina Musić, DDG, 23 April 2020; and Toby Robinson, HALO Trust, 27 April 2020.

73 Email from Almedina Musić, DRC, 7 February 2022.

74 Ibid.

75 Email from Imogen Churchill, HALO Trust, 23 March 2022.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

NMAS were finalised by the MoD in September 2018 after multi-year input and review from key stakeholders.⁷⁶ However, the NMAS did not consider all the inputs from the mine action stakeholders and have not been updated regularly to address new challenges and ensure employment of best practices.⁷⁷ In May 2020, representatives from the GICHD, OSCE PCU, DRC, and HALO Trust formed a working group with the objective of revising NMAS to better align it with the IMAS. The working group submitted its recommendations to the MoD, the acting NMAA at that time.⁷⁸ According to DRC, the Ukrainian government had set a deadline to finalise the NMAS by August 2021,⁷⁹ a target that was then postponed to April 2023 due to delays in establishing the NMAA.⁸⁰ In January 2022, HALO received information from the MoD saying that, while in waiting for professional support from the GICHD to develop national standards, amendments to the national standards were not to be expected before April 2023.⁸¹

DRC, FSD, and HALO consider that the current NMAS are yet to be fully developed to meet the needs of the mine action sector in Ukraine.⁸² In July 2021, the GICHD submitted the recommendations on behalf of the technical working group to the MoD for its consideration.⁸³ The recommendations suggested improvements on the liability clause, monitoring

of land release operations, and considerations on all reasonable efforts. According to the GICHD, Ukraine has developed NMAS that are in line with IMAS with GICHD support in the past. Now with the conflict unfolding, the review and application of standards has become an important topic which will need further support. The GICHD intends to continue its work supporting the national authorities in developing NMAS once the conditions are right.⁸⁴

In April 2019, the Cabinet of Ministers approved Resolution 372 on "Regulations on marking mine and ERW hazards", which are said to follow the provisions in the IMAS.⁸⁵

DRC has been working with the military unit "A2641" acting in accordance with the regulations of the certification body, and was officially requested to submit its application for accreditation in February 2021. The process was completed at the end of 2021 with a physical inspection, and DRC received its certificates of conformity for manual mine clearance, BAC, risk education, technical, and non-technical survey by December 2021. According to DRC, the resolution of establishment of NMAA in November 2021 aims at addressing the issue of delayed accreditations that resulted from the lack of fully functional mine action structures in the preceding years.⁸⁶

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

The MoD and several other ministries continue to deploy units that undertake clearance and destruction of mines and ERW. This includes the military engineering school, which has a licence to accredit operators; the National Guard of Ukraine; the Mol, which conducts clearance through SESU and also has an engineering department that conducts EOD; the Security Service; the SSTS, which is responsible for demining national infrastructure; and the State Border Service, which conducts demining in areas under its control on land and in the sea.⁸⁷

Three international demining organisations—DRC, FSD, and The HALO Trust—are operating in Ukraine.⁸⁸

In 2019, the Ukrainian organisations Demining Team of Ukraine and Demining Solutions were active in demining in the east of the country.⁸⁹ In its 2020 APMB Article 5 deadline extension request, Ukraine reported that 41 demining "groups" with a total of more than 500 people were involved in mine action from these organisations.⁹⁰ Since the beginning of the conflict in 2022, SESU reportedly deployed more than 600 deminers across the country, and was rushing to hire more. One SESU unit cleared approximately 30 items of UXO per day.⁹¹

76 Email from Gianluca Maspoli, GICHD, 25 September 2018; and Miljenko Vahtarić, OSCE PCU, 25 September 2018; and Interview with Miljenko Vahtarić, OSCE PCU, 7 February 2019.

77 Email from GICHD, 30 April 2021.

78 Emails from Almedina Musić, DRC, 20 April 2021; and Ronan Shenhav, HALO Trust, 20 April 2021.

79 Email from Almedina Musić, DRC, 26 July 2021.

80 Email from Almedina Musić, DRC, 7 February 2022.

81 Email from Imogen Churchill, HALO Trust, 23 March 2022.

82 Emails from Almedina Musić, DRC, 7 February 2022; Imogen Churchill, HALO Trust, 23 March 2022; and Tony Connell, FSD, 10 June 2022.

