

### KEY DATA

#### APMBC ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE: 31 DECEMBER 2025

Not on track to meet deadline  
Five-year extension to 31 December 2030 requested

#### AP MINE CONTAMINATION: 12km<sup>2</sup>

Medium  
(National Authority estimate)

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

| Release of AP mined area | Release in 2024 (km <sup>2</sup> ) | Release in 2023 (km <sup>2</sup> ) |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Clearance                | 1.95                               | 1.91                               |
| Technical Survey         | 2.44                               | 0.4                                |
| Non-Technical Survey     | 0                                  | 0.01                               |

  

| Destruction of AP mines during clearance, survey, and spot tasks | 2024   | 2023                                   |
|--|--|--|
| AP Mines destroyed   | 31,972<br>(with 45 destroyed in spot tasks according to operator data) | 37,360<br>(incl. 30 during spot tasks) |

### MAIN AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Zimbabwean Armed Forces' National Mine Clearance Unit (NMCU)
- APOPO
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

## KEY DEVELOPMENTS

All mined areas remaining in Zimbabwe are now confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs). Zimbabwe continued to make steady progress in land release during 2024, but its main challenge remains securing the funding needed to complete clearance. The programme was significantly impacted by the reduction of US funding in early 2025, which led The HALO Trust (HALO) to further reduce capacity and APOPO to withdraw from the country altogether in March 2025. On 1 April 2025, Zimbabwe submitted its sixth Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline extension request, seeking a five-year extension to the end of 2030.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Zimbabwe should ensure the next extension period is its last and fulfil Article 5 as soon as possible.
- Zimbabwe should continue to prioritise efforts to secure additional national and international funding for the mine action programme.
- Zimbabwe should elaborate a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan for the programme.

## ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

| Criterion  | Score (2024) | Score (2023) | Performance Commentary   |
|--|--------------|--------------|--|
| <b>UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION</b><br>(20% of overall score)        | 8            | 8            | Zimbabwe has a good understanding of remaining mine contamination, all of which is in CHAs. It believes most of the 11.99km <sup>2</sup> of mined area will need to be released by clearance.  |
| <b>NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT</b><br>(10% of overall score)   | 8            | 8            | The mine action programme is managed effectively by the Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC), with good stakeholder collaboration. There is a high degree of national ownership, with the government continuing to provide US\$500,000 annually.  |
| <b>GENDER AND DIVERSITY</b><br>(10% of overall score)                          | 7            | 7            | ZIMAC does not have a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan although the importance of gender is acknowledged in the national mine action strategy and integrated into annual work plans. The Zimbabwean Armed Forces' National Mine Clearance Unit (NMCU) has no women in operational roles but survey and community liaison teams are reportedly inclusive and gender-balanced.  |
| <b>ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION</b><br>(10% of overall score)             | 7            | 7            | ZIMAC has a national standard and policy on environmental management. The use of highly destructive mechanical clearance methods is not permitted in areas with large trees. All demining operators seek to reduce the environmental impact of their operations, but vary in the degree to which they undertake environmental assessments or have environmental policies and management systems in place.  |
| <b>INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING</b><br>(10% of overall score)          | 8            | 8            | ZIMAC continued to improve its information management in 2024, and the transition from the Information Management for Mine Action System (IMSMA) New Generation system to IMSMA Core was expected to be completed by the end of 2025. Zimbabwe submits detailed Article 7 reports annually. Regular cross-checking of data with operators continues.   |
| <b>PLANNING AND TASKING</b><br>(10% of overall score)                          | 8            | 8            | In its 2025 extension request ZIMAC presented revised annual land release targets to 2030, identifying the resources, time, and funding needed to complete clearance.  |
| <b>LAND RELEASE SYSTEM</b><br>(10% of overall score)                           | 9            | 9            | Zimbabwe maintained approximately the same overall capacity across operators in 2024 compared to 2023. Use of mechanical assets alongside mine detection dogs and the roll-out of a new detector in 2024 further increased land release efficiency. Operators continue to destroy tens of thousands of anti-personnel mines annually.  |
| <b>LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE</b><br>(20% of overall score) | 8            | 8            | Zimbabwe released 4.39km <sup>2</sup> of mined area in 2024, mostly through technical survey, up from 2.32km <sup>2</sup> in 2023. Clearance output remained stable. If Zimbabwe's request for a planned five-year extension is granted in 2025, it will still need to secure additional funding. Completion by the end of 2030 would still be a considerable achievement for one of the world's most heavily mined countries in a particularly challenging donor funding environment. |
| <b>Average Score</b>   | <b>7.9</b>   | <b>7.9</b>   | <b>Overall Programme Performance: GOOD</b>   |

## AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

### MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National Mine Action Authority of Zimbabwe (NMAAZ)
- Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC)

### NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Zimbabwean Armed Forces' National Mine Clearance Unit (NMCU)

### INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- APOPO (programme closed in March 2025)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

### OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

# UNDERSTANDING OF AP MINE CONTAMINATION

As at the end of 2024 Zimbabwe reported a total of 11.99km<sup>2</sup> of confirmed mined area<sup>1</sup> (see Table 1). This is substantially down on the 16.1km<sup>2</sup> a year earlier.<sup>2</sup> Four of Zimbabwe's ten provinces are contaminated with anti-personnel (AP) mines. With the exception of one minefield, located inland in Matabeleland North province, all the remaining mined areas are along the border with Mozambique.<sup>3</sup> Manicaland province no longer contains any mined areas, following completion of clearance by Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) in 2024.<sup>4</sup>

According to the Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC), the baseline of contamination is complete following the completion of significant re-survey in 2016.<sup>5</sup> The Geneva

International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has stated its belief that the understanding of remaining contamination is up to date and accurate.<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, ZIMAC added 223,374m<sup>2</sup> to the national database in 2024, due to an adjustment to an original CHA<sup>7</sup> while HALO notes that targeted survey may yet highlight additional mined areas.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, while all contaminated areas remaining in Zimbabwe are CHAs, in general they are widely drawn. Indeed, some 15.7km<sup>2</sup> has been released through survey between 2021 and the end of 2024, compared to 8.43km<sup>2</sup> through clearance.<sup>9</sup>

Table 1: AP mined area (at end 2024)<sup>10</sup>

| Province            | CHAs | Sectors* | Area (m²)  |
|---------------------|------|----------|------------|
| Masvingo            | 1    | 5        | 830,239    |
| Mashonaland East    | 1    | 28       | 8,562,236  |
| Matabeleland North  | 1    | 7        | 797,363    |
| Mashonaland Central | 1    | 20       | 1,809,661  |
| Totals              | 4    | 60       | 11,999,499 |

\*In Zimbabwe, as CHAs are generally relatively large and can take up to several years to complete, each CHA is split into "sectors" to enable more regular release of land.

Zimbabwe's mine contamination, the overwhelming majority of which is of AP mines, originates from the laying of minefields in the late 1970s during a decolonisation war. At the time of its independence in 1980, Zimbabwe was left with seven major mined areas along its borders with Mozambique and Zambia, and one inland minefield laid by the Rhodesian Army.<sup>11</sup> Initially, AP mines were laid in very dense belts (on average 2,500 mines per kilometre of frontage) to form a so-called "cordon sanitaire", with up to 5,500 mines per kilometre in some places.<sup>12</sup> Over time, this cordon sanitaire was breached or subject to erosion. In response,

in many sections, a second belt of "ploughshare" directional fragmentation mines protected by AP mines was laid behind the cordon sanitaire. Few areas contain anti-vehicle (AV) mines and it is thought that the number of such mines remaining is low.<sup>13</sup> No AV mines were destroyed during clearance or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks in 2024. In January 2025, however, an accident occurred in a previously cleared area that was most likely the result of an AV mine,<sup>14</sup> when a vehicle struck a landmine on the edge of a road in the Sebungwe area.<sup>15</sup>

1 Email from Capt. Godwish, Quality Management Officer, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024).  
2 Email from Capt. Patson Mandaba, Operations Officer, ZIMAC, 3 June 2024; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 6.  
3 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A.  
4 Email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.  
5 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 6 April 2020.  
6 Email from Åsa Massleberg, Programme Manager and Senior Advisor, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), 16 May 2023.  
7 Emails from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025; and Capt. Mandaba, ZIMAC, 22 September 2025. The CHA was adjusted due to "over clearance", which refers to the situation where the area that has been cleared exceeds the initial polygon.  
8 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, Programme Manager, HALO, 19 August 2024.  
9 Article 7 report (covering 2021), p. 5; Article 7 report (covering 2022), p. 6; and Article 7 report (covering 2023), p. 6; and email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.  
10 Email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A.  
11 2013 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, p. 1; and email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 10 October 2017.  
12 "To Walk the Earth in Safety, Documenting the United States' Commitment to Conventional Weapons Destruction, Fiscal Year 2022, October 1, 2021–September 30, 2022", p. 10.  
13 Email from Maj. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 19 August 2021.  
14 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, Programme Manager, NPA, 11 April 2025.  
15 'Three Killed, Three Injured In Landmine Blast In Binga', *Pindula*, 9 January 2025, at: <https://bit.ly/404Ft2b>.

## NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The National Mine Action Authority of Zimbabwe (NMAAZ) is a policy and regulatory body on all issues relating to mine action in Zimbabwe. ZIMAC was established in 2000 within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) as the focal point and coordination centre of all mine action in the country. ZIMAC is mandated to report to NMAAZ.<sup>16</sup> The Zimbabwe Anti-Personnel Mines (Prohibition) Act domesticates the APMBC and provides the framework for the elaboration of mine action policies and strategies by the NMAAZ.<sup>17</sup>

Stakeholders believe that the existing structure and routines of coordination suffice. However, it has also been pointed out that a national forum was one of the objectives identified at the National Stakeholder Dialogue (NSD) in January 2023, and that such a forum could help better integrate mine action into the national development strategy.<sup>18</sup> It may also encourage donors who wish to support development initiatives to also support mine action initiatives.<sup>19</sup> These issues were discussed again at the NSD in February 2025.<sup>20</sup> As at April 2025, ZIMAC was still awaiting feedback on its proposal to include mine action in the national development goals.<sup>21</sup> In the additional information it provided on its 2025 extension request in August 2025, Zimbabwe stated that its "revised strategic plan" (for mine action) would be integrated into the 2026–30 national development plan, in order to align mine action with broader national development priorities. Zimbabwe expected the national development plan to be finalised by the end of 2025, for implementation from 2026.<sup>22</sup>

Operators are involved in key decision-making, with strategic, co-ordination and technical working group (TWG) meetings between operators and ZIMAC held regularly.<sup>23</sup> TWG meetings were not called for in 2024, but one was set to take place in September 2025,<sup>24</sup> with ongoing plans for operators to host these and to include field visits with a view to sharing learning and best practices.<sup>25</sup> Operators were fully involved in the drafting of Zimbabwe's 2025 Article 5 deadline

extension request, including through a dedicated side session at the NSD in February 2025.<sup>26</sup> Communication between ZIMAC and NMAAZ, operators, and other Zimbabwean government ministries is reported to be good, with regular bilateral meetings.<sup>27</sup>

Operators report an enabling environment for mine action in Zimbabwe,<sup>28</sup> including good administrative support from ZIMAC in liaising with government departments from ZIMAC.<sup>29</sup> However, operators do note that security clearance, a prerequisite for obtaining work permits for international staff, is often a lengthy process.<sup>30</sup> Security clearance is the responsibility of NMAAZ, which seeks authority through the defence and national security departments. ZIMAC's role is to follow up on this process with NMAAZ on behalf of the operators, which it has continued to do.<sup>31</sup> The introduction of a new process in 2024 brought some improvement, but operators still experienced delays and lacked information about applications in progress.<sup>32</sup> HALO notes that it presents a particular problem for those who are not a citizen of a Southern African Development Community country.<sup>33</sup>

APOPO reported experiencing challenges with taxes on imported demining equipment.<sup>34</sup> HALO has resolved this through a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the MoD, which allows it to apply to the Zimbabwe revenue authority (ZIMRA) for exemption from import fees for any capital equipment.<sup>35</sup> NPA has found that demining equipment can be imported without significant complications.<sup>36</sup>

ZIMAC continued to receive capacity development support in 2024, including in information management (IM) through workshops facilitated by NPA, and training from the GICHD in various areas including Information Management for Mine Action System (IMSMA) Core, the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and national mine action standards (NMAS).<sup>37</sup> HALO also provided training for 12 ZIMAC and

16 2013 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.

17 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A.

18 Emails from Mikael Bold, Programme Manager, APOPO, Zimbabwe, 10 June 2024; Nokutenda Masiyanise, Head of Donor Management and Partnerships, HALO, 21 June 2024; Peter Avenell, Country Director, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 24 May 2024; and Åsa Massleberg, GICHD, 16 May 2023.

19 Emails from Robert Burny, Country Director, APOPO, 30 April 2025; and Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025.

20 Email from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025.

21 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 3; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A; and email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

22 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Zimbabwe, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on APMBC website on 6 August 2025, at: <https://bit.ly/45FKlge>, p. 11.

23 Emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025; Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025; Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025; and Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 June 2024; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form I.

24 Emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025; Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 15 July 2025; and Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 16 July 2025.

25 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 14 July 2025.

26 Emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025; Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025; and Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

27 Email from Gemma Welsh, Programme Manager, NPA, 19 April 2023; and Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 June 2024.

28 Emails from Mikael Bold, APOPO, 12 May 2023; Nokutenda Masiyanise, HALO, 21 June 2024; Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 March 2023; and Gemma Welsh, NPA, 19 April 2023.

29 Email from Nokutenda Masiyanise, HALO, 21 June 2024.

30 Emails from Mikael Bold, APOPO, 10 June 2024; Nokutenda Masiyanise, HALO, 21 June 2024; Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 June 2024; and Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024.

31 Emails from Mikael Bold, APOPO, 10 June 2024; and Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 June 2024.

32 Emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025; Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025; and Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025.

33 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

34 Email from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025.

35 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

36 Email from Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 June 2024.

37 Email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

NMCU staff in use of the Minelab GPZ 7000 detectors for secondary search, enabling them to undertake missed-mine drills using these detectors. HALO handed over four GPZ 7000 detectors to ZIMAC for issue to the NMCU in May 2025, with more planned to be provided in July.<sup>38</sup> NPA trained ZIMAC quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) officers in the use of mine detection dogs (MDDs) for QA.<sup>39</sup> The NMCU trains new deminers annually, mainly to replace personnel who have worked in demining for two years or more.<sup>40</sup>

ZIMAC and all operators are taking steps to prepare staff for eventual demobilisation upon completion,<sup>41</sup> though this is now further away than anticipated. Mines Advisory Group (MAG) has been training staff across a range of skills, including business, financial literacy, catering, IT, and agriculture. MAG is also continuing technical training for those who may wish to work internationally or pursue certificated skills as team leaders.<sup>42</sup> NPA continued to provide entrepreneurship training, extending this from office staff to operational staff in 2024, as well as supporting 142 staff to undertake vocational training courses.<sup>43</sup> HALO provides English literacy training in all camps through permanent teaching staff, as well as ongoing agricultural training programmes. HALO also provides training grants for staff who self-enrol on professional development or academic courses.<sup>44</sup> APOPO has

been training its field staff in a range of skills in recent years, including agroforestry and syntropic farming, but this ended due to the unforeseen closure of APOPO's programme in March 2025, following the termination of US funding.<sup>45</sup>

NPA held a multi-stakeholder workshop in July 2024, on the possibility of setting up an Explosive Ordnance (EO) hotline for affected communities. As of July 2025, the roll-out of this hotline was still pending ZIMAC approval.<sup>46</sup> ZIMAC continues with efforts in regional cooperation and hosted the Ethiopian Mine Action Office on a learning visit in March 2025, and also joined HALO to receive a learning visit from Angola.<sup>47</sup>

Zimbabwe stated in 2024 that it did not expect to meet its existing Article 5 deadline of the end of 2025, citing "natural disasters", reduction of operational capacity during the COVID-19 pandemic and withdrawal of funding during the pandemic as the main causes.<sup>48</sup> On 1 April 2025, Zimbabwe submitted its sixth request for an extension to its Article 5 deadline, seeking a further five years to the end of 2030.<sup>49</sup> In its most recent Article 7 report (covering 2024), Zimbabwe reiterates that the withdrawal of APOPO from Zimbabwe in March 2025 and a 50% capacity drop for HALO compared to March 2024, made completion "extremely unattainable by any time before 2030".<sup>50</sup>

## FUNDING FOR AP MINE SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

The Government of Zimbabwe continues to fund mine action in line with previous commitments, with the national financial contribution to the implementation of its obligations in 2024 unchanged from recent years at US\$500,000.<sup>51</sup> The government also continues to fully fund the NMCU and, in 2024, committed US\$2 million to re-equip the unit,<sup>52</sup> with the funds released and procurement underway as at September 2025.<sup>53</sup> In 2024, Zimbabwe pledged that national funding will remain at its current level until completion, and could even increase if the economy strengthens.<sup>54</sup>

Zimbabwe's mine action programme requires an estimated US\$68.3 million between 2025 and 2030,<sup>55</sup> with the majority

of this allocated for survey and clearance.<sup>56</sup> Zimbabwe provided information in its 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request on its funding requirements for this proposed extension period,<sup>57</sup> and clarified certain important points in additional information provided in August 2025. First, Zimbabwe clarified how much international donor funding has already been secured for the proposed extension period, and the shortfall still remaining, stating that, of the US\$68.3 million required, US\$15.52 million had been secured, leaving a gap of US\$52.78 million.<sup>58</sup> Zimbabwe also clarified that the US\$0.5m, committed annually in 2025–30 by the government, does not include equipment costs for the NMCU, as these are to be budgeted for as and when "necessary". Zimbabwe

38 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

39 Email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

40 Ibid.

41 'Zimbabwe's Preparations for Capacity to Address Residual Contamination and Demobilisation of Demining Personnel', Lt. Col. S. Moyo, Co-ordinator, ZIMAC, February 2025, p. 9.

42 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025.

43 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025.

44 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

45 Email from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025.

46 Emails from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April and 16 July 2025.

47 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 14 July 2025.

48 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Annex A, p. A-1.

49 2025 Article 5 deadline extension Request, cover page and p. 6.

50 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A.

51 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form I; Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 17; and emails from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025; and Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 28 August 2024.

52 Article 7 report (covering 2024), Annex A, page 34; and email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

53 Email from Capt. Mandaba, ZIMAC, 22 September 2025.

54 Preliminary Observations, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 18-20 June 2024, p. 2.

55 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Annex A, p. 38; and 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 9.

56 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Zimbabwe, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on APMBC website on 6 August 2025, p. 11.

57 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, pp. 9 and 44–49.

