

ZIMBABWE



ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 1 JANUARY 2018
(EIGHT-YEAR EXTENSION REQUESTED)

MINE ACTION PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE	For 2016	For 2015
Problem understood	9	8
Target date for completion of mine clearance	6	5
Targeted clearance	8	8
Efficient clearance	7	6
National funding of programme	5	4
Timely clearance	5	5
Land release system in place	7	7
National mine action standards	8	8
Reporting on progress	6	5
Improving performance	9	8
PERFORMANCE SCORE: GOOD	7.0	6.4

PERFORMANCE COMMENTARY

Building on progress achieved in 2015, Zimbabwe's national mine action programme made major advances in 2016. The amount of mined area cleared in 2016 more than doubled compared to the previous year and re-survey of all suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) was completed during the year, enabling Zimbabwe to better estimate the extent of confirmed contamination remaining to be released.

In August 2017, Zimbabwe submitted a revised Article 5 deadline extension request for a period of eight years, until 2025, setting for the first time a deadline for the completion of mine clearance. The revised document is a substantial improvement on the request initially submitted in April. It presents a realistic estimate of remaining contamination, and clearly describes

the resources, time, and funding needed for efficient completion of clearance. The approval in 2017 by the Zimbabwean Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC) of pilot projects of the use of mechanical demining assets and mine detection dogs (MDDs), and the arrival of two additional international clearance operators mean that Zimbabwe's mine action programme is poised to make further significant progress in land release in 2018.

Operators reported that the strengthening of the mine action programme in 2016 was in large part due to a more solid working relationship between operators and ZIMAC, as well as to the efforts of ZIMAC to address a number of key areas, such as the quality of the national mine action database and consequent reporting, and the introduction of integrated demining assets and methodologies.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Zimbabwe should meet the annual mine clearance targets in its new national mine action strategy for 2018–25, working in continued cooperation with international operators.
- Zimbabwe should expand the application of integrated demining methodologies introduced in 2017, including mechanical assets and MDDs.
- Continued efforts should be made to ensure that all operators are using appropriate land-release methodologies and standards and that progress in information management and reporting is maintained.
- Increased resources and staffing capacity should be allocated to ZIMAC to enable it to effectively manage a fast growing national mine action programme.
- ZIMAC should promote the resource mobilisation plan set out in its Article 5 extension request and increase efforts to secure additional national and international funding in order to meet its 2025 clearance completion deadline.
- Broader efforts to mainstream mine action into planning and development processes in Zimbabwe should also be explored

CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2016, Zimbabwe had a total of 66.2km² of confirmed mined area remaining.¹ This is a significant drop from the nearly 75km² remaining at the end of 2015,² and is due to cancellation of close to 6.3km² on the Rusitu to Muzite mined area and more than doubled clearance output from operators in 2016 compared to the previous year.

In its revised 2017 Article 5 extension request, Zimbabwe reported that during its previous extension period, from December 2014 to December 2016, almost 143km² (some two-thirds) of all recorded mined areas had been addressed, from a total of close to 209km² remaining as at December 2014.³

Table 1: Mined areas (as at end-2016)⁴

Location	Confirmed mined area (m ²)
Musengezi to Rwenya	25,716,432
Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner	24,473,736
Rusitu to Muzite Mission	8,702,023
Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest	7,281,912
Lusulu	56,000
Total	66,230,103

Zimbabwe's contamination, the overwhelming majority of which is of anti-personnel mines, originates from the laying of minefields in the late 1970s during a conflict of decolonisation. At the time of its independence in 1980, Zimbabwe was left with seven major mined areas along its borders with Mozambique and Zambia, and one inland minefield laid by the Rhodesian Army.⁵ Initially, anti-personnel mines were laid in very dense belts (reportedly 5,500 mines per kilometre of frontage) to form a "cordon sanitaire". Over time, this cordon sanitaire was breached or subject to erosion. In response, in many sections, a second belt of "ploughshare" directional fragmentation mines protected by anti-personnel mines was laid "inland" of the cordon sanitaire.⁶ Anti-vehicle mines were used extensively by insurgents but most were detonated by vehicles or have since been cleared.⁷

