

ZIMBABWE

ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2025
(ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE)

PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE	2017	2016
Problem understood	9	9
Target date for completion of mine clearance	6	6
Targeted clearance	8	8
Efficient clearance	8	7
National funding of programme	5	5
Timely clearance	5	5
Land-release system in place	7	7
National mine action standards	8	8
Reporting on progress	7	6
Improving performance	9	9
PERFORMANCE SCORE: GOOD	7.2	7.0

PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Zimbabwe's mine action programme continued to improve in 2017, in particular by moving towards a comprehensive tool-box approach to operations, as a result of the launch of pilot projects on the use of mechanical assets and mine detection dogs (MDDs) during the year. Mine action capacity in the country increased with the arrival of Mines Advisory Group (MAG), which became operational in December 2017, and APOPO, which opened a programme in 2017 (though not yet operational as at September 2018), along with increased capacity in the National Mine Clearance Squadrons (NMCS).

Information management and reporting also continued to improve, with visible results. With support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), the Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre

(ZIMAC) developed Zimbabwe's first ever national mine action strategy in 2016–17, in consultation with and with support from international mine action organisations. The strategy was officially launched by the Government of Zimbabwe in March 2018. The strategic plan complements Zimbabwe's revised Article 5 extension request, approved at the Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) in December 2017, for a period of eight years, until the end of 2025. The plan and the revised request present a realistic estimate of remaining contamination, contain clear annual milestones for land release, and describe the resources, time, and funding needed for efficient completion of clearance. The annual workplan projections, which were subsequently revised on the basis of 2017 survey and clearance results, were made available in April 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Zimbabwe should meet the revised annual mine clearance targets announced in April 2018 and implement the provisions of its National Mine Action Strategy for 2018–25.
- Zimbabwe should expand the application of integrated demining methodologies introduced in 2017, including mechanical assets and MDDs, and officially approve their use and incorporation into land release methodologies.
- ZIMAC should complete the revision of its national mine action standards.
- Increased resources and staffing capacity should be allocated to ZIMAC to enable it to effectively manage a fast growing national mine action programme.
- ZIMAC should implement the resource mobilisation plan set out in its Article 5 extension request and increase efforts to secure additional national and international funding in order to meet its 2025 clearance completion deadline.

CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2017, Zimbabwe had a total of less than 62km² of confirmed mined area remaining (see Table 1).¹ This is a decrease from the 66km² remaining at the end of 2016.²

In June 2018, ZIMAC informed APMBC states parties that with continued progress in the first half of 2018, a total of just over 60.3km² remained to be addressed.³

Table 1: Mined areas (at end-2017)⁴

Location	Confirmed mined area (m ²)
Musengezi to Mazowe (formerly one area, Musengezi to Rwenya)	11,784,543
Mazowe to Rwenya (formerly one area, Musengezi to Rwenya)	11,802,059
Mwenezi to Sango Border Post Sector 3 (formerly one area, Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner)	16,508,588
Mwenezi to Sango Border Post Sector 4 (formerly one area, Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner)	7,196,038
Rusitu to Muzite Mission	8,550,808
Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest	5,895,954
Lusulu	56,000
Total	61,793,990

Zimbabwe's contamination, the overwhelming majority of which is of anti-personnel mines, originates from the laying of minefields in the late 1970s during a conflict of decolonisation. At the time of its independence in 1980, Zimbabwe was left with seven major mined areas along its borders with Mozambique and Zambia, and one inland minefield laid by the Rhodesian Army.⁵ Initially, anti-personnel mines were laid in very dense belts (reportedly 5,500 mines per kilometre of frontage) to form a "cordon sanitaire". Over time, this cordon sanitaire was breached or subject to erosion. In response, in many sections, a second belt of "ploughshare" directional fragmentation mines protected by anti-personnel mines was laid "inland" of the cordon sanitaire.⁶ Anti-vehicle mines were used extensively by armed groups but most were detonated by vehicles or have since been cleared.⁷