58 Zimbabwe also provides a breakdown of funding secured and shortfall remaining for each operator, with HALO, MAG and NPA each facing a shortfall, but the NMCU not facing a shortfall. Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Zimbabwe, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on APMBC website on 6 August 2025, p. 8.

adds that any international support in the form of demining equipment for the NMCU “will be greatly appreciated”.<sup>59</sup> Given this, Zimbabwe could further strengthen the request by clarifying the total funding and timeline required to fully equip the NMCU, and what international assistance, financial or in-kind in the form of equipment, is likely to be required.<sup>60</sup>

In the additional information provided, Zimbabwe also responded to a request for more information on its planned or proposed resource mobilisation activities during the extension period, by stating that it “proposes to conduct individualised approaches on each and every international meeting that will be held”.<sup>61</sup> Although Zimbabwe does state that resource mobilisation will be an “ongoing effort”, including hosting conferences and presenting on international platforms,<sup>62</sup> the request could be further strengthened by including more details on the planned resource mobilisation efforts.<sup>63</sup> It was hoped that the NSD in early 2025 would attract more donor support. In July, however, operators reported that, although it was a productive meeting, it had not so far led to new funding.<sup>64</sup> An added challenge, as MAG highlights, is that factors such as the possibility of operators being assigned to a different minefield, requiring different assets; the need to replace key equipment over the next five

years or so; and inflation (an ongoing issue in Zimbabwe), can make it difficult to make exact funding projections.<sup>65</sup> ZIMAC has encouraged operators to seek new and innovative funding opportunities. HALO has advocated the concept of development-linked mine action projects, aimed at traditional donors who do not have funding available for mine action in Zimbabwe, but do for development interventions.<sup>66</sup> As previously mentioned, the integration of mine action into Zimbabwe’s national development strategy could bolster this approach. MAG was also working with NPA on a possible joint operations concept note to offer to donors.<sup>67</sup>

The US funding freeze and subsequent review of grants in early 2025 impacted both APOPO and HALO significantly. APOPO’s grant was suspended on 26 January 2025 and then terminated on 26 February, forcing APOPO to close its survey and clearance project in Zimbabwe in March 2025.<sup>68</sup> HALO had already experienced a reduction in US funding in August 2024, from USD\$1.75m USD\$1.25m. In February 2025, HALO’s US funding was frozen, and then terminated in March, cutting approximately 30% of its total annual funding.<sup>69</sup> A summary of 2024–2025 funding of international operators is provided in Table 2.

**Table 2: Funding for survey and clearance by international operators in Zimbabwe (2024–25)<sup>70</sup>**

| Donor  | 2024      | 2025  |
|--|-----------|---|
| Embassy of Japan (EOJ)                                 | HALO      | HALO (reduced)                              |
| German Federal Foreign office (GFFO)                   | NPA       | NPA (until July 2026)                       |
| Gould Foundation                                       | None      | HALO  |
| Ireland (Irish Aid)                                    | HALO      | HALO (2025 is final year of 3-year project) |
| Norway, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)              | MAG, NPA  | MAG (until end April 2025)                  |
| Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad)   | None      | NPA   |
| Oak Foundation   | None      | HALO  |
| UK, Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) | MAG, HALO | MAG (reduced), HALO (extended)              |

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Mine Action Review comments on Zimbabwe’s Article 5 Extension Request (delivered by NPA), Intersessional Meetings, 17–20 June 2025, p. 2. It is not clear if the equipment costs for NMCU are in addition to or included in the annual clearance budget of US\$500,000 per year to be provided by the Government of Zimbabwe. 2025 Article 5 deadline extension Request, p. 9.

<sup>61</sup> Responses to “Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Zimbabwe, Committee on Article 5 Implementation”, undated but published on APMBC website on 6 August 2025, p. 10.

<sup>62</sup> 2025 Article 5 deadline extension Request, Annex B, p. 50.

<sup>63</sup> Mine Action Review comments on Zimbabwe’s Article 5 Extension Request (delivered by NPA), p. 2; and “ICBL Comments on Zimbabwe’s Article 5 Extension Request”, Intersessional Meetings, 17–20 June 2025.

<sup>64</sup> Emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025; Peter Avenell, MAG, 14 July 2025; and Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 16 July 2025.

<sup>65</sup> Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 20 August 2025.

<sup>66</sup> Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

<sup>67</sup> Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 14 July 2025.

<sup>68</sup> Emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025.

<sup>69</sup> Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

<sup>70</sup> Emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025; Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025; Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025; and Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

**Table 2 Continued**

| Donor   | 2024        | 2025           |
|---|-------------|----------------|
| US Department of Defense, Humanitarian Demining Research and Development (DoD HD R&D) | APOPO       | None           |
| US Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA)                                   | APOPO, HALO | None           |
| World Without Mines (WWM)   | HALO        | HALO (reduced) |

## GENDER AND DIVERSITY

ZIMAC had pledged to seek assistance from international stakeholders to formulate a gender and diversity policy by the end of 2022.<sup>71</sup> In its latest Article 7 report covering 2024, however, Zimbabwe noted once again that its gender and diversity policy “has not yet been completed”. As per its previous Article 7 reports in recent years, Zimbabwe stresses that it is bound by national policy, which upholds gender equality of opportunity and seeks to support women to take on roles which have been male-dominated. Zimbabwe asserts that no barriers exist to gender-balanced participation in mine action.<sup>72</sup>

Zimbabwe's National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 does refer to the importance of addressing gender and diversity considerations and existing guidelines that stakeholders should use as a reference, including the UN's Gender Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes.<sup>73</sup> Zimbabwe has also included gender considerations in NMAS 07 (“Management of Demining Operations”), which calls for “special efforts” to be made “to ensure gender balance and diversity of background for Community Liaison Officers”.<sup>74</sup>

**Table 3: Gender composition of operators in 2024<sup>75</sup>**

| Organisation  | Total staff | Women staff      | Total managerial or supervisory staff | Women managerial or supervisory staff | Total operational staff | Women operational staff |
|---------------|-------------|------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| ZIMAC         | 38          | 3 (8%)           | 4                                     | 0 (0%)                                | 34                      | 3 (9%)                  |
| APOPO         | 69          | 21 (30%)         | 9                                     | 3 (33%)                               | 60                      | 18 (30%)                |
| HALO          | 455         | 147 (32%)        | 78                                    | 29 (37%)                              | 342                     | 100 (29%)               |
| MAG           | 87          | 40 (46%)         | 13                                    | 6 (46%)                               | 76                      | 35 (46%)                |
| NPA           | 146         | 47 (32%)         | 5                                     | 1 (20%)                               | 91                      | 31 (34%)                |
| <b>Totals</b> | <b>795</b>  | <b>258 (32%)</b> | <b>109</b>                            | <b>39 (36%)</b>                       | <b>603</b>              | <b>187 (31%)</b>        |

ZIMAC had no women in its small cohort of managerial or supervisory staff in 2024, compared to one in 2023. However, it saw a marginal increase among operational staff, with women making up 9% (3 of 34) of operational positions in 2024, compared to 3% (1 of 37) in 2023.<sup>76</sup> No women are employed in operational roles in the NMCU because staff are recruited from the corps of military engineers, where very few women are working. NMCU deminers are drawn exclusively from soldiers and therefore tend to be male.<sup>77</sup> While ZIMAC can

recommend the deployment of women within NMCU, as they do with all operators, the decision on which personnel to deploy lies with the Army.<sup>78</sup> ZIMAC notes that, thanks to community liaison efforts, all international operators employ considerable numbers of female deminers, team leaders, and supervisors.<sup>79</sup> This represents progress since 2020, when ZIMAC stated that the number of women employed in mine action fell short of “required” levels and noted that Zimbabwean women were somewhat reluctant to work in mine action.<sup>80</sup>

71 Email from Maj. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 2 June 2022.

72 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Annex A, p. 23; Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Annex A, pp. A-1 – A-2; Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Annex A, p. A-1; and Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Annex A, p. A-1.

73 Email from Tom Dibb, HALO, 22 February 2018; and Zimbabwe National Mine Action Strategy, 2018–2025, p. 15.

74 Email from Samuel Fricker, HALO, 20 July 2019.

75 Emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025; Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025; and Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025.

76 Emails from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 3 June 2024; and Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

77 Emails from Maj. Cainos Tamanikwa, 23 August 2022; and Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 3 June 2024.

78 Email from Capt. Mandaba, ZIMAC, 22 September 2025.

79 Email from Maj. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 2 June 2022.

80 Emails from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 31 July 2019 and 6 April 2020.



ZIMAC confirms that all community groups are routinely consulted in the NMCU's survey and community liaison activities, using teams that are gender-balanced and diverse. Personnel are recruited locally, to incorporate ethnic and minority groups who speak the local language.<sup>81</sup> ZIMAC reports that gender is considered during planning and prioritisation of minefields for clearance, such as the risks taken by women and girls to cross minefields to fetch water and by men and boys who herd cattle or plough near mined areas.<sup>82</sup> However, given the nature of the minefields, which are essentially one long and continuous line, operational access constraints often dictate clearance priorities as much as other factors.<sup>83</sup>

All international operators in Zimbabwe have either global or country-specific gender policies in place for their programme staff<sup>84</sup> and demonstrate continued commitment to measures that encourage and support employment of women in mine action as well as the integration of gender and diversity concerns and the needs of affected communities into their operations.

