Mali

Efforts to establish a Mine Action Unit within the National Commission against the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (CNLPAL) were not successful in 2024, although institutional progress has been made. The draft proposal was expected to be adopted by the Council of Ministers by the end of August, but has not been approved as at early September 2025. For the first time since 2005, Mali submitted an Article 7 report in 2024, acknowledging contamination from improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including mines of an improvised nature, and explosive remnants of war (ERW). At the June 2025 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) intersessional meetings, Mali announced plans to submit an Article 5 deadline extension request by March 2026, which is a positive development.

The military coups in 2020 and 2021, followed by a reshuffling of Mali’s regional and international alliances, led to the withdrawal of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in 2023 and an end to United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) peacekeeping operations after a decade operating in the country. At the request of Mali, UNMAS returned in October 2024, but was forced to shut down in April 2025 due to lack of funding. Since MINUSMA’s exit, only the Malian Armed Forces’ explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams have been authorised to detect and neutralise explosive threats. Amid escalating conflict, humanitarian actors are prohibited from conducting non-technical survey (NTS) or clearance and are limited to community liaison, ERW marking (when security permits), risk education, and victim assistance.

• Mali should follow through on its plans and seek a new Article 5 deadline in order to return to compliance with the APMBC.

• Mali should proceed with establishing a national mine action authority (NMAA) and a national structure to coordinate mine action operations.

• Mali should resume operation of its Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database and ensure systematic collection of data and reporting on explosive ordnance incidents and casualties, disaggregating anti- personnel (AP) mines of an improvised nature from other types of improvised explosive devices. An improvised anti-vehicle (AV) mine sensitive enough to be detonated by a person should be recorded as an improvised AP mine.

• When circumstances allow, Mali should develop a civilian mine clearance capacity in addition to the military counter-IED operations.

Click here to download the "Clearing the Mines 2025" report for Mali.