At the end of 2017, remaining contamination comprised five primary minefields, of which two were further divided into four areas for the purpose of tasking, identification, and reporting, making a total of seven minefields referred to by ZIMAC as set out in Table 1 above. All areas are confirmed hazardous areas and no suspected hazardous areas remain to be addressed in Zimbabwe following the completion of significant re-survey in 2016.⁸

The HALO Trust and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), the two non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that have conducted mine action in Zimbabwe since 2013, have reported that remaining mined areas are located close to populated areas and have considerable humanitarian, social, and economic impacts on local communities.⁹ The HALO Trust says that in areas where it operates in

the north-east of Zimbabwe, mines continue to block access to residential land, inhibit cross-border trading, deny small-scale farmers access to agricultural land, and separate communities from primary water sources, adversely affecting sanitation and livestock production. The threat to livestock is particularly severe and results in a heavy socio-economic impact as livestock is a major investment commodity in rural Zimbabwe.¹⁰ NPA says that mines have continued to block agricultural production, infrastructure development, access to clean water, and safe movement to and from neighbouring Mozambique, along Zimbabwe's longest border.¹¹

ZIMAC likewise states that anti-personnel mines continue to have a humanitarian as well as a socio-economic impact in 2017, most severely affecting poor, rural populations living along heavily mined border areas.¹² Mines continued to separate relatives living on both sides of minefields, deny use of agricultural land, kill and injure livestock and impede access for grazing, halt the productivity of areas of commercial farming, and impel some poor communities to take unacceptable risks to use contaminated land.¹³ Accordingly, clearance of mined areas will generate opportunities for local farmers, commercial agriculture, business, and tourism, allow for the construction of schools and clinics, and enable the safe return of those displaced as a result of the mine threat.¹⁴

According to ZIMAC, efforts to change high-risk behaviour resulted in no new victims being recorded in the country in 2017. However, a total of seven cattle in the Nyampanda area of Mashonaland East province were killed during the year.¹⁵

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The National Mine Action Authority of Zimbabwe (NMAAZ) is a policy and regulatory body on all issues relating to mine action in Zimbabwe. ZIMAC was established in 2000 within the Ministry of Defence as the focal point and coordination centre of all mine action in the country. ZIMAC is mandated to report to NMAAZ.¹⁶

Since 2012, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has provided assistance under a joint cooperation agreement with the Government to the national programme, training ZIMAC personnel, and supplying metal detectors, protective equipment, and trauma kits.¹⁷ This concluded in 2016, but the ICRC reported that in 2017 it provided support for the mine action authorities to enhance national ownership, delivered training on clearance, quality assurance and control, and information management, and made a financial contribution towards the launch of Zimbabwe's new National Mine Action Strategy for 2018–2025. It stated that, as planned, the ICRC ended its support for mine action in the country at the end of 2017.¹⁸

In its fifth Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in 2017, Zimbabwe again pledged to relocate ZIMAC outside of military installations once the Ministry of Defence has secured the necessary funds.¹⁹ As at April 2018, ZIMAC was still housed within military premises, reportedly owing to budgetary constraints.²⁰

Strategic Planning

Zimbabwe submitted a revised version of its fifth Article 5 extension request in August 2017, seeking an eight-year extension to 31 December 2025. This request marks a significant achievement for Zimbabwe's mine action programme, setting for the first time an end date for completion of clearance. It also establishes a realistic estimate of remaining contamination, and sets attainable annual clearance targets, provided sufficient funding is secured.²¹ Operators commended the cooperative and inclusive process behind the preparation of the extension request and the national mine action strategic plan, as well as efforts to accurately define the amount of contamination remaining, enabled by the application of solid survey methodology in earlier years.²²