NPA has a global target of a minimum of 25% female mine action staff, with representation in operational and management roles, though NPA Zimbabwe aims to achieve a higher target of 50% female recruitment.<sup>85</sup> As at the end of 2024, it had some way to go, with the figure standing at 32% (see Table 3). NPA undertakes targeted recruitment campaigns to encourage more women to apply, particularly for male-dominated roles, as well as to encourage applications from members of marginalised communities.<sup>86</sup> Among NPA's staff, the proportion of women in managerial or supervisory positions actually fell – from 39% in 2023 to 20% in 2024. This fall was said to be due to an overall increase in the number of supervisors and team leaders.<sup>87</sup> In June 2025, ZIMAC accredited two female dog handlers for deployment in NPA.<sup>88</sup>

In MAG, the proportion of women increased significantly – from 29% to 46%.<sup>89</sup> This was due to an overall increase in the

number of teams from three to five, meaning more openings and the promotion of female staff to some supervisory roles.<sup>90</sup> MAG has one all-female mine action team (MAT), which continued its work in 2024.<sup>91</sup> MAG also established post-maternity accommodation in the field for new mothers, to enable them to stay with their child and a helper for an additional three months after maternity leave. Staff can ask for an extended period based on individual circumstances. MAG also began distribution of menstrual products to all female staff in 2024.<sup>92</sup>

HALO continued its initiatives to provide material and financial support to pregnant women and breastfeeding mothers among its staff, as well as providing childcare allowances, while a female nurse rotates through HALO's operations camps.<sup>93</sup> HALO also continued to provide skills training for female staff to support their wider employment opportunities after HALO, and to support female staff to obtain or upgrade their driving licence.<sup>94</sup>

HALO and MAG note that, while they deploy gender-mixed teams and both Shona and English-speaking staff, to help facilitate access and participation by all groups in community liaison and survey activities, their areas of operation (AoOs), are mostly culturally homogenous, comprised largely of communities from the Shona ethnic group.<sup>95</sup>

NPA provided a one-day training course on sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) to 104 staff (61 men and 43 women), having identified a need for work on this topic through its community gender assessments, conducted during the pre-task impact assessments. These showed that women and girls are at increased risk as they are forced to take longer routes to avoid mined areas, for example, when collecting water. Restrictions on land use, due to mine contamination, also impact livelihoods and increase poverty; another factor contributing to SGBV prevalence. As well as training staff, NPA is taking steps to integrate SGBV awareness into risk education.<sup>96</sup>

## ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

All mine action activities in Zimbabwe are conducted in line with the Zimbabwe Environmental Agency (EMA)

regulations and requirements.<sup>97</sup> Zimbabwe has an NMAS on environmental management (ZNMAS 10.07) and a policy on

81 Emails from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 31 July 2019 and 6 April 2020, and then as Major, 2 June 2022.

82 Emails from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 31 July 2019 and 6 April 2020.

83 Emails from Samuel Fricker, HALO, 20 July 2019; and Adam Komorowski, Regional Director West Africa and Latin America, MAG, 1 August 2019.

84 Emails from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025; Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2024; Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 April 2025; and Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025.

85 Email from Gemma Welsh, NPA, 19 April 2023; and Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 June 2024.

86 Email from Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 June 2024.

87 Emails from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 June 2024, and 11 April and 16 July 2025.

88 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Zimbabwe, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on APMBC website on 6 August 2025, p. 13.

89 Emails from Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024 and 11 April 2025.

90 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 14 July 2025.

91 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025.

92 Ibid.

93 Emails from Samuel Fricker, HALO, 30 May 2022; and Nicholas Torbet, HALO, 19 April 2023.

94 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

95 Emails from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025; and Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024.

96 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025.

97 Email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.



environmental management, with ZNMAS 10.07 updated in 2023 and shared with operators.<sup>98</sup> NMAS 10.07 covers “Safety and Occupational Health and Protection of the Environment”. This standard provides operational guidance on air, water, and soil pollution; reduction and disposal of waste, especially toxic and hazardous waste; obstruction of watercourses; burning of vegetation; environmental considerations at worksites and temporary accommodation facilities, as well as at fuel, oil, and lubricant storage and maintenance areas. It also covers reduction of energy consumption and carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>) emissions and environmental considerations related to use of land and risk to heritage.<sup>99</sup> ZIMAC reported in April 2025 plans to update Zimbabwe’s NMAS 10.07 it to meet the revised IMAS 07.13,<sup>100</sup> though no timeframe for this was specified.

In terms of good practice, the use of highly destructive mechanical clearance methods is not permitted in areas with large trees. Manual clearance only is used in such areas, with back-filling of soil undertaken soon after clearance.<sup>101</sup> Additionally, use of mechanical assets is limited to five hours per day, which helps reduce emissions.<sup>102</sup> ZIMAC also states that, where mechanical demining takes place, there is a plan for afforestation. ZIMAC’s quality management (QM) department acts as the organisation’s environmental focal point.<sup>103</sup>

**Table 4: Environmental policies and action**<sup>104</sup>

| Operator | Environmental policy in place | Environmental assessments conducted to support planning and delivery of survey and clearance | Environmental focal point at country-programme level |
|----------|-------------------------------|--|--|
| APOPO    | Yes                           | Yes  | No <sup>105</sup>                                    |
| HALO     | No (in development)           | No   | Yes  |
| MAG      | Yes                           | No   | Yes  |
| NPA      | Yes                           | Yes  | Yes  |

All operators take measures to reduce the environmental impact of demining operations but vary in the degree to which they have environmental policies and management systems in place. MAG works in Zimbabwe according to its global environmental policy.<sup>106</sup> It does not have an environmental management system in place<sup>107</sup> but follows IMAS 07.13.<sup>108</sup> HALO has standard operating procedures (SOPs) on environmental management,<sup>109</sup> and was developing a global environmental management policy as at July 2025, which it will implement in Zimbabwe.<sup>110</sup> NPA has an environmental management system in place, including an environmental policy and environmental SOP, last updated in 2021.<sup>111</sup> Prior to closing its programme in March 2025, APOPO had an environmental policy and action plan for 2021–25,

with environmental management procedures outlined in its SOP on Safety And Occupational Health.<sup>112</sup> NPA undertakes environmental assessments to support planning and delivery of survey and clearance and planned to roll out its Green Office and Green Field Tools fully in Zimbabwe in 2025, to support environmental assessments and management.<sup>113</sup>

Operators are taking a range of steps to reduce their carbon emissions. HALO field camps have been run on solar power since 2016. HALO also uses electric trimmers to clear vegetation.<sup>114</sup> NPA extended solar panel installation to the remaining two of its three field camps in 2024.<sup>115</sup> MAG continued to use solar power for field activities and is collecting data within its Zimbabwe programme for a global Carbon Accounting Project, which should offer further

98 Emails from Maj. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 2 June 2022; and Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 28 August 2024.

99 Zimbabwe National Mine Action Standards (ZNMAS) 10.07, First edition (February 2013), “Safety and Occupational Health. Protection of the Environment”.

100 Email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

101 Email from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 13 April 2023.

102 Email from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 3 June 2024.

103 Email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025. Afforestation refers to the process of planting trees in an area which was not historically forested. Such plans for afforestation include the planting of “exotic and indigenous fruit trees such as mangoes and guavas”. Responses to “Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Zimbabwe, Committee on Article 5 Implementation”, undated but published on APMBC website on 6 August 2025, p. 11.

104 Emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025; Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025; and Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

105 APOPO did not have an environmental focal point in Zimbabwe, but responsibility for this was assigned to the Country Director and Head of Support Services. Email from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025.

106 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024.

107 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 March 2023.

108 Email from Roxana Bobolicu, MAG, 29 September 2022.

109 Email from Nokutenda Masiyanise, HALO, 21 June 2024.

110 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

111 Emails from Gemma Walsh, NPA, 2 June and 8 July 2022 and 19 April 2023.

112 Email from Mikael Bold, APOPO, 12 May 2023.

113 Email from Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 16 July 2025.

114 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

115 Email from Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 April 2025.

country-level advice on minimising its local environmental impact.<sup>116</sup> In line with its global initiative, APOPO had a carbon sequestration plan for its Zimbabwe programme, which included emissions reduction and a primary goal to plant and monitor more than 110,000 trees.<sup>117</sup>

HALO explains that the selection of manual versus mechanical teams to conduct clearance is the primary environmental consideration in Zimbabwe, weighing the impact of the more environmentally intrusive mechanical clearance against the operational benefits.<sup>118</sup> Operators minimise the cutting or larger trees and other vegetation where possible, and MAG reserves use of its mini-excavator for area contaminated with sensitive R2M2 mines.<sup>119</sup> NPA only cuts trees if they present an obstruction to the use of the detector to confirm a hazard in the safe lane.<sup>120</sup> In 2024, NPA received some training in water management

and participated in refuse clean-up campaigns in local communities.<sup>121</sup> NPA also introduced a water borehole system at its Manicaland East camp, allowing it to store and filter water on-site, rather than bring water in.<sup>122</sup>

Operators are taking steps to adapt to increasingly frequent higher temperatures. APOPO systematised a proactive field work schedule in 2024, with an early start in the summer and additional breaks during hot days.<sup>123</sup> MAG starts operations at daylight to make use of cooler conditions but, even so, has been forced to halt operations by 9am at times due to extremely high temperatures.<sup>124</sup> During the planning and prioritising of clearance tasks, HALO takes into account the effect extreme weather on surrounding communities, particularly the changing distances and routes people travel to collect water. Areas that see increased movement and access are prioritised for clearance.<sup>125</sup>

## INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

ZIMAC operates an IMSMA New Generation (NG) database with all data disaggregated by type of munition and method of land release.<sup>126</sup> Zimbabwe and operators confirm the national information database is accurate and up to date.<sup>127</sup> ZIMAC and operators continued to hold regular meetings in 2024 to cross-reference data to help ensure accuracy and reliability.<sup>128</sup> Operators confirm that data collection forms are consistent and enable efficient collection of necessary data.<sup>129</sup>

ZIMAC reports that migration of data to IMSMA Core is at an advanced stage, with Survey 123 installed and IMSMA forms developed. Zimbabwe's NMAs on IM were also updated in 2024 to make provision for IMSMA Core.<sup>130</sup> The GICHD now intends to introduce IMSMA Core in Zimbabwe towards the end of 2025.<sup>131</sup> NPA suggests that ZIMAC should develop IM SOPs with the support of the GICHD and operators.<sup>132</sup> APOPO, in cooperation with Cranfield University in the

United Kingdom, field tested the Clearance Data Model (CDM) in Zimbabwe 2024, which records 66 attributes per mine, producing highly detailed datasets and reportedly improving risk assessment and management; operational understanding; and QA.<sup>133</sup> NPA held a joint IM workshop with all operators in 2024 and another with ZIMAC to consolidate data in March 2025.<sup>134</sup> HALO is supporting ZIMAC in 2025 with provision of some IT equipment and IM training.<sup>135</sup>

As in previous years, ZIMAC's latest Article 7 report (covering 2024) was detailed and of good quality. Zimbabwe's Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted on 1 April 2025, was also highly detailed and of generally good quality, though areas for further clarification are detailed in the section above, "Funding for AP Mine Survey and Clearance", and in the section below, "Planning and Tasking".