83 Email from Almedina Musić, DRC, 7 February 2022.

84 Email from GICHD, 18 May 2022.

85 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, OSCE PCU, 13 June 2019; and Ministry for Temporarily Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons, "Danger! Mines! Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Approved Regulations of Marking Mine and ERW Hazards, Developed By MTOT", 4 May 2019, at: <http://bit.ly/2l06vCA>.

86 Email from Almedina Musić, DRC, 13 July 2022.

87 Interview with Col. Oleksandr Shchebatiuk, Ukrainian Armed Forces, in Geneva, 26 June 2015; email from Anton Shevchenko, OSCE, 23 June 2015; "Mine Action in Ukraine", Side-event presentation by Lt.-Col. Yevhenii Zubarevskyi, MoD, Geneva, 17 February 2016; Article 7 Report (covering 2018), Form F, and email from GICHD, 17 June 2022.

88 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request; and Article 7 Report (covering 2018), Form F.

89 Email from Gianluca Maspoli, GICHD, 20 June 2017; "Tightening with the process of mine clearance in the East of Ukraine can lead to a new crisis", *Military Informant*, 25 July 2016, at: <http://bit.ly/2Qf1jeg>; and "Presentation of the Demining team of Ukraine", SD Crisis, 26 April 2017, at: <http://bit.ly/2wb6DG7>.

90 2020 Article 5 deadline Extension Request.

91 "Clearing the deadly litter of unexploded Russian bombs in Ukraine", *The Washington Post*, 15 April 2022, at: <https://wapo.st/37XmuPc>.

Table 1: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2021⁹²

Operator	Manual teams	Total deminers*	Dogs and handlers	Machines**	Comments
DRC	8	60	0	0	Five teams (41 deminers) between January and May 2021, then increased to eight teams (60 deminers) for the remaining of 2021.
HALO	23	299	0	3	1x JCB excavator 1x Case frontloader 1x Volvo frontloader Initial trials of a tractor with harrow magnet attachment started. ⁹³
FSD***	3	20	0	0	One clearance team operated with only six deminers. Medics and drivers are cross-trained as deminers, and have therefore been included.
Demining Solutions***	1	7	0	0	
Totals	35	386	0	3	

* Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers unless otherwise stated. ** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.

*** Data correct as at the end of 2020.

In 2021, DRC deployed two non-technical survey personnel in one team, then in July 2021, increased to four non-technical survey personnel in two teams. All of DRC’s technical survey teams are trained and equipped to conduct manual mine clearance and BAC. This is double the technical and demining capacity deployed in 2020. The number of DRC’s clearance teams (including technical survey), increased by three in 2021 compared to the previous year, reaching eight at the end of 2021, thanks to secured donor funding. DRC might create one more clearance and one non-technical survey teams in 2022, contingent upon funding, but as at June 2022, the Russian military offensive did not allow for this increase to happen and DRC was reassessing the need to step up its capacity.⁹⁴

FSD suspended demining operations in 2019 due to lack of funding but later secured additional funds and restarted its programme in 2020.⁹⁵ As at June 2022, FSD has started both non-technical survey and risk education activities in Chernihiv, and was recruiting additional staff from Chernihiv and Kyiv regions in preparation for a rapid response and BAC tasking by August 2022. FSD plans to deploy seven clearance teams, three non-technical survey, and three risk education teams, and is waiting for an import clearance from the Ukrainian authorities to deploy an MV4, armoured front-end loaders, armoured excavators, and tipper trucks. FSD also

plans to increase its international staff from one to nine, and its national staff from 53 to 105.⁹⁶

The HALO Trust deployed 12 non-technical survey personnel across three teams until October 2021, then increased by one additional four-strong non-technical survey team until the end of the same year thanks to additional secured funds. Similar to the previous year, HALO deployed three teams of 18 technical survey personnel. Apart from an increase of one-technical survey team, HALO has maintained the same survey and clearance capacity in 2021 compared to the previous year. In 2022, The HALO Trust planned to increase its non-technical survey capacity by one more team, and to increase its clearance teams by reducing their size but augmenting their number, in line with HALO’s global practices.⁹⁷