At the end of 2016, ZIMAC and the GICHD organised the first strategy stakeholder workshop in Harare, bringing all relevant national and international partners together, ensuring a consultative and participatory process to develop Zimbabwe's first-ever national mine action strategy.²³ The National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 was formally approved by the Government in October 2017, presented at the Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties to the APMB in December 2017, and officially launched on 9 March 2018 by the Vice President and Minister of Defence and War Veterans Affairs in a

public event.²⁴ The strategy's timeline corresponds to Zimbabwe's revised fifth Article 5 deadline extension request with the overall goal of completing clearance in 2025.²⁵ In June 2018, ZIMAC reported that, together with NAMAAS, efforts were ongoing to ensure that the plan was widely disseminated.²⁶ Gender and diversity considerations are also addressed in the strategy.²⁷

Legislation and Standards

There is no national legislation specific to mine action in Zimbabwe. In June 2018, ZIMAC informed Mine Action Review that it had identified areas of Zimbabwe's national mine action standards which required revision, including, but not limited to, standards for MDDs, mechanical assets, clearance depth, technical survey, and the cancellation of land already in use. It stated that standards for these areas would be considered during 2018, having previously reported that revisions would be made at the end of 2017.²⁸

Quality Management

ZIMAC quality assurance (QA) monitors were present on site at operations on a daily basis during 2017. An independent quality control (QC) team was regularly dispatched to conduct QC by sampling a minimum of 10% of completed tasks.²⁹ In 2018, ZIMAC reported that positive steps were being taken to ensure that its QC system was better aligned to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), with an increased reliance of independent QC teams on reports from daily monitors in the field.³⁰ Operators reported that the allocation of more resources to ZIMAC would bolster these ongoing improvements, including by increasing the frequency of ZIMAC QC visits and reducing delays between the completion of tasks and final ZIMAC QC.³¹

Information Management

According to ZIMAC, there were significant improvements in information management capacity in 2017, although it relied more on an Excel worksheet than the national Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database for national reporting/statistics.³² ZIMAC informed Mine Action Review that a GICHD information management advisor held a workshop in the start of 2018 to ensure that the IMSMA database was accurate and that ZIMAC personnel were able to retrieve all the information from it, with positive results. It noted that workshops, trainings, and international expert support for information management had produced significant results and remained important to ensure the ZIMAC database is up to date and accurate.³³

NPA additionally reported providing technical support to ZIMAC on information management during the year and assistance in data reconciliation.³⁴ HALO likewise confirmed that the regularity and accuracy of data input increased in 2017 and regular data checks were carried out between operators and ZIMAC. It noted that it would be beneficial to receive read-only copies of the entire national database in due course.³⁵

Operators

The Zimbabwean Armed Forces' NMCS and, since 2013, The HALO Trust and NPA, all conduct land release in Zimbabwe. MAG became operational in December 2017, and APOPO, while accredited, was yet to commence operations as at September 2018.³⁶

In 2017–18, The HALO Trust was assigned operations on the Musengezi to Mazowe minefield in Mashonaland Central, while MAG was assigned to the Mazowe to Rwenya minefield in Mashonaland East province (formerly one area, the Musengezi to Rwenya minebelt). Mwenezi to Sango Border Post Sector 3 was assigned to the NMCS and Mwenezi to Sango Border Post Sector 4 was assigned to APOPO (both in Masvingo province and formerly one area, Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner). Rusitu to Muzite Mission and Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest in Manicaland province remained assigned to NPA, and Lusulu, in Matabeleland North province to the NMCS.³⁷

In 2017, HALO Trust deployed a total of 291 operations staff for clearance, with a further 83 support staff. Its capacity increased slightly in 2017 with the introduction of the programme's first mechanical demining team, while the number of its manual demining teams remained consistent at 28 as at the end of 2016.³⁸

NPA reported that as a result of increased funding, at the start of 2017 its capacity increased from five manual clearance teams to seven, as well as one MDD team. This increased national demining personnel from a total of 56 in 2016 to 98.³⁹ It lost capacity, however, due to subsequent funding cuts during the year, and was down to three manual demining teams and one MDD team by January 2018.⁴⁰

ZIMAC reported that the capacity of the NMCS increased from 120 deminers to 150, across 15 teams, thanks to equipment supplied by the ICRC in 2016. The NMCS also recruited two additional teams of ten deminers each in March 2018 to deploy to the Lusulu minefield.⁴¹