## PLANNING AND TASKING

An updated National Mine Action Strategy for Zimbabwe's current extension period through to the end of 2025 was launched in January 2023.<sup>136</sup> The strategy sets out clear

objectives, baselines, indicators, and targets for four strategic mine action goals around survey and clearance; explosive ordnance risk education; victim assistance; and

116 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025.

117 Email from Mikael Bold, APOPO, 10 June 2024.

118 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

119 Emails from Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025; Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025; and Gemma Walsh, NPA, 19 April 2023.

120 Emails from Gemma Walsh, NPA, 2 June and 8 July 2022 and 19 April 2023.

121 Emails from Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 April and 16 July 2025.

122 Emails from Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 June 2024 and 16 July 2025.

123 Emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April and 28 August 2025.

124 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025.

125 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

126 Email from (then) Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.

127 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A; and emails from Nokutenda Masiyanise, HALO, 21 June 2024; and Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024.

128 Emails from Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025; Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025; and Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

129 Emails from Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024; and Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 June 2024.

130 Email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

131 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025.

132 Ibid.

133 Email from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025.

134 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025.

135 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

136 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Annex A, pp. A20-A21.

advocacy and communication.<sup>137</sup> Zimbabwe has committed to updating the strategy to cover its proposed extension period from 1 January 2026 to 31 December 2030.<sup>138</sup> With the assistance of the GICHD and stakeholders, Zimbabwe states the strategy will be “finalised in 2026 and submitted to relevant ministries for approval.”<sup>139</sup>

Zimbabwe provided a detailed work plan for 2024–25<sup>140</sup> and has provided one for 2026–30,<sup>141</sup> which includes the annual

targets for land release shown in Table 5.<sup>142</sup> Zimbabwe says it will update this five-year work plan annually.<sup>143</sup> In 2023, Zimbabwe fell behind its annual land release target for the first time since 2018,<sup>144</sup> releasing only 2.31km<sup>2</sup> during the year instead of the 6.39km<sup>2</sup> projected.<sup>145</sup> In 2024, Zimbabwe again released less mined area than planned, though with a much smaller gap between projected and achieved release (4.39km<sup>2</sup><sup>146</sup> instead of 5.71km<sup>2</sup>).<sup>147</sup>

**Table 5: Revised NSP (National Strategic Plan) Projections, 2025–30 (m<sup>2</sup>)<sup>148</sup>**

| Minefield                    | Operator | 2025             | 2026             | 2027             | 2028             | 2029             | 2030             |
|------------------------------|----------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Musengezi to Mazowe River    | HALO     | 815,000          | 900,000          | 94,661           | 0                | 0                | 0                |
| Mazowe River to Nyahuku      | HALO     | 0                | 0                | 805,339          | 900,000          | 459,495          | 0                |
| Nyahuku to Nyamapanda        | NPA      | 2,500,000        | 441,201          | 0                | 0                | 0                | 0                |
| Nyamapanda to Rwenya River   | MAG      | 331,000          | 277,000          | 277,000          | 277,000          | 277,000          | 277,000          |
|                              | NPA      | 0                | 198,201          | 210,000          | 210,000          | 210,000          | 210,000          |
|                              | HALO     | 0                | 0                | 0                | 0                | 350,000          | 350,000          |
| Mwenzi River to Sango Border | NMCU     | 140,000          | 140,000          | 140,000          | 140,000          | 140,000          | 130,239          |
| Lusulu                       | NMCU     | 84,000           | 120,000          | 149,000          | 149,000          | 149,000          | 149,000          |
| <b>Totals</b>                |          | <b>3,870,000</b> | <b>2,076,402</b> | <b>1,676,000</b> | <b>1,676,000</b> | <b>1,585,495</b> | <b>1,116,239</b> |

In its 2025 extension request, Zimbabwe provides a detailed and costed work plan for the proposed extension period of 2026–30. The plan includes the clear land release targets already outlined; operators assigned to specific minefield sectors; and details of the operational capacity and equipment currently available.<sup>149</sup> In additional information provided in August 2025, Zimbabwe also gave further detail on a number of planning issues, including the following: First, it said that the operational capacity underpinning its work plan accounts for the reduction in clearance capacity resulting from decreased international funding, including from the United States.<sup>150</sup> Second, Zimbabwe provided additional information on the basis on which it has calculated

projected clearance outputs for various minefields, notably the number of deminers, MDDs, and machines allocated per organisation and the estimated number of operational days.<sup>151</sup> Third, Zimbabwe clarified, for each operator, how much of the remaining mined area it expects to cancel through non-technical survey (NTS) (very minimal), reduce through TS, and release through clearance.<sup>152</sup> In addition to these helpful clarifications, Zimbabwe could further strengthen the request by providing a more detailed rationale and breakdown of its budget, including budget lines for key cost centres, which would help more clearly reconcile the projected funding requirements with the expected outputs.

<sup>137</sup> Zimbabwe, National Mine Action Completion Strategy 2018–2025, Reviewed Version, pp. 18–27.

<sup>138</sup> Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A.

<sup>139</sup> 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 19.

<sup>140</sup> Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Annex A, p. A-1.

<sup>141</sup> The work plan is provided as Annex A in Zimbabwe's Article 7 Report (covering 2024).

<sup>142</sup> Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid., Annex A, pp. 22–23; and 2025 Article 5 deadline extension Request, p. 6.

<sup>144</sup> Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Annex A, p. A-2.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid., Annex A, p. A-23.

<sup>146</sup> Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A.

<sup>147</sup> Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 6.

<sup>148</sup> Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A and Annex A, pp. 38–39.

<sup>149</sup> 2025 Article 5 deadline extension Request, Annex B, pp. 44–52.

<sup>150</sup> Responses to “Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Zimbabwe, Committee on Article 5 Implementation”, undated but published on APMBBC website on 6 August 2025, p. 4.

<sup>151</sup> Zimbabwe states that: “On average a deminer produces 40m<sup>2</sup> per day, MDD output 250m<sup>2</sup> per day per dog while mechanical clearance account for 400m<sup>2</sup> per one mechanical team per day. On average Zimbabwe's programme has 21 days per month constituting to 195 working days for the ten (10) operational months. One manual team consist of 9 deminers, MDD team comprises of six (6) dogs with six (6) handlers assisted by three (3) manual deminers. Mechanical team comprises of four (4) operators”. Ibid

<sup>152</sup> Zimbabwe projects the following for the remaining areas assigned to each operator: MAG: 65% cleared, 35% reduced; NPA: 11.6% cleared, 88.4% reduced; HALO: 54% cleared, 45% reduced; 1% cancelled; and NMCU: 75% cleared, 25% reduced. Zimbabwe also states: “The percentages are based on the current minefields that may change in future”, likely referring to the possible re-allocation of areas of operation between operators. Responses to “Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Zimbabwe, Committee on Article 5 Implementation”, undated but published on APMBBC website on 6 August 2025, p. 5.

Historically, clearance was prioritised by ZIMAC according to impact, with contaminated areas closest to highly populated areas to be addressed first.<sup>153</sup> However, as most of the minefields are along the border with Mozambique, operations tend to proceed in a linear fashion to allow for optimal use of resources and facilitate concentrated logistical support and command and control, rather than opening tasks all over the frontage of the border.<sup>154</sup> ZIMAC and operators do state, however, that factors such as national priorities, community impact, and the level of incident risk also inform ongoing task prioritisation.<sup>155</sup> HALO also notes that its current clearance priority is those areas contaminated with R2M2 AP mines, as these cause the most accidents to animals and people in affected communities.<sup>156</sup>

Operators report that clearance and survey task dossiers have been issued in a timely and effective manner,<sup>157</sup> with all

remaining tasks now allocated among them.<sup>158</sup> Since 2022, however, as it approached its current Article 5 deadline of the end of 2025, Zimbabwe has been taking steps to adjust plans and redistribute areas of operation so that operators who complete assigned tasks or gain additional capacity may deploy their resources elsewhere. ZIMAC re-allocated some of MAG's tasks to NPA and HALO in 2022 and 2023.<sup>159</sup> In April 2025, MAG handed two further minefields in Mudzi District, measuring 176,000m<sup>2</sup> and thought to be phoney, to NPA.<sup>160</sup> NPA has suggested it should be assigned more sectors within the Mashonaland East minefield, suitable for its MDDs (which are used only by NPA) and manual teams.<sup>161</sup> ZIMAC plans to allocate further tasks to the NMCU as needed, once it completes its current allocation, though the NMCU has a major shortage of detectors.<sup>162</sup>

## LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

### STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

ZIMAC last reviewed the NMAS and updated some chapters in 2022,<sup>163</sup> and states that NMAS are reviewed every three years and in line with updates to the IMAS.<sup>164</sup> Operators confirm that they were consulted during this last review.<sup>165</sup> SOPs are also reviewed regularly and as needed to address new challenges, ensure the employment of best practice, and update them in line with IMAS and Zimbabwe's NMAS.<sup>166</sup> The NMAS were re-shared with operators in 2024, but no changes were made.<sup>167</sup>

Operators have, though, made some suggestions for improvement. While HALO, for example, believes that the NMAS are suitably adapted to the local threat and enable efficient, evidence-based survey and clearance, it does point out that no criteria are set for cancellation or reclamation of land, an omission it believes should be rectified to help aid the decision-making process for operators.<sup>168</sup> HALO planned to present this matter to ZIMAC during 2025 with a view to the cancellation of some areas in Mashonaland Central. HALO

agrees that the issue must be carefully considered before being introduced into the NMAS.<sup>169</sup>

NPA adds that Zimbabwe lacks definitions of direct and indirect evidence of explosive ordnance (EO), which it believes should be rectified, in accordance with IMAS.<sup>170</sup> APOPO has suggested that the NMAS on quality management systems (QMS) requires updating to be brought in line with IMAS, and that the NMAS for accident investigation also requires revision.<sup>171</sup> It presented on these issues to ZIMAC and operators in 2024, but no further progress had been made as at June 2025. APOPO also recommends that ZIMAC consider updating the NMAS on IM and environmental management. It believes these updates, together a revision of the NMAS on QMS, would result in an updated land release system in line with current IMAS.<sup>172</sup>

ZIMAC conducts QA. In 2023, ZIMAC noted that, in addition to having a QA Officer attached to each operator, a stand-alone, external QC team samples completed tasks in line with Zimbabwe's inspection procedures as per the NMAS.<sup>173</sup>

153 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 6 April 2020.