At the end of 2016, remaining contamination comprised five minefields, referred to as: Musengezi to Rwenya, Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner, Rusitu to Muzite Mission, Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest, and Lusulu. The Victoria Falls to Mlibizi minefield was cleared in 1998–2005 while demining of the Burma Valley minefield was completed in 2015 and a former SHA at Kariba was cleared of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in 2013.⁸

The HALO Trust and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), the two NGOs conducting mine action in Zimbabwe in 2016, have reported that remaining mined areas are located close to populated areas and have considerable humanitarian, social, and economic impacts on local communities.⁹ The HALO Trust reported that in areas where it operates in the north-east of Zimbabwe, mines continue to block access to residential land, inhibit cross-border trading, deny small-scale farmers access to agricultural land, and separate communities from primary water sources, adversely affecting sanitation and livestock production. The threat to livestock is particularly severe and results in a heavy socio-economic impact as livestock is a major investment commodity in rural Zimbabwe.¹⁰

ZIMAC likewise confirmed that anti-personnel mine contamination continued to have a socio-economic and humanitarian impact in 2016, most severely affecting poor, rural populations living along heavily mined border areas.¹¹ Mines continued to prevent free movement of people, deny use of agricultural land, kill and injure livestock and impede access for grazing, halt the productivity of areas of commercial farming, and impel some poor communities to take unacceptable risks to use contaminated land.¹² Accordingly, clearance of mined areas will generate opportunities for local farmers, commercial agriculture, business, and tourism, allow for the construction of schools and clinics, and enable the safe return of those displaced as a result of the mine threat.¹³

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The National Mine Action Authority of Zimbabwe (NAMAAZ) is a policy and regulatory body on all issues relating to mine action in Zimbabwe. ZIMAC was established in 2000 within the Ministry of Defence as the focal point and coordination centre of all mine action in the country. ZIMAC is mandated to report to NAMAAZ.¹⁴

Since 2012, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has provided assistance to the government of Zimbabwe to train ZIMAC personnel and to supply metal detectors, protective equipment, and trauma kits, under a joint cooperation agreement.¹⁵ In 2016, the ICRC continued to support ZIMAC, providing equipment and training as well as refresher courses for key staff.¹⁶

In its fifth Article 5 deadline extension request in 2017, Zimbabwe again pledged to relocate ZIMAC outside of military installations once the Ministry of Defence has secured the necessary funds.¹⁷ In 2016, ZIMAC was still housed within military premises, reportedly owing to budgetary constraints.¹⁸

Strategic Planning

In December 2016, ZIMAC held a strategy stakeholder workshop with support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to develop Zimbabwe's first-ever national mine action strategy.¹⁹ The December 2016 workshop was followed by a strategy validation meeting in Harare in May 2017, at which ZIMAC and the GICHD presented the draft national strategy, following which the first draft was finalised. Zimbabwe's National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 was due to be formally approved by the government by the end of 2017. The strategy timeline corresponds to Zimbabwe's fifth Article 5 deadline extension request with the overall goal of completing clearance in 2025.²⁰

As reported above, Zimbabwe submitted a fifth Article 5 extension request in April 2017, for a period of eight years through to 31 December 2025. In August 2017, it submitted a revised version of the request, correcting errors in reporting and deleting outdated contamination estimates. The revised request marks a significant achievement for Zimbabwe's mine action programme, setting for the first time an end date for completion of clearance. It also establishes a realistic estimate of remaining contamination, and sets attainable annual clearance targets, provided sufficient funding is secured.²¹ Operators commended the cooperative and inclusive process behind the preparation of the extension request and the national mine action strategic plan, as well as efforts to accurately define the amount of contamination remaining, enabled by the application of solid survey methodology in earlier years.²²

Standards

ZIMAC reported that national mine action standards would be revised in the second half of 2017, with input from all mine action stakeholders. Once disseminated, ZIMAC QA/QC officers will monitor their implementation.²³ The HALO Trust confirmed that standards for mechanical clearance would be updated, as it was introducing mechanical clearance operations during the year, and NPA confirmed that revisions would also include standards for MDDs.²⁴