In 2016, ZIMAC began accrediting two further international demining operators, MAG and APOPO, both of which were scheduled to begin operations in 2017.⁴² In September 2017, MAG had signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with ZIMAC and established an office in Harare ready to support the start of clearance operations later in the year.⁴³ As noted above, MAG became operational in December 2017 and deployed one manual clearance team with twelve staff and one non-technical survey team with two staff.⁴⁴

APOPO reported it had signed a MoU with ZIMAC and that the Ministry of Defence had granted permission for the organisation to begin operating in Zimbabwe in 2017. It was tasked, in cooperation with the NMCS, to survey and clear a 37km-long stretch of minefield along the border with Mozambique, running south-west from the Sango Border Post to the Mwenezi river. It stated that, as at May 2017, a task assessment had been carried out and that it expected to recruit and train approximately 25 national operations and support staff in the second

half of 2018 to deploy in two manual demining sections.⁴⁵ However, despite its accreditation in 2017, APOPO failed to import its equipment from Mozambique in time to be operational. As at September 2018, APOPO was still waiting for both the equipment and sufficient funding to begin operations.⁴⁶

While the majority of clearance in Zimbabwe continued to be manual in 2017, mechanical assets and the use of MDDs were in the process of being integrated into the national mine action programme. As at mid-2018, however, the use of MDDs was limited to technical survey and clearance of soil with a high metallic content and the use of mechanical assets limited to clearance of areas with deeply buried mines and also areas with a high metallic content.⁴⁷

LAND RELEASE

A total of just over 6.2km² of land was reportedly released in 2017, with close to 4.5km² of mined area released by clearance and technical survey and just under 1.8km² cancelled by non-technical survey.⁴⁸ A further 1.8km² was confirmed as mined. Results in 2017 compare to total release in 2016 of nearly 9.5km².⁴⁹

While clearance of anti-personnel mines remained steady in 2017, with just under 1.7km² released through clearance, there was a major drop in cancellation output in 2017 of nearly 1.8km² compared to close to 7.8km² in 2016, due to the fact that comprehensive survey was finalised at the end of 2016. By 2017, Zimbabwe had a significantly more robust and realistic picture of verified contaminated area remaining and so little survey or cancellation was carried out that year.⁵⁰

NPA reported that key improvements to the national mine action programme in 2017 included improved prioritisation of high-impact areas for clearance through the use of impact assessment survey and technical survey reports, the introduction of the use of MDDs for technical survey, and a reduction, agreed by ZIMAC, in required clearance fade-out distances along minebelts from 10 metres to 5.⁵¹ MAG reported that another positive development was the convening of quarterly meetings with NAMAAC and ZIMAC, which began at the start of 2018.⁵²

Survey in 2017

Just over 4.5km² of land was released by survey in 2017: 1,768,118m² was cancelled through non-technical survey while 2,794,713m² was reduced through technical survey. A further 1,782,579m² was confirmed as mined.⁵³ In 2016, close to 7.8km² of land was released (just under 6.3km² cancelled, 1.5km² reduced) with a further 9.8km² confirmed as mined.⁵⁴

As noted above, according to ZIMAC in 2017 no major survey was done; instead only low-scale, pre-clearance re-surveys were carried out to confirm previous data of surveyed areas. In 2014–16, a large amount of survey was undertaken, resulting in huge cancellation of land, and no new significant survey has been undertaken or required since and there ceased to be any cancellation of that magnitude. According to ZIMAC, the few areas of cancellation recorded in 2017 were a limited number of areas along the Mozambique border which had been previously erroneously identified as cleared by the Mozambican mine action programme or had since been put to use by locals.⁵⁵

According to ZIMAC, the additional areas reported as confirmed to contain anti-personnel mines in 2017, particularly in the NMCS's areas of operations (*see Table 2 below*), were the result of the confirmation of a number of polygons that had been overlooked during previous survey and the subsequent enlargement of the recording of the size of these areas. These had not been accounted for in the results of the primary survey ending in 2016.⁵⁶