154 Emails from Nicholas Torbet, HALO, 19 April 2023; and Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024.

155 Emails from Nokutenda Masiyanise, HALO, 21 June 2024; and Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 3 June 2024.

156 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

157 Emails from Mikael Bold, APOPO, 10 June 2024; Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024; and Nokutenda Masiyanise, HALO, 21 June 2024.

158 Email from Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 June 2024.

159 Emails from Gemma Welsh, NPA, 19 April 2023 and Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 June 2024; and Article 7 Report (covering 2022), p. 7.

160 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025.

161 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025.

162 'Demining Operational Overview', Major B. Kabvunye, 21C 1 Engr. Sp. Regt., uploaded 18 February 2025, pp. 10–11 and 16, at: <https://bit.ly/4o8cBAI>.

163 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), p. 3; and emails from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 13 April 2023 and 7 June 2024.

164 Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 6 April 2020.

165 Emails from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 13 April 2023; Mikael Bold, APOPO, 12 May 2023; Gemma Welsh, NPA, 2 June 2022 and 19 April 2023; and Nicholas Torbet, HALO, 19 April 2023.

166 Email from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 13 April 2023; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p.3.

167 Emails from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025; Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 and 15 July 2025; and Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025.

168 Emails from Nokutenda Masiyanise, HALO, 21 June 2024; and Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 19 August 2024. The term "reclamation criteria" refers to a situation where the land has been reclaimed through activities such as construction or cultivation. If the relevant criteria are met, the area may be considered for cancellation.

169 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

170 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025.

171 Email from Mikael Bold, APOPO, 9 August 2024.

172 Email from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025.

173 Email from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 13 April 2023.

APOPO notes that, since ZIMAC cannot mobilise its QA team until a certain number of sectors are cleared, their field visits for external QA are not always in line with clearance progress, sometimes leaving cleared land unused for longer than necessary.<sup>174</sup>

In the additional information on its extension request it provided in August 2025, Zimbabwe outlines how different land release methods are selected and applied to enhance operational efficiency. Zimbabwe explains that land release methodologies are selected based on the type of minefield being worked on. Cordon sanitaire minefields require full clearance through manual and mechanical methods, while ploughshare minefields require use of TS, full clearance, and targeted clearance, hence the current use of MDDs only by NPA in Zimbabwe, which have played a crucial role in expediting TS and facilitating prompt deployment of deminers to mine lanes.<sup>175</sup> NPA is working with ZIMAC towards accreditation in 2025 for clearance using MDDs, with trial sectors complete and awaiting QC by ZIMAC as at July 2025.<sup>176</sup> Use of MDDs in missed-mine drills was trialled in 2023, but not approved by ZIMAC, with the primary concern being to demonstrate sufficiently that dogs could detect deeply buried mines.<sup>177</sup>

If accreditation of MDDs for clearance is secured, NPA plans to revisit accreditation of MDDs for missed-mine drills.<sup>178</sup> These drills are required when gaps in the mine pattern are found, and had been an ongoing challenge to land release efficiency for Zimbabwe,<sup>179</sup> proving time consuming and seemingly ineffective as mines were found only rarely.<sup>180</sup> Use of the highly sensitive Minelab GPZ 7000 detector since 2024 has significantly improved the efficiency and effectiveness of clearance generally, as well as reducing the

need for missing-mine excavations in Zimbabwe.<sup>181</sup> However, ZIMAC and NPA reopened the possibility of using MDDs in missed-mine drills in early 2025 as part of efforts to further increase efficiency. As at July 2025, NPA had established a new MDD training area with deeply-buried targets, intended to demonstrate MDD detection capability down to 40cm.<sup>182</sup>

HALO introduced the Minelab GPZ 7000 detector in Zimbabwe in 2024 and explains that, due to the detector's high sensitivity, it would be inefficient for use in primary search or clearance. As such, HALO reserves it for deeply buried mines that may have been missed during clearance. This helps more quickly determine whether the mine has been initiated or washed away, without the need for full excavation, which is far more time consuming.<sup>183</sup> APOPO extended the use of GPZ-7000 in 2024, not only for use in missed-mine drills, but also as a tool for internal QC. This shortened the process of handing over completed sectors from a month to just a few days.<sup>184</sup> MAG trialled and then deployed the GPZ-7000 in 2024 but, unfortunately, as at April 2025, MAG's two GPZ-7000 detectors were being returned, due to the withdrawal of US Department of State (PM/WRA) funding and an accompanying order to return US Humanitarian Demining Research and Development (HD-RD) assets.<sup>185</sup>

MAG explains that the ability to use the best tools and methods for particular minefields in Zimbabwe remains a challenge at times, and may require further sharing of AoOs and collaboration with joint funding. Operators have discussed this as a group and with ZIMAC.<sup>186</sup>

All areas cleared in Zimbabwe in 2024 proved to contain AP mines.<sup>187</sup>

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Land release in Zimbabwe is conducted by the Zimbabwean Armed Forces' NMCU and, as of March 2025, three international operators: HALO, MAG, and NPA. As previously noted, APOPO was forced to close its mine action programme in Zimbabwe that month due to the termination of its US funding.<sup>188</sup> All operators in Zimbabwe deploy combined TS and clearance teams (see Table 7).

Table 6: Operational NTS capacities deployed in 2024<sup>189</sup>

| Operator | NTS teams | Total NTS personnel | Comments   |
|----------|-----------|---------------------|--|
| APOPO    | 0         | 1                   | In addition, one road clearance team also capable of NTS.                    |
| HALO     | 0         | 0                   | No specific NTS teams. NTS managed by Community Outreach team (3 personnel). |

174 Email from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025.  
175 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Annex I, p. A-3.  
176 Emails from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April and 16 July 2025.  
177 Emails from Gemma Welsh, NPA, 19 April 2023; Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 13 April 2023; and Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 3 June 2024.  
178 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 16 July 2025.  
179 Emails from Samuel Fricker, HALO, 20 July 2019; and Adam Komorowski, MAG, 1 August 2019.  
180 Emails from Samuel Fricker, HALO, 5 August 2021; and Peter Avenell, MAG, 20 May 2020.  
181 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 16 July 2025.  
182 Ibid.  
183 HALO explains that, for example, for a single 1m<sup>2</sup> area, manual excavation in favourable soil conditions takes approximately two shifts (60 minutes of work). By contrast, using a GPZ 7000 detector, the same 1m<sup>2</sup> can be completed in two minutes. Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.  
184 Email from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025.  
185 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025.  
186 Ibid.  
187 Emails from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 3 June 2024; and Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 19 August 2024.  
188 Email from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025.  
189 Emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025; Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025; Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025; and Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

Table 6 Continued

| Operator      | NTS teams | Total NTS personnel | Comments                                      |
|---------------|-----------|---------------------|---|
| MAG           | 1         | 3                   |   |
| NPA           | 1         | 2                   | Community liaison staff conduct NTS and EORE. |
| NMCU          | 1         | 5                   |   |
| <b>Totals</b> | <b>3</b>  | <b>11</b>           |   |

Table 7: Operational TS and clearance capacities deployed in 2024<sup>190</sup>

| Operator      | Manual teams | Mechanical teams | Total deminers | Dog teams                 | Machines  | Comments   |
|---------------|--------------|------------------|----------------|---------------------------|---|--|
| HALO          | 30           | 1                | 210            | 0                         | 11 (2 x excavators for mechanical clearance, 9 x mini- excavators to support clearance on R2M2 AP mine tasks) | Decreased from 30 teams in January to 26 teams by the end of 2024. |
| NPA           | 8            | 0                | 84             | 5<br>(5 dogs, 5 handlers) | 0   | MDDs deployed for TS only.   |
| APOPO         | 6            | 0                | 36             | 0                         | 0   |  |
| MAG           | 5            | 1                | 47             | 0                         | 1 (mini-excavator)  | Total deminers includes two mechanical deminers.                   |
| NMCU          | 13           | 1                | 84             | 0                         | 1 (bulldozer)   | Total deminers includes four mechanical deminers.                  |
| <b>Totals</b> | <b>62</b>    | <b>3</b>         | <b>461</b>     | <b>5 dogs, 5 handlers</b> | <b>13</b>   |  |

Overall, Zimbabwe maintained a similar TS and clearance capacity in 2024 as it did in 2023 and recent years, with the combined capacity of humanitarian operators and the NMCU totalling 62 teams of 461 deminers in 2024 (see Table 7), compared to 59 teams of 455 deminers in 2023.<sup>191</sup> There has been a slight decrease in recent years overall though, with 59 teams of 496 deminers in 2022,<sup>192</sup> and 58 teams of 500 deminers in 2021.<sup>193</sup>

The NMCU increased from three to five NTS personnel, but maintained the same clearance and TS capacity as in 2023. It envisages equipping the NMCU with more detectors in 2025 to increase the clearance rate.<sup>194</sup> APOPO saw an almost 30% reduction in clearance capacity in 2024 compared to its peak of 50 deminers for much of 2023.<sup>195</sup> In comparison to

2023, MAG reduced its NTS capacity from two teams of five personnel to one team of three, but increased its clearance and TS capacity from four teams of 36 deminers to five teams of 45, due to increased funding. However, it expected to reduce manual clearance capacity during Q2 2025, due to expected funding decreases.<sup>196</sup> ZIMAC estimates that MAG would have to double its capacity to meet its land release targets set for the end of 2025 and has been reassigning some of MAG's AoO to other operators, as noted above.<sup>197</sup>

NPA maintained the same manual clearance capacity in 2024 as it had in 2023, but was able to add one further MDD in 2024. As of June 2025, NPA had increased its operational MDD capacity to six dogs and handlers.<sup>198</sup> HALO started 2024 with the same manual clearance capacity (30 teams) as in

<sup>190</sup> Ibid.