Quality Management

ZIMAC reported that quality monitors were present on site at operations on a daily basis during 2016 and an independent quality control (QC) team was regularly dispatched to sample completed areas. Sample sizes varied with increasing confidence and capacity within the QC team during quality assurance (QA) processes, it said, and that in 2016, the NMCS, NPA, and HALO Trust had areas of 131,995m², 887,684m², and 2,155,310m² qualified for safe handover respectively.²⁵

The HALO Trust reported that ZIMAC monitored all tasks of its clearance operations and carried out 10% sampling of completed tasks during the year.²⁶ NPA confirmed that ZIMAC QA officers remained on site daily during clearance activities and ZIMAC QC occurred once during the year. According to NPA, ZIMAC was revising its approach to conducting QC in 2017, with the aim of improving efficiency, in line with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) recommended procedures.²⁷

Information Management

ZIMAC's information management capacity showed significant signs of progress in 2016.²⁸ ZIMAC reported that the national Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database was markedly improved during the year and that work was continuing in 2017 with GICHD assistance to input and improve historic operator data.²⁹ The GICHD reported it conducted an information management baseline assessment in May 2017 and drafted a corresponding workplan. A key objective is to update the national database to ensure it includes all the information from the various operators, including historical data.³⁰ Inflated and outdated baseline contamination estimates were eliminated from the database and erroneous reporting, such as for the total area released in the Burma Valley minefield, was corrected, as evidenced in Zimbabwe's revised Article 5 extension request.³¹

Operators

The Zimbabwean Armed Forces' National Mine Clearance Squadrons (NMCS) and, since 2013, The HALO Trust and NPA, all conduct land release in Zimbabwe. In 2013, ZIMAC tasked HALO Trust to survey and clear the Musengezi to Rwenya, Rushinga, and Mukumbura mined areas; NPA was assigned survey and clearance of the Rusitu to Muzite Mission, Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest, and Burma Valley mined areas; and the NMCS are responsible for survey and clearance of the Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner and Lusulu mined areas.³²

In 2016, HALO Trust's capacity more than doubled from 13 to 30 manual demining sections, with increased funding from the United Kingdom (UK) and United States (US).³³ NPA reached its maximum operating capacity at the end of 2016 with a total of 56 deminers, up from 48 at the start of the year, also benefitting from additional funding.³⁴ ZIMAC reported that the capacity of the NMCS increased from 120 deminers to 150 during the year.³⁵

In 2016, ZIMAC began accrediting two further international demining operators, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and APOPO, both of which were scheduled to begin operations in 2017.³⁶ APOPO reported it had signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with ZIMAC and that the Ministry of Defence had granted permission for the organisation to begin operating in Zimbabwe. As at May 2017, it had been tasked to survey and clear a 37km-long stretch of minefield along the border with Mozambique, running south-west from the Sango Border Post to the Mwenezi river, in cooperation with the NMCS. It stated that, as at May 2017, a task assessment had been carried out and that it expected to recruit and train approximately 55 national operations and support staff in the second half of 2017 to deploy four manual demining sections.³⁷ In September 2017, MAG had also signed an MoU with ZIMAC and established an office in Harare ready to support the start of clearance operations later in the year. MAG said it had been provided with a tasking profile in Mashonaland East incorporating a mined area that is 130km in length with a total area of more than 11.8km².³⁸

LAND RELEASE

A total of nearly 9.5km² of land was released by HALO Trust and NPA in 2016, including just under 3.2km² of mined area released by clearance and technical survey and 6.3km² cancelled by non-technical survey.³⁹ This is more than double the total area released in 2015 (just under 4.1km²).⁴⁰ The significant increase in output in 2016 was the result of cancellation of nearly 6.3km² at the Muzite to Rusitu mined area by NPA and ZIMAC survey teams and a doubling in total clearance output by the three operators.⁴¹

Survey in 2016

Close to 7.8km² of land was released by survey in 2016, including just under 6.3km² cancelled through non-technical survey and 1.5km² reduced through technical survey, with a further 9.8km² confirmed as mined.⁴² This is more than twice the amount released by survey in 2015, when just over 3.4km² of land was released.⁴³

