Ukraine

Cluster Munition Remnants

Anti-Personnel Mines

  • Article 5 deadline

    1 December 2033

  • Performance

    Poor

Performance Criterion Score
Understanding of anti-personnel mine contamination (20% of overall score) 5
National ownership and programme management (10% of overall score) 6
Gender (10% of overall score) 2
Information management and reporting (10% of overall score) 5
Planning and tasking (10% of overall score) 3
Land release system (20% of overall score) 5
Land release outputs and Article 5 compliance (20% of overall score) 5
Performance score 4.6

Key Developments

From the outset of its attack against Ukraine that began in late February 2022, Russia’s armed forces have extensively used anti-personnel (AP) mines on Ukrainian territory. At least 13 different types of AP mines have been used by Russia since the beginning of its attack, including a recently developed variant with a sensor fuze that is exceedingly difficult to clear safely. Russian forces have also emplaced mines of an improvised nature as they have retreated from their early positions in the war.

In serious violation of its obligations to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APBMC), Ukraine used AP mines in 2022 in the city of Izium while it was under Russian control. Ukraine did not directly refute the allegations use of AP mines. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces have also used at least 13 types of anti-vehicle mines. The Ukrainian authorities have been clearing some contamination soon after use, and by the end of 2022, had disposed of several thousand items of explosive ordnance, including landmines.

Ukraine’s National Mne Action Authority (NMAA) assumed its full responsibilities in 2022. The two national mine action centres, one operating under the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and other under the Ministry of Interior (MoI), became fully operational in 2022. New international operators started operations in 2022: DanChurchAid (DCA), Humanity & Inclusion (HI), Mines Advisory Group (MAG). Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) received its accreditation in 2023.

Ukraine was not on track to meet its extended APMBC Article 5 deadline of 1 December 2023 even before the renewed use of AP mines. In June 2023, Ukraine requested a new ten-year extension to its current APMBC Article 5 deadline, but following comments from the Committee on Implementation of Article 5, said that it does not object to reducing the extension period to five years. The new contamination and ongoing hostilities mean that Ukraine will face many years (or potentially decades) of clearance in order to fulfil its treaty obligations.


Recommendations for Action

  • Ukraine should immediately halt the use of AP mines.
  • Ukraine should investigate the use of AP mines by its armed forces and report back to the States Parties to the APMBC in all transparency.
  • Ukraine should simplify its mine action coordination and management structures in order to allow an efficient and effective demining response.
  • Ukraine should develop a mine action strategy in line with government and local authorities assessment and needs.
  • Given the increasing number of mine action actors, organisations, and commercial companies, Ukraine should improve coordination of the work of the numerous operators.
  • Ukraine should unknot its administrative processes and grant operators the permissions to use explosives in clearance and destruction operations as well as subsequent accreditation to conduct explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).
  • Ukraine should continue exploring of the use of drones as means to increase the efficiency of non-technical survey (NTS), and to the extent possible, deploy them on areas suspected of contamination immediately after it regains control over its territories.

Download the full "Clearing the Mines 2023" report for Ukraine

Click here to download the "Clearing the Mines 2023" report for Ukraine.