<sup>191</sup> Emails from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 3 June 2024; Mikael Bold, APOPO, 10 June 2024; Nokutenda Masiyanise, HALO, 21 June 2024; Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024; and Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 June 2024, and email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 19 August 2024; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Annex 1, pp. A-6 – A-9; and A-10 – A-11.

<sup>192</sup> Emails from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 13 April 2023; Gemma Welsh, NPA, 19 April 2023; Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 March 2023; and Mikael Bold, APOPO, 12 May and 8 August 2023.

<sup>193</sup> Emails from Maj. Cainos Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 2 June 2022; Peter Avenell, MAG, 17 May 2022; Gemma Walsh, NPA, 2 June 2022; and John Sorbo, APOPO, 20 June 2022.

<sup>194</sup> Email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

<sup>195</sup> Email from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025.

<sup>196</sup> Emails from Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024 and 11 April 2025.

<sup>197</sup> Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Annex A, pp. A-8 and A-9.

<sup>198</sup> Emails from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 June 2024; and 11 April and 16 July 2025.

2023 but had to decrease to 28 teams in July, and then to 26 in October, due to drops in funding. It expected to decrease even further to 12 teams in during 2025, due to reduced donor support.<sup>199</sup>

Zimbabwe first introduced mechanical assets in 2016. These have been useful in tackling deeply buried mines on hard ground as well as in areas with highly mineralised soils.<sup>200</sup> HALO introduced a micro excavator in 2023.<sup>201</sup> The machine works in conjunction with manual demining to complete excavations that would otherwise be done entirely by hand, thus increasing both deminer safety and overall efficiency.<sup>202</sup> In 2024, HALO led on use of the micro-excavator for excavation of sensitive R2M2 mines and MAG, having introduced the machine in 2024, followed with this practice when possible.<sup>203</sup> NPA had planned to introduce drones

for NTS and quality management in 2024.<sup>204</sup> However, discussions on this possibility were still ongoing with ZIMAC as at April 2025.<sup>205</sup>

In late 2024 and early 2025, HALO increased its capacity for teams to use and manage hand-held standoff mine detection system (HSTAMIDS) detectors. These help distinguish clutter and pieces of metal from mines and have proved efficient for use in the high-metal content minefields. HALO also implemented a new testing system for all deminers using Minelab F3 detectors with a yellow end cap, which allows for custom sensitivity configuration. Deminers were provided with a new, extended adaptor to the standard Minelab test piece. This removed the requirement for deminers to wait each morning for team commanders to arrive with test boxes and test the detectors prior to work starting.<sup>206</sup>

## LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

### LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

Table 8: Summary of land release outputs in 2024 (national authority data)

| Release of mined area  | Release in 2024 (km <sup>2</sup> ) |
|--|------------------------------------|
| <b>Clearance</b>   | 1.95                               |
| <b>Technical survey</b>  | 2.44                               |
| <b>Non-technical survey</b>  | 0                                  |
| <b>AP mines destroyed during clearance, survey, and spot tasks</b> | 2024                               |
| <b>AP mines destroyed</b>  | 31,672                             |
| (with 45 destroyed in spot tasks according to operator data)       |                                    |

A total of 4.39km<sup>2</sup> of mined area was released in 2024, of which 1.95km<sup>2</sup> was cleared and 2.44km<sup>2</sup> was reduced through TS. No area was cancelled through NTS. A total of 31,672 AP mines were found and destroyed according to national authority data.<sup>207</sup> Operators report that 45 were destroyed during EOD spot tasks.<sup>208</sup> A total of 223,374m<sup>2</sup> was added to the national database in 2024, due to an adjustment to an original CHA by ZIMAC.<sup>209</sup>

### SURVEY IN 2024

According to national authority data, Zimbabwe released 2.44km<sup>2</sup> through survey in 2024, all of which was reduced through TS (see Table 9).<sup>210</sup> This is a significant increase on

2023, when just over 0.4km<sup>2</sup> of mined area was released through survey, of which 10,845m<sup>2</sup> was cancelled through NTS<sup>211</sup> and 404,311m<sup>2</sup> was reduced through TS.<sup>212</sup>

199 Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

200 Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Annex A, p. A-2.

201 Email from Nokutenda Masiyanise, HALO, 21 June 2024.

202 Email from Nicholas Torbet, HALO, 19 April 2023.

203 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025.

204 Email from Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 June 2024.

205 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025.

206 Emails from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 and 15 July 2025.

207 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A; and email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

208 Emails from Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April and 14 July 2025; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025; and Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

209 Email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

210 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A; and email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

211 Emails from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 3 June 2024; and Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May and 15 August 2024; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p.6.

212 Emails from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 3 June 2024; Mikael Bold, APOPO, 10 June and 9 August 2024; Nokutenda Masiyanise, HALO, 21 June 2024; Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024; and Miroslav Pisarević, NPA, 11 June 2024; and Article 7 report (covering 2023), p. 6.



NPA saw almost a fourfold increase in reduction from 0.97km<sup>2</sup> in 2023 to 3.8km<sup>2</sup> in 2024, through increased and improved use of MDDs for TS, leading to the completion of clearance in Manicaland province during the year.<sup>213</sup> MAG also saw an increase in reduction from 130,507m<sup>2</sup> in 2023 to 305,003m<sup>2</sup> in 2024 due to increased capacity and increased distance between rows from the usual 25-30m up to 100m.<sup>214</sup>

NPA reported reducing a total of 3.8km<sup>2</sup> through TS during 2024 – higher than the 2.4km<sup>2</sup> reported for the organisation by ZIMAC (see Table 9).<sup>215</sup> NPA believes the discrepancy in figures may be due to a difference in the recording of clearance versus reduction, since ZIMAC initially records

land released through a combination of TS and clearance as clearance, then records reduced area as only area that had no work conducted on it.<sup>216</sup> ZIMAC confirms that, in Zimbabwe, reduction is officially recorded upon completion of a sector,<sup>217</sup> and that, whereas international operators may record land released by TS as reduction, ZIMAC considers that any area where a detector has been used must, ultimately, be recorded as clearance.<sup>218</sup>

A total of 223,374m<sup>2</sup> was added to the national database in 2024, due to an adjustment to an original CHA by ZIMAC.<sup>219</sup> This is a decrease on the 166,815m<sup>2</sup> added to the database in 2023, due to expansion of a known CHA.<sup>220</sup>

**Table 9: Release of mined area through TS in 2024<sup>221</sup>**

| Area                                     | Operator | Reported area reduced* (m <sup>2</sup> ) | Operator data (m <sup>2</sup> ) |
|--|----------|--|---------------------------------|
| Mashonaland Central (Musengezi to Mazoe) | HALO     | 3,655                                    | 3,655                           |
| Mashonaland East (Mazoe to Rwenya)       | MAG      | 3,888                                    | 3,888                           |
| Mashonaland East (Nyahuku to Nyamapanda) | NPA      | 173,897                                  | **287,997                       |
| Manicaland (Rusitu to Muzite)            | NPA      | 225,8758                                 | **351,9022                      |
| <b>Totals</b>                            |          | <b>2,440,198</b>                         | <b>3,814,562</b>                |

\*Article 7 report covering 2024. \*\*NPA data.

## CLEARANCE IN 2024

Zimbabwe reports that a total of 1.95km<sup>2</sup> was released through clearance in 2024, with 31,672 AP mines destroyed during TS and clearance, as well as 19 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) (see Table 10).<sup>222</sup> Operators reported the slightly higher number of 31,706 AP mines destroyed during TS and clearance, along with an additional 45 during EOD spot tasks<sup>223</sup> (see Table 11), bringing the total number of AP mines destroyed in 2024 as reported by operators to 31,751. At the time of writing in August 2025, this slight discrepancy had not been resolved, although ZIMAC's use of an Excel spreadsheet to collect all data from operators could involve human error in transcribing data.<sup>224</sup>

NPA reported to Mine Action Review it cleared a total of 310,270m<sup>2</sup> during 2024 – somewhat lower than the 694,139km<sup>2</sup> reported by ZIMAC as cleared by NPA (see Table 10).<sup>225</sup> At the time of writing, in September 2024, the discrepancy had not been explained. NPA suggests it may be due to data lag or a difference in the recording by NPA and ZIMAC of clearance versus reduction. NPA and ZIMAC continue to collaborate to resolve discrepancies and align data.<sup>226</sup>

Overall clearance figures remained stable for Zimbabwe compared to a year earlier, with 1.91km<sup>2</sup> cleared in 2023.<sup>227</sup> APOPO saw a decrease in clearance output from 250,503m<sup>2</sup> in 2023 to 164,516m<sup>2</sup> in 2024, largely due to a reduction from

213 Emails from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025; and Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

214 Emails from Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024 and 11 April 2025.

215 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A; and emails from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April, 16 July, and 1 September 2025; and Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

216 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 1 September 2025.

217 Email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

218 Email from Capt. Mandaba, ZIMAC, 22 September 2025.

219 Email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

220 Email from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 3 June 2024.

221 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A, and emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025; Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April, 14 July, and 20 August 2025; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April, 16 July, and 1 September 2025; Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1, 15, and 18 July 2025; and Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

222 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A; and email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

223 Emails from Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025; Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April and 14 July 2025; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April and 16 July 2025; and Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1, 15, and 18 July 2025.

224 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 16 July 2025.