In 2016, NPA reported that comprehensive combined non-technical and technical survey was carried out within the Leacon Hill to Sheba Forrest and Muzite to Rusitu mined areas as a joint exercise by ZIMAC officials and NPA teams. A total of nearly 6.3km² was cancelled within the Muzite to Rusitu mined area and more than 8.7km² confirmed, changing the status of the mined area from suspected to confirmed contamination. The survey also identified the time and capacity needed for completion of clearance of the minefield, as well as defining the direct and indirect beneficiaries and expected land use upon completion.⁴⁴

Table 2: Mined area survey in 2016⁴⁵

Operator	SHAs cancelled	Area cancelled (m ²)	Areas confirmed	Area confirmed (m ²)	Area reduced by TS (m ²)
HALO	0	0	9	1,075,167	1,127,597
NPA (Muzite to Rusitu)	0	6,297,997	1	8,702,023	376,068
NMCS	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	0	6,297,997	10	9,777,190	1,503,665

TS = Technical survey

Clearance in 2016

In 2016, The HALO Trust, NPA, and the NMCS cleared a total of just under 1.7km² of mined area, destroying 23,193 anti-personnel mines, 4 anti-vehicle mines, and 14 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO). This is more than twice the amount cleared in 2015, when the three entities cleared a total of almost 0.71m² of mined area.⁴⁶

The HALO Trust attributed the large increase in its clearance output in 2016 to a nearly doubling of its manual demining capacity thanks to increased UK and US funding.⁴⁷ NPA reported that its increase in mine

clearance in 2016 was due in part to the deployment of additional teams in January and October, but was primarily the result of a 50% reduction in the amount of fadeout required during clearance, from 10 metres to 5 metres, after a change in methodology approved by ZIMAC. Both NPA and HALO Trust emphasised the importance and positive impact of a supportive host government and ZIMAC's willingness to accept innovation in clearance methodologies as key reasons behind the increase in clearance output.⁴⁸

Table 3: Mine clearance in 2016⁴⁹

Operator	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m ²)	AP mines destroyed	AV mines destroyed	UXO destroyed
HALO (all areas of operations)	30	1,027,704	16,699	0	14
NPA (Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest)	5	511,616	6,410	4	0
NMCS	1	131,995	84	0	0
Totals	36	1,671,315	23,193	4	14

AP = Anti-personnel

AV = Anti-vehicle

Deminer Safety

The HALO Trust reported that five of its staff were involved in five separate accidents during mine clearance operations involving R2M2 mines in 2016. Two deminers were injured in the accidents, while three were unharmed.⁵⁰ NPA reported no accidents or injuries involving its mine action personnel since the start of its operations in 2013.⁵¹

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

In June 2014, Zimbabwe was granted an Article 5 mine clearance deadline extension of three years until 1 January 2018. Since its initial Article 5 deadline expired on 1 March 2009, it has submitted three previous extension requests, the last of which expired on 1 January 2015. The current extension until 1 January 2018 is to enable further survey and clearance, but Zimbabwe is not committing itself to complete its clearance obligations within the requested period, nor will it manage to do so.⁵²

As noted above, Zimbabwe submitted a fifth extension request in April 2017, which it revised in August, for a period of eight years through to 31 December 2025, setting a deadline for the completion of clearance for the first time. According to its extension request workplan, a total of more 6.3km² would be addressed in 2017, followed by close to 8km² in 2018; 8.5m² in 2019; 9.1km² in 2020; 7.7km² in 2021; 7.8km² in 2022; 7.9km² in 2023; 6.7km² in 2024; and 4.2km² in 2025, for a total of just over 66.2km² of remaining contamination released.⁵³

In the request, Zimbabwe lists three primary factors which have prevented it from completing its Article 5 obligations thus far since becoming a state party to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC): the extent of the contamination, inadequate national funding for demining, and a lack of demining equipment. Positively, however, Zimbabwe reported that the impact of these factors was ameliorated by the completion of re-survey, allowing efforts to focus on clearance; increasing partnerships between international operators and the government to build capacity; and continued assistance from the ICRC for better demining equipment.⁵⁴ In the request, Zimbabwe also enumerated possible risks and assumptions that could impede it from completing clearance in due time, including heavy rain, difficult terrain, significant metal contamination in ploughshare minefields, and lack of funding.⁵⁵