HALO reported that its survey cancellation in 2018 was the result of non-technical resurvey of several tasks. It stated that the tasks themselves were not cancelled, but re-survey was done to better able to identify the contaminated area, generally through reducing the estimates of the depth of lower-density ploughshare minefields by engaging with more members of the community and by tracking the location of mine rows on adjacent tasks.⁵⁷

Table 2: Mined area survey in 2017⁵⁸

Operator	Area	Area cancelled (m ²)	Areas confirmed	Area confirmed (m ²)	Area reduced by TS (m ²)
HALO	Musengezi to Mazowe	568,118	0	219,233	839,330
NPA	Muzite to Rusitu	0	0	0	83,190
NPA	Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest	0	0	0	802,308
NMCS	Mwenezi to Sango Border Post Sector 3	1,200,000	0	1,548,946	1,069,885
APOPO*	Mwenezi to Sango Border Post Sector 4	0	0	14,400	0
MAG		0	0	0	0
Totals		1,768,118	0	1,782,579	2,794,713

TS = Technical survey

* While APOPO was not operational in 2017, the areas reported as confirmed in its assigned areas of operations occurred as a result of remapping and correction of grid points by ZIMAC.

Clearance in 2017

Clearance of anti-personnel mined area remained steady in 2017 compared to the previous year, with only a 15,454m² decrease from 2016 in the 1.66km² cleared in 2017. Clearance by The HALO Trust, MAG, NPA, and the NMCS in 2017 involved the destruction of 30,533 anti-personnel mines and 1 item of unexploded ordnance (UXO).⁵⁹ This represented an increase of 7,340 anti-personnel mines destroyed in 2017 over the year before, potentially the result of improvements in the targeting of clearance.

NPA reported that its increase in clearance output of more than 140,000m² in 2017 compared with 2016 was due to funding which enabled an increase in the number of its manual demining teams from five to seven, and the introduction of a MDD team during the year. Productivity also improved from the agreement with ZIMAC to reduce clearance fade-out distances by five metres along the minebelts; to deploy MDDs as the main technical survey

assets in the field; and an enhanced technical survey approach, under which the size of a standard technical survey search box doubled from 32 metres to 64, while processing requirements were reduced from 10% to 5%, enabling an increase in survey output.⁶⁰

HALO reported a slight decrease in the total area cleared by its operations in 2018, though the number of mines destroyed was largely the same. More areas were processed in 2017 where, due to heavy soil disposition, many anti-personnel mines had sunk deep into the ground and were below metal-detector detection depth, necessitating a large increase in the number of slow “missing mine drills” that had to be conducted during clearance. These involved gaps in the minefield pattern being reinvestigated by excavating a top layer of soil and re-sweeping with a metal detector. The HALO Trust reported that the introduction of a mechanical demining team in 2017 was highly effective and that in areas of deeply buried mines, it was working six times as quickly as a manual demining section.⁶¹

Table 3: Mine clearance in 2017⁶²

Operator	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m ²)	AP mines destroyed	UXO destroyed
HALO (all areas of operations)	21	941,576	16,652	1
NPA (Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest)	5	583,650	13,446	0
NPA (Rusitu)	1	68,025	0	0
NMCS (Sango)	1	62,571	435	0
APOPO	0	0	0	0
MAG	0	39	0	0
Totals	28	1,655,861	30,533	1

AP = Anti-personnel AV = Anti-vehicle

Deminer Safety

ZIMAC reported that one member of the NMCS was injured by a R2M2 anti-personnel mine in the Limpopo to Sango Border minefield in 2017.⁶³

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the eight-year extension granted in 2017), Zimbabwe is required to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2025. It is currently on track to meet this deadline.