225 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A, and emails from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April, 16 July, and 1 September 2025; and Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

226 Emails from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April, 16 July, and 1 September 2025.

227 Emails from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 3 June 2024; Mikael Bold, APOPO, 10 June and 9 August 2024; Nokutenda Masiyanise, HALO, 21 June 2024; Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 19 August 2024; Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May and 15 August 2024; and Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 June 2024; and Article 7 report (covering 2023), Form D.

50 deminers down to 36.<sup>228</sup> MAG saw an increase in clearance from 158,195m<sup>2</sup> in 2023 to 202,134m<sup>2</sup> in 2024, due to an increase in capacity early in the year.<sup>229</sup>

ZIMAC reported that all areas cleared in Zimbabwe in 2024 proved to contain AP mines.<sup>230</sup> However, NPA reported

that it released seven sectors that proved to contain no AP mines, but did contain sporadic evidence of previous mine contamination (shrapnel). These areas were addressed with TS, to confirm lack of evidence, and with minimal clearance. The total size of these seven sectors was 1,215,924m<sup>2</sup>.<sup>231</sup>

Table 10: AP mine clearance in 2024<sup>232</sup>

| Area   | Operator | Sectors* cleared | Reported area cleared** (m <sup>2</sup> ) | AP mines destroyed** | UXO destroyed*** |
|--|----------|------------------|---|----------------------|------------------|
| Mashonaland Central (Musengezi to Mazowe) <sup>233</sup>   | HALO     | 4                | 595,394                                   | 24,044               | 11               |
| Mashonaland East (Mazowe to Rwenya)                        | MAG      | 2                | 202,134                                   | 3,832                | 0                |
| Mashonaland East (Nyahuku to Nyamapanda)                   | NPA      | 2                | 141,984                                   | 279                  | 5                |
| Masvingo (Mwenezi to Sango Border Post) (Cordon Sanitaire) | APOPO    | 3                | 232,546                                   | 2,167                | 2                |
| Masvingo (Mwenezi to Sango Border Post) (Cordon Sanitaire) | NMCU     | 3                | 140,649                                   | 1,177                | 0                |
| Manicaland (Rusitu to Muzite)                              | NPA      | 13               | 552,155                                   | 76                   | 1                |
| Matabeleland North (Lusulu)                                | NMCU     | 0                | 83,112                                    | 97                   | 0                |
| Totals   |          | 27               | 1,947,974                                 | 31,672               | 19               |

\*In Zimbabwe, as CHAs are generally relatively large and can take up to several years to complete, each CHA is split into "sectors" to enable more regular release of land.  
\*\*Data in Article 7 report covering 2024. \*\*\*Data in Article 7 report covering 2024. ZIMAC states these 19 UXO were destroyed in EOD spot tasks. However, NPA was the only operator to have reported destroying an item of UXO during EOD spot tasks in 2024 (see Table 11).

Table 11: AP mines destroyed in EOD spot tasks in 2024 (operator data)<sup>234</sup>

| Operator | Area                               | AP mines destroyed | UXO destroyed |
|----------|------------------------------------|--------------------|---------------|
| MAG      | Mashonaland East (Mudzi District)  | 7                  | 0             |
| NPA      | Manicaland (Chipinge)              | 5                  | 1             |
| HALO     | Mashonaland Central (Rushinga)     | 18                 | 0             |
| HALO     | Mashonaland Central (Mount Darwin) | 15                 | 0             |
| Total    |                                    | 45                 | 1             |

228 Email from Mikael Bold, APOPO, 10 June 2024; and Robert Burny, APOPO, 30 April 2025.  
229 Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024 and 11 April 2025.  
230 Email from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.  
231 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025.  
232 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A, and emails from Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025; Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 18 July 2025; Peter Avenell, MAG, 15 July and 20 August 2025; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April, 16 July, and 1 September 2025; Mikael Bold, APOPO, 15 July 2025; Seb Haddock, Operations Manager, HALO, 28 August 2025; Robert Burny, APOPO, 28 August 2025; and Capt. Mandaba, ZIMAC, 22 September 2025.  
233 HALO reports an additional 21,830m<sup>2</sup> cleared in Mashonaland Central (Mount Darwin), with 46 AP mines destroyed. Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 18 July 2025. This discrepancy had not yet been resolved at the time of writing. In the interim, Mine Action Review has used the national authority data in Zimbabwe's Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A.  
234 Emails from Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April and 14 July 2025; Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025; and Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

## DEMINER SAFETY

Four accidents involving deminers were reported in Zimbabwe in 2024, all involving excavation of R2M2 AP mines (see Table 12). This is the same number of accidents as in 2023, all of which similarly involved R2M2 AP mines.<sup>235</sup>

**Table 12: Demining accidents in Zimbabwe in 2024<sup>236</sup>**

| Operator      | Accidents | Activity  | Type of AP mine | Deminers injured |
|---------------|-----------|-----------|-----------------|------------------|
| MAG           | 2         | Clearance | R2M2            | 2                |
| HALO          | 2         | Clearance | R2M2            | 3                |
| <b>Totals</b> | <b>4</b>  |           |                 | <b>5</b>         |

HALO had two accidents in 2024 and conducted detailed internal investigations. The first involved use of an authorised excavation technique of a surface R2M2 mine, resulting in one deminer being injured. The second resulted in minor injuries to two deminers when an R2M2 mine detonated during bound (territorial limit) preparation.<sup>237</sup>

MAG also had two accidents, in which two deminers sustained minor injuries. MAG conducted full internal investigations, supported by HQ, and shared reports with ZIMAC and operators. All have concluded that R2M2 mines should always be mechanically excavated.<sup>238</sup> ZIMAC confirms that all incidents and accidents are investigated in accordance with Zimbabwe's NMAS and guided by the IMAS, with findings and learning always shared across operators.<sup>239</sup>

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE



Under Article 5 of the APMBC (and in accordance with the eight-year extension granted in 2017), Zimbabwe is required to destroy all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2025.<sup>240</sup> It will not meet this deadline and has requested a sixth extension, this time of five years, to 31 December 2030.<sup>241</sup> Zimbabwe cites the main challenges it has faced in meeting its current deadline as; the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and of cyclone Idai, and related withdrawal or reduction of donor funding; insufficient government resources to fully support demining operations; delayed resumption of work by MAG and APOPO at the start of the current extension period; and challenges in re-equipping the NMCU.<sup>242</sup>

In its latest Article 7 report (covering 2024) Zimbabwe notes that, as in previous years, the main risks that could impede progress towards completion are potentially insufficient funding; the heavy rains and risk of flooding experienced in Zimbabwe from November to March each year; and potential changes in the political or economic climate, given that national capacity is dependent on government funding. Zimbabwe does note, however, that the government has continued to prioritise demining in spite of economic challenges in recent years and that the political climate is expected remain "supportive of the initiative until the nation's landmines are removed".<sup>243</sup>

<sup>235</sup> Emails from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 3 June 2024; Mikael Bold, APOPO, 10 June 2024; Nokutenda Masiyanise, HALO, 21 June 2024; Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 19 August 2024 and 1 July 2025; and Peter Avenell, MAG, 24 May 2024 and 11 April 2025.

<sup>236</sup> Emails from Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025; and Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 and 15 July 2025.

<sup>237</sup> Email from Oliver Gerard-Pearse, HALO, 1 July 2025.

<sup>238</sup> Email from Peter Avenell, MAG, 11 April 2025.

<sup>239</sup> Emails from Capt. Patson Mandaba, ZIMAC, 13 April 2023 and 3 June 2024; and Capt. Godwish, ZIMAC, 11 April 2025.

<sup>240</sup> Article 5 Update to the APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 20–22 June 2022, p. 1.

<sup>241</sup> 2025 Article 5 deadline extension Request, p. 6.

<sup>242</sup> Ibid, pp. 12–13.

<sup>243</sup> Article 7 Reports covering 2024, Annex A, p. 38; and covering 2023, Annex A, pp. A-17 to A-18.

There are many consistent strengths in Zimbabwe's mine action programme, including strong national ownership and programme management; a reliable and improving information management system; robust planning; and recent gains in land release efficiency through effective trial and deployment of new technologies. However, the extent to which Zimbabwe can secure additional funding going forward, will most likely be the deciding factor that determines whether Zimbabwe can optimise its strong mine action programme and meet its proposed new Article 5 deadline of 2030.

Table 13: Five-year summary of AP mine clearance

| Year  | Area cleared (km²) |
|-------|--------------------|
| 2024  | 1.95               |
| 2023  | 1.91               |
| 2022  | 2.13               |
| 2021  | 2.44               |
| 2020  | 2.41               |
| Total | 10.84              |

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

On the matter of contamination that might be found after completion of major clearance operations, the Government of Zimbabwe will wholly fund, maintain, and equip the NMCU and military engineering units to be deployed for residual risk mitigation and management, with military engineering units EOD teams stationed in each province.<sup>244</sup> Zimbabwe explains that any individual who identifies a suspected hazardous item will report it to the “nearest police camp”. The police will, in turn, notify the army.<sup>245</sup> All stakeholders were involved in a discussion on the management of the residual contamination at the NSD in 2025.<sup>246</sup> Zimbabwe highlights that, though it will continue clearing for several years to come, this does not prevent it from drawing up a provisional residual risk management plan.<sup>247</sup>

244 "Zimbabwe's Preparations for Capacity to Address Residual Contamination and Demobilisation of Demining Personnel", Lt.-Col. S. Moyo, Coordinator, ZIMAC, February 2025, pp. 5–6; and 2025 Article 5 deadline extension request, p. 39.

245 Responses to "Questions and Clarifications concerning the Request for Extension submitted by Zimbabwe, Committee on Article 5 Implementation", undated but published on APBMC website on 6 August 2025, p. 8.

246 Email from Miroslav Pisarevic, NPA, 11 April 2025.

247 "Zimbabwe's Preparations for Capacity to Address Residual Contamination and Demobilisation of Demining Personnel" Lt.-Col. S. Moyo, Coordinator, ZIMAC, February 2025, p. 4.