In its 2017 extension request, Zimbabwe estimated that activities planned for the eight-year extension period through to completion of clearance will cost a total of almost US\$130 million, with \$12.7 million to be provided by the Government of Zimbabwe, including \$0.6 million in 2017.⁵⁶ The request states that resource mobilisation will be an ongoing effort, and that Zimbabwe will continue seeking support from the international community. To complement efforts, ZIMAC was also developing a website to increase the visibility of the mine action programme, it stated.⁵⁷

According to ZIMAC, the Government of Zimbabwe has committed US\$500,000 per year since 2010 to fund the NMCS and the operational costs of ZIMAC, and also provided salary costs and vehicles. Positively, in 2017, it reported that funding was set to increase, given the expansion of the national mine action programme.⁵⁸

According to ZIMAC, although the government funds allocated have not been sufficient to contract commercial demining companies alongside the military's demining efforts, it is a sign of the significant commitment to national ownership of the demining programme.⁵⁹ Operators concurred that this is a demonstration of the commitment of the government to national mine action ownership, especially in the context of Zimbabwe's economic crisis.⁶⁰

NPA reported receiving in-kind support during joint risk education activities carried out by NPA and the NMCS teams, along with assistance for the renewal of work permits.⁶¹ The HALO Trust did not report receiving in-kind support from the government in 2016, but noted the contributions of the NMCS to the national demining programme and the overall supportive operational environment, while raising some concerns about an increase in import bureaucracy and subsequent increases in costs and delays during the year.⁶²

In 2017, both NPA and The HALO Trust confirmed that the 2025 completion date was feasible, provided that a significant ramping up of funding is secured.⁶³ HALO Trust was expanding its operations to include mechanical demining, with the deployment of an excavator/screener combination as a priority for the year. It did not expect significant changes to its manual demining capacity, though it was seeking to expand the number of sections, subject to funding.⁶⁴

NPA deployed 10 additional deminers in January 2017 and an MDD team in May, which it expected would equal the daily output of two of its manual demining teams.⁶⁵ It planned to continue clearing within the Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest minefield and begin clearance within the Muzite to Rusitu minefield by September 2017, with a targeted release of 1.5km² by the end of the year. It likewise did not anticipate major changes in funding, so would continue to deploy seven manual clearance teams and one MDD team.⁶⁶

ZIMAC reported that with the commencement of MAG and APOPO's operations in late 2017 a marked increase in land release output was expected. In addition, it emphasised that the introduction of MDD teams by NPA would increase the speed of technical survey while the deployment of mechanical assets by HALO Trust would reduce the time needed to remove deeply buried mines in manual demining.⁶⁷ ZIMAC stated that the development of a new national mine action strategy had given the national programme a new impetus to complete clearance by 2025 and would help to ensure the full support of other relevant government departments to mine action.⁶⁸