In June 2014, Zimbabwe was granted a (fourth) Article 5 clearance deadline extension of three years until 1 January 2018. Prior to that, since its initial Article 5 deadline expired on 1 March 2009, it had submitted three previous extension requests, the last of which expired on 1 January 2015. The extension until 1 January 2018 was to enable further survey and clearance, but did not commit Zimbabwe to complete its clearance obligations within the requested period.⁶⁴

Zimbabwe's fifth extension request initially submitted in April 2017 and then revised in August, sought a final period of eight years through to 31 December 2025, setting a deadline for the completion of all clearance for the first time. The request was approved by APMBC states parties at the Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties in Vienna in December 2017.

In its latest extension request, Zimbabwe lists three primary factors which have prevented it from completing its Article 5 obligations thus far: the extent of the contamination, inadequate national funding for demining, and a lack of demining equipment. Positively, however, Zimbabwe reported that the impact of these factors was ameliorated by the completion of re-survey, allowing efforts to focus on clearance; by increasing partnerships between international operators and the government to build capacity; and by assistance from the ICRC for better demining equipment.⁶⁵ In the request, Zimbabwe also enumerated risks and assumptions that could impede it from completing clearance in due time, including heavy rain, difficult terrain, significant metal contamination in ploughshare minefields, and lack of funding.⁶⁶

In June 2018, Zimbabwe informed states parties to the APMBC that it had reassessed and revised its annual land release output figures in its extension request and National Mine Action Strategy on the basis of 2017 results and progress to date, versus expected future results. It stated that the adjustment was also in part the result of changes to surveyed polygons, particularly in the area of Rushinga, and the unexpected discovery of an extension of the Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner minefield which occupied much of the NMCS's capacity in 2017.⁶⁷ The revised figures were also reported in its Article 7 transparency report submitted in April 2018, and were not expected to affect its overall completion deadline projection of 2025.⁶⁸ The revised annual milestones to be achieved project that a total of 7.16km² will be addressed in 2018; 8km² in 2019; 8.3km² in 2020; 8.99km² in 2021; 8.87km² in 2022; 7.97km² in 2023; 6.73km² in 2024; and finally, 5.83km² in 2025.⁶⁹

In mid-2018, ZIMAC confirmed that Zimbabwe was on track to meet its targets under its Article 5 extension and affirmed that the revised workplan is highly achievable, provided that funding is secured from both the Government and international donors.⁷⁰ ZIMAC informed Mine Action Review that key priorities were securing funding for independent offices to house ZIMAC outside of its current location in a military cantonment, in order to enable freer interaction with all mine action stakeholders; purchase of additional demining equipment to better equip the NMCS, which it reported had significant human resources available but lacked equipment which could enable it to double its capacity; funding to conduct a comprehensive national victim survey; and information management and communication equipment, such as laptops, shared drives, and for the construction of a website.⁷¹

According to ZIMAC's projections, a total of US\$130.34 million is required to meet its Article 5 extension request clearance deadline by 2025, with on average close to US\$16.3 million per year.⁷² ZIMAC confirmed that in 2017, the NMCS and ZIMAC's operational costs were fully funded by the Government and that US\$500,000 was made available for the repair of equipment and logistical requirements of the two entities.⁷³ According to ZIMAC, the Government of Zimbabwe had committed US\$500,000 to the NMCS and for the operational costs of ZIMAC per year since 2010.⁷⁴

In 2018, both NPA and The HALO Trust confirmed that the 2025 completion date was feasible, provided that a significant ramping up of funding, along with an increase in capacity, is secured.⁷⁵ ZIMAC informed Mine Action Review that a total of 7,160,645m² was set to be released across the country during 2018 and that remaining contamination was expected to drop to a total of 54.6km². It expected positive developments during the year with an increase in national capacity, as it expected MAG to double its capacity by mid-2018, along with the two additional NMCS teams deployed to carry out demining on the Lusulu minefield, and with APOPO operational by the end of the year. It also expected an increase in funding in 2018, due to greater engagement with international donors by operators and the national authorities, and through engagement with the APMBC's Committee on the Enhancement of Cooperation and Assistance.⁷⁶