The HALO Trust used Minehound detectors in combination with rapid excavation drills on appropriate tasks in the first half of 2021. It also changed its approach to the use of remote vegetation cutting devices, which enabled more efficient manual clearance. HALO also started increasing the scope of the types of tasks (threat types) where these machines can be deployed. Initial trials started on the use of a harrow magnet, but conclusions were yet to be drawn.⁹⁸

92 Emails from Almedina Musić, DRC, 7 February 2022; and Imogen Churchill, HALO Trust, 23 March 2022.

93 The harrow magnet system combines a power harrow with a large, fixed magnet pulled by an armoured tractor. The system is designed to improve productivity on heavily metal-contaminated hazardous areas that do not contain landmines (battle areas or unplanned explosions at munitions sites). The harrow breaks up the soil and the magnet collects metal which can then be inspected for any hazardous items. A metal detector can then rapidly clear the land for any remaining EO once the majority of metal has been removed. This is a technique pioneered by HALO in Afghanistan that has been shown to significantly improve the speed of clearance. Email from Imogen Churchill, HALO Trust, 23 March 2022, 17 June 2022.

94 Emails from Almedina Musić, DRC, 7 February and 13 June 2022.

95 Email from Tony Connell, FSD, 24 March 2021.

96 Email from Tony Connell, FSD, 10 June 2022.

97 Emails from Ronan Shenhav, HALO Trust, 20 April 2021; and Imogen Churchill, HALO Trust, 23 March 2022.

98 Ibid.

The COVID-19 pandemic had a direct impact on DRC's Ukraine operations mainly due to the three-month lockdown and procurement challenges. DRC had to postpone some compulsory pre-deployment training courses. Local restrictions in place also lead to a reduction of training attendees and demining operations.⁹⁹

HALO reported that COVID-19 reduced efficiency due to mitigation measures such as limits on the number of people in a vehicle and deployment of staff from home. In addition, working time was lost because precautionary isolation of staff who were in contact with positive cases.¹⁰⁰

On 19 May 2022, the GICHD issued a first edition of an explosive ordnance guidance for Ukraine. The guidance aimed to assist qualified personnel conducting survey and EO reconnaissance work to correctly identify EO and understand some of the associated hazards.¹⁰¹ In June 2022, the GICHD was preparing for a second edition of the guide and intended to collaborate with SESU on reviewing the technical terminology of the Ukrainian version.¹⁰²

Following the decision by NPA's management board to initiate a humanitarian response in Ukraine, NPA has been working to establish a mine action programme based out of Kyiv with funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA). Since 15 May 2022, NPA has a country office with three international staff, and has been seeking registration and accreditation. NPA has also had discussions with the national operator, Ukrainian Deminer's Association (UDA), on the possibility of partnership in EORE, conflict preparedness, and protection.¹⁰³

NPA's plans for the immediate future are focused on reducing the humanitarian impact of EO and weapons through a combination of survey, clearance, and risk education projects. NPA is planning to certify, recruit, train, equip, and deploy four non-technical teams and two multi-task teams conducting EOD, clearance, and BAC by the end of 2022. UDA is operating in several districts (oblasts) conducting non-technical survey, EORE, EOD, and clearance.¹⁰⁴

DEMINER SAFETY

The SESU reported to the media that, as at 15 April 2022, 29 deminers had been killed while on duty, and 73 had been injured. Demining teams have had to work under the assumption that any object could have a mine attached.¹⁰⁵

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2021

None of the international operators released any cluster munition-contaminated area through survey in 2021, as in the previous two years.¹⁰⁶ A total of 1.57km² of previously unrecorded CMR contamination was discovered by HALO Trust in 2021.¹⁰⁷

A total of 572,142m² of CMR-contaminated land was cleared in 2021 in Donetsk and Luhansk districts by international operators, destroying in the process four submunitions and seventy-two items of UXO.¹⁰⁸

DRC demining teams manually cleared a total of 273,364m² of cluster munition-contaminated area. Four submunitions and 11 items of UXO were destroyed. The HALO Trust cleared 298,778m² of what was reported as cluster munition-contaminated area. No submunitions were found, but 61 other items of UXO were destroyed.¹⁰⁹

The year 2021 saw a significant increase in clearance compared to 2020 where 16,527m² of CMR-contaminated area was released by clearance, and one submunition destroyed.¹¹⁰ This increase occurred as a result of increased demining capacity in the case of DRC, and more efficient clearance as HALO adjusted its use of remote vegetation-cutting devices to increase efficiency gains in manual clearance.¹¹¹

99 Email from Almedina Musić, DRC, 7 February 2022.

100 Email from Imogen Churchill, HALO Trust, 23 March 2022.

101 GICHD publication, "Explosive Ordnance Guide for Ukraine", 9 May 2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3a4d70j>.