- 1 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, Operations Coordinator, ZIMAC, 4 July 2017.
- 2 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 14 October 2016.
- 3 Revised Fifth Article 5 Extension Request, received 9 August 2017, p. 5.
- 4 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 July 2017; and Revised Fifth Article 5 Extension Request, received 9 August 2017, p. 5.
- 5 Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary (received 31 December 2013), p. 1; and email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 10 October 2017.
- 6 HALO Trust, "Zimbabwe, History of Minelaying", accessed 10 February 2014; Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary; and Analysis of Zimbabwe's Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the 13th Meeting of States Parties on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyse requests for extensions, 18 June 2014, p. 3.
- 7 HALO Trust, "Zimbabwe, History of Minelaying", undated but accessed 10 February 2014.
- 8 Emails from Learnfirst Musiza, Operations Manager, NPA, 19 October 2015; and Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 10 October 2017; and Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 6.
- 9 Emails from Tom Dobb, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 24 April 2017; and Claus Nielsen, Programme Manager, NPA, 31 March 2017.
- 10 Email from Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 24 April 2017; and HALO Trust, "HALO clears over 5,000 mines in Zimbabwe", Press release, undated but March 2015.
- 11 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 14 October 2016.
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 Analysis of Zimbabwe's Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18 June 2014, pp. 2–4.
- 14 Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 7.
- 15 ICRC, "Zimbabwe: Living with the dread of an invisible enemy", 29 November 2013.
- 16 ICRC, ICRC Annual Report 2016, pp. 227–28, available at: <https://www.icrc.org/data/files/annual-report-2016/ICRC-2016-annual-report.pdf>.
- 17 Revised Fifth Article 5 Extension Request, received 9 August 2017, p. 39.
- 18 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 14 October 2016.
- 19 Statement of Zimbabwe, 15th Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, 29 November 2016; and email from Åsa Massleberg, Advisor, Strategic Management, GICHD, 27 September 2017.
- 20 Emails from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 10 October 2017; and Åsa Massleberg, GICHD, 27 September 2017.
- 21 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 21 September 2017.
- 22 Emails from Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 24 April 2017; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.
- 23 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 July 2017.
- 24 Emails from Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 24 April 2017; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March and 23 September 2017.
- 25 Ibid.
- 26 Email from Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 24 April 2017.
- 27 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.
- 28 Email from Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 24 April 2017.
- 29 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 July 2017.
- 30 Email from Åsa Massleberg, GICHD, 27 September 2017.
- 31 Emails Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March and 21 September 2017. NPA reported continuing to use a digital recording and mapping system, the DEDUCT Observer application in 2016, and that it was sending ZIMAC daily electronic updates on survey and clearance outputs through the DEDUCT system.
- 32 Analysis of Zimbabwe's Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18 June 2014, p. 4; and Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 27.
- 33 Email from Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 24 April 2017.
- 34 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.
- 35 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 July 2017.
- 36 Article 7 Report (for 2015), p. 7; and interviews with Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, Harare, 30 June 2016; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, Mutare, 2 July 2016.
- 37 Email from Ashley Fitzpatrick, Grant and Regional Manager, APOPO, 29 May 2017.
- 38 Email from Adam Komorowski, Regional Director, MAG, 29 September 2017.
- 39 Emails from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 July 2017; Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 24 April 2017; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.
- 40 Email from Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 11 July 2016; interview with Fanuel Chitiyo, NPA, Mutare, 29 June 2016; and email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa ZIMAC, 14 October 2016.
- 41 Emails from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 July 2017; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.
- 42 Emails from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 July 2017; Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 24 April 2017; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.
- 43 Email from Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 11 July 2016; interview with Fanuel Chitiyo, Information Management Officer, NPA, Mutare, 29 June 2016; and email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 14 October 2016.
- 44 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.
- 45 Emails from Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 24 April 2017; Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017; and Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 July 2017. HALO reported debate within the local community as to whether commercial clearance had taken place in the nine areas it confirmed over 1km², during 1998–2000.
- 46 Email from Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 11 July 2016; interview with Fanuel Chitiyo, NPA, Mutare, 29 June 2016; and email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 14 October 2016.
- 47 Email from Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 24 April 2017.
- 48 Ibid.; and email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.
- 49 Emails from Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 24 April and 29 September 2017; Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017; and Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 July 2017.
- 50 Email from Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 24 April and 29 September 2017.
- 51 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.
- 52 Under its three-year extension until January 2018, Zimbabwe undertook "to clarify the remaining challenge, understand what progress will be possible once partners operate at full capacity and once additional support has been identified, produce a detailed plan, and submit a subsequent request for fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations". The purpose of the extension period is also to complete survey of all remaining areas and to clear approx. 4km² of mined area. Under the extension, Zimbabwe intended to meet the following milestones: clearance of 1.23km² and the development of a national strategic plan on the basis of survey results in 2015; clearance of 1.28km² in 2016; and clearance of 1.51km² and the submission of a new clearance plan in 2017. Decision on Zimbabwe's Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Third Review Conference, Maputo, 26 June 2014; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, pp. 5–6.
- 53 Revised Fifth Article 5 Extension Request, received 9 August 2017, pp. 8–9.
- 54 Ibid., pp. 14–15.
- 55 Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 7.
- 56 Revised Fifth Article 5 Extension Request, received 9 August 2017, p. 10.
- 57 Ibid, p. 47.
- 58 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 July 2017.
- 59 Revised Fifth Article 5 Extension Request, received 9 August 2017, p. 18.
- 60 Emails from Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 24 April 2017; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.
- 61 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.
- 62 Email from Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 24 April 2017.
- 63 Ibid.; and email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.
- 64 Email from Tom Dobb, HALO Trust, 24 April 2017.
- 65 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.
- 66 Ibid.
- 67 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 July 2017.
- 68 Ibid.