HALO Trust reported it was expanding its mechanical demining operations in 2018, even if additional funding is not secured.⁷⁷ As at September 2018, MAG was deploying two additional teams and an expanded existing team, for a total of three teams in the field.⁷⁸ It reported it would like to use mechanical assets and MDDs in its operations in the future, funding permitting.⁷⁹

NPA planned to deploy three manual demining teams in 2018, with two teams working in the Muzite to Rusitu minefield and one team in the Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest minefield, each supported by the MDD team for technical survey. This is a decrease however from seven manual demining teams deployed in 2017, due to a significant cut in funding from the United States, which forced it to stop the work of four demining teams.⁸⁰

In December 2017, during the Sixteenth Meeting of APMBC States Parties, Zimbabwe and the Committee on the Enhancement of Cooperation and Assistance convened an “Individualised Approach Platform” meeting, which ZIMAC reported enabled Zimbabwe to present its needs and challenges to international mine action stakeholders and donors. It hoped that on the basis of this meeting, additional assistance could be secured to fund its eight-year workplan.⁸¹ Both ZIMAC and operators commended the increasingly collaborative relationship in-country, the product of which was evident in the organisation of the event.⁸²

While HALO noted that at the national level, the NAMA and ZIMAC were making more frequent and effective approaches to the international donor community, including at the Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2017, it remained concerned that mine contamination in Zimbabwe continues to be seen as a “legacy” problem, which is less visible and less of a priority for donors. It emphasised the continued importance of funding mine action in Zimbabwe.⁸³

Table 4: Mine clearance in 2013–17

Year	Area cleared (km ²)
2017	1.66
2016	1.67
2015	0.71
2014	0.49
2013	0.80
Total	5.33

- 1 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, Operations Coordinator, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.
- 2 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 July 2017.
- 3 Statement of Zimbabwe, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018.
- 4 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018; and Article 7 Report (for 2017), Form D.
- 5 Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary (received 31 December 2013), p. 1; and email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 10 October 2017.
- 6 HALO Trust, “Zimbabwe, History of Minelaying”, accessed 10 February 2014; Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary; and Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the 13th Meeting of States Parties on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyse requests for extensions, 18 June 2014, p. 3.
- 7 HALO Trust, “Zimbabwe, History of Minelaying”, undated but accessed 10 February 2014.
- 8 Article 7 report (for 2017), Form D.
- 9 Emails from Tom Dobb, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018; and Chimwemwe Tembo, Programme Manager, NPA, 13 February 2018.
- 10 Email from Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 24 April 2017; and HALO Trust, “HALO clears over 5,000 mines in Zimbabwe”, Press release, undated but March 2015.
- 11 Email from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 13 February 2018.
- 12 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18 June 2014, pp. 2–4.
- 15 Article 7 Report (for 2017), Form D. According to ZIMAC, the last human victims were reported in 2016. According to HALO Trust, it is undoubtedly likely that more cattle were killed or injured during 2017; however, mechanisms for capturing this data are still lacking. Emails from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 September 2018; and Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 10 September 2018.
- 16 Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 7.
- 17 ICRC, “Zimbabwe: Living with the dread of an invisible enemy”, 29 November 2013.
- 18 ICRC, ICRC Annual Report 2017, p. 229.
- 19 Revised Fifth Article 5 Extension Request, received 9 August 2017, p. 39.
- 20 Article 7 Report (for 2017), Form I.
- 21 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 21 September 2017.
- 22 Emails from Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 24 April 2017; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.
- 23 Statement of Zimbabwe, 15th Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, 29 November 2016; and email from Åsa Massleberg, Advisor, Strategic Management, GICHD, 27 September 2017.
- 24 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.
- 25 Emails from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 10 October 2017; and Åsa Massleberg, GICHD, 27 September 2017.
- 26 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.
- 27 Email from Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018.
- 28 Emails from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018 and 4 July 2017.
- 29 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.
- 30 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 September 2018.
- 31 Emails from Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 22 February and 10 September 2018.
- 32 Emails from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018; and Anne-Li Nauclér, Information Management Advisor, GICHD, 14 September 2018.
- 33 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.
- 34 Email from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 13 February 2018.
- 35 Email from Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018.
- 36 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 September 2018.
- 37 Article 7 Report (for 2017), Form D.
- 38 Email from Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018.
- 39 Emails from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 13 February 2018; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.
- 40 Email from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 13 February 2018.