102 Email from GICHD, 17 June 2022.

103 Email from Alberto Serra, NPA, 5 July 2022.

104 Ibid.

105 "Clearing the deadly litter of unexploded Russian bombs in Ukraine", *The Washington Post*, 15 April 2022.

106 Emails from Almedina Musić, DRC, 7 February 2022 and 20 April 2021; Imogen Churchill, HALO Trust, 23 March 2022; Tony Connell, FSD, 24 March 2021; and Ronan Shenhav, HALO Trust, 20 April 2021.

107 Email from Imogen Churchill, HALO Trust, 23 March 2022.

108 Emails from Almedina Musić, DRC, 7 February 2022; and Imogen Churchill, HALO Trust, 23 March 2022.

109 Email from Imogen Churchill, HALO Trust, 23 March 2022.

110 Email from Ronan Shenhav, HALO Trust, 20 April 2021.

111 Emails from Almedina Musić, DRC, 7 February 2022; and Imogen Churchill, HALO Trust, 23 March 2022.

According to SESU, a total of 98,864 items of UXO, including submunitions and landmines (not disaggregated), have been cleared and destroyed between the start of the conflict in 24 February 2022 and 9 May 2022.¹¹² Media reports also quoted a spokesperson of SESU relating that, as at 15 April 2022, 54,000 mines and other items of EO, including almost 2,000 missiles, had been found and deactivated.¹¹³

Table 2: CMR clearance in 2021¹¹⁴

District (oblast)	Sub-district	Village	Operator	Area cleared (m ²)	Submunitions destroyed	Other UXO destroyed
Luhansk	Shchastynskiyi	Peredilske	DRC	130,468	4	0
Luhansk	Shchastynskiyi	Schastia	DRC	*142,896	0	11
Luhansk	Shchastynskiyi	Dmytrivka**	HALO	*287,272	0	57
Luhansk	Svativskiyi	Svatove	HALO	*286	0	2
Donetsk	Volnovskiyi	Novohryhorivka	HALO	*10,100	0	2
Donetsk	Pokrovskiyi	Slavne**	HALO	*1,120	0	0
Totals				572,142	4	72

* No CMR found in areas with CM threat where clearance took place.

** Areas where non-technical survey suggested a mixed threat of anti-personnel mines and CMR.

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

No target date has been set for the completion of CMR clearance in Ukraine, nor is it realistic to expect one for the foreseeable future given ongoing hostilities. In addition to what is being cleared by international operators, substantial CMR clearance is being undertaken by the MoD and the SESU, some of which is conducted immediately after the contamination has occurred. The clearance conducted by Ukrainian national bodies was not being reported. The 2022 conflict has certainly resulted in new and large-scale contamination. While initial estimates project a timeline of anything between five and twenty years to complete the CMR clearance, these remain pure speculation until Ukraine has conducted a national survey to assess the scale and nature of its new contamination.¹¹⁵

For its part, Russia has obligations under international human rights law to clear CMR as soon as possible, in particular by virtue of its duty to protect the right to life of every person under its jurisdiction, in any areas of Ukraine over which it exercises effective control.

112 Updates provided on SESU's official Facebook page, 9 May 2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3G04DDJ>.

113 "Clearing the deadly litter of unexploded Russian bombs in Ukraine", *The Washington Post*, 15 April 2022.

114 Emails from Imogen Churchill, HALO Trust, 23 March 2022; and Almedina Musić, DRC, 7 February 2022.

115 Online presentation by Hannah Rose Holloway, DRC, CCM Intersessional Meeting, Geneva, 16 May 2022.