- 41 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 July 2017.
- 42 Article 7 Report (for 2015), p. 7; and interviews with Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, Harare, 30 June 2016; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, Mutare, 2 July 2016.
- 43 Email from Adam Komorowski, MAG, 29 September 2017.
- 44 Email from Adam Komorowski, MAG, 13 April 2018.
- 45 Email from Ashley Fitzpatrick, then Grant and Regional Manager, APOPO, 29 May 2017.
- 46 Statement of Zimbabwe, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018; and emails from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 September 2018; and Ashley Fitzpatrick, Director of Grants and Contracts, APOPO, 12 September 2018.
- 47 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.
- 48 Ibid.; and emails from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 13 February and 27 August 2018; Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018; and Adam Komorowski, MAG, 13 April 2018.
- 49 Emails from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 July 2017; Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 24 April 2017; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.
- 50 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.
- 51 Email from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 13 February 2018.
- 52 Email from Adam Komorowski, MAG, 13 April 2018.
- 53 Emails from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018; Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 13 February and 27 August 2018; Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018; and Adam Komorowski, MAG, 13 April 2018.
- 54 Emails from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 July 2017; Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 24 April 2017; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.
- 55 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.
- 56 Emails from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June and 4 September 2018.
- 57 Email from Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018.
- 58 Emails from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June and 4 September 2018; Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 13 February and 27 August 2018; Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018; and Adam Komorowski, MAG, 13 April 2018.
- 59 Emails from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018 and 4 July 2017; Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 13 February and 27 August 2018; Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018; and Adam Komorowski, MAG, 13 April 2018.
- 60 Emails from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 13 February and 30 August 2018.
- 61 Email from Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018.
- 62 Emails from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018; Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 13 February and 27 August 2018; Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018; and Adam Komorowski, MAG, 13 April 2018. HALO reported a total of 16,673 anti-personnel mines destroyed and stated that the item of UXO was not destroyed during mine clearance but as a spot task. According to Zimbabwe's Article 7 report, four anti-vehicle mines were destroyed in Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest and two items of UXO in Musengezi to Mazowe minefield in 2017. NPA reported destroying four anti-vehicle mines in Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest in 2016. Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, March 2017.
- 63 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.
- 64 Under its three-year extension until January 2018, Zimbabwe undertook "to clarify the remaining challenge, understand what progress will be possible once partners operate at full capacity and once additional support has been identified, produce a detailed plan, and submit a subsequent request for fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations". Decision on Zimbabwe's Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Third Review Conference, Maputo, 26 June 2014; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, pp. 5–6.
- 65 Revised Fifth Article 5 Extension Request, received 9 August 2017, pp. 8–9.
- 66 Ibid., p. 41.
- 67 Statement of Zimbabwe, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018.
- 68 Ibid.; and Article 7 Report (for 2017), Annex A: Revised Workplan for 2018–25.
- 69 Statement of Zimbabwe, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018; and Article 7 Report (for 2017), Annex A: Revised Workplan for 2018–25.
- 70 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.
- 71 Ibid.
- 72 Statement of Zimbabwe, Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018.
- 73 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.
- 74 Article 7 Report (for 2017), Form D.
- 75 Ibid.; and email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.
- 76 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.
- 77 Email from Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018.
- 78 Emails from Adam Komorowski, MAG, 13 April 2018; and Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 September 2018.
- 79 Email from Adam Komorowski, MAG, 13 April 2018.
- 80 Email from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 13 February 2018.
- 81 Article 7 Report (for 2017), Form I.
- 82 Emails from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018; Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 13 February 2018; and Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018.
- 83 Email